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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis concerns with intelligent autonomous software agents that populate open 
computational environments, in which they interact for various purposes, e.g. competitively in the case 
of auctions or resource allocation problems, collaboratively in the case of distributed problem solving 
or parallel processing, joint planning, etc. We use the term open to characterize a computational 
environment in Hewitt’s sense, that is to describe an environment that is dynamic, continuous, 
unobservable (or, at best, partially observable) and non-deterministic. 
Agents in such environments possess, unavoidably, information that is incomplete, imprecise, 
maybe even incorrect, due to the very fact that the environment is open and, at the very least, agents 
join and leave it as they please. The information exchanged between agents may be delayed, or 
distorted by noise during its communication, and in any case, as the environment evolves, it is bound 
to change. 
The interactions among agents in any multi-agent system are typically governed by norms. These 
may refer to restrictions on communication means among agents, or to particular coordination 
mechanisms, liveness and safety properties of the system etc. In some application areas, such as e-
commerce, additional norms may regulate the agents’ behaviours, resulting from agreements into 
which the agents enter willingly, and possibly from the protocol that governs the e-market. Norms 
prescribe what each agent is obliged, permitted, prohibited, empowered and so on, to do during its life 
in the particular environment. Autonomous agents decide for themselves which norms to subject itself 
to and whether to comply with the norms of their environment. This decision-making is all the more 
challenging when an agent has to perform it in circumstances where its available knowledge is 
incomplete/imprecise/incorrect.  
This thesis addresses the need and requirement for common-sense reasoning agents in open 
computational environments. We discuss and illustrate our proposals with reference to an e-commerce 
example. First, based on the example scenario, we identify the requirements for the representation of 
the norms that govern the environment and the specifications for the environment itself. Nevertheless, 
our proposals are generally applicable to any case where multiple agents interact and their interaction 
is governed by some contract as a coordination or collaboration mechanism.  
Primarily, this thesis examines and motivates the need of agents to fill in information gaps by 
resorting to assumptions. Agents need to be able to identify and use assumptions dynamically, in any 
open computational environment, as well as in the particular application context of an e-commerce 
example. We present a novel approach to dynamic assumption identification and hypothetical non-
monotonic reasoning inspired by the syntax and semantics of Default Logic, without however resorting 
to proof, which is notably computationally hard. We discuss in detail what distinguishes our approach 
from other work on dynamic assumption based reasoning, namely i.e., we do not resort to a pre-
specified pool of assumptions, nor to goal-orientation as a means to identify candidate assumptions. In 
this way, we claim, an agent is autonomous in deciding which assumptions are appropriate, given its 
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knowledge-hypotheses requirements at any given time. We propose symbolic and schematic 
representations to characterize formally the possible knowledge-hypotheses status of an agent, and we 
use their properties to characterize their dynamics. From these formal characterizations we derive and 
present the algorithms that support our approach, which we have implemented in a prototype. 
Moreover, this thesis addresses other issues of common-sense reasoning agency, such as the need 
for temporal reasoning and reasoning about actions and their effects or the need for normative conflict 
management. Ιt is expected that in realistic scenaria an agent will find itself in a situation where it 
needs to establish, for itself or other agents, what is obliged (permitted, prohibited, empowered etc.) to 
do at a given point in time; to determine whether, itself or other agents, comply with the agreement; 
whether deviation is detected from the prescribed behaviour, to determine what, if any, remedial 
mechanisms might return the transaction to a normal course; and finally, to establish which norms 
apply or what holds at a given time point, because multiple, possibly conflicting, norms apply. 
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ΠΕΡΙΛΗΨΗ 
 
 
Η παρούσα διατριβή αφορά στους ευφυείς και αυτόνομους πράκτορες λογισμικού ως μέλη ενός 
ανοιχτού υπολογιστικού περιβάλλοντος, στο πλαίσιο του οποίου αλληλεπιδρούν με διάφορους 
σκοπούς, για παράδειγμα, ανταγωνιστικά στην περίπτωση δημοπρασίας ή προβλημάτων κατανομής 
πόρων, συνεργατικά στην περίπτωση κατανεμημένης επίλυσης προβλημάτων, συντονισμένου 
σχεδιασμού ενεργειών κ.α. Χρησιμοποιούμε τον όρο ανοιχτό για να χαρακτηρίσουμε ένα 
υπολογιστικό περιβάλλον κατά την έννοια που αποδόθηκε από τον Hewitt, δηλαδή ένα περιβάλλον 
δυναμικό, συνεχές, μη παρατηρήσιμο (ή, στην βέλτιστη περίπτωση, μερικώς παρατηρήσιμο) και μη 
αιτιοκρατικό. 
Σε αυτού του είδους τα περιβάλλοντα, οι πράκτορες, αναπόφευκτα, κατέχουν πληροφορία η οποία 
είναι μη πλήρης, μη ακριβής, και ίσως, μη ορθή, εξαιτίας του γεγονότος πως το περιβάλλον είναι 
ανοιχτό, και στην ελάχιστη περίπτωση, οι πράκτορες εισέρχονται και αποχωρούν από το περιβάλλον 
κατά βούληση. Η πληροφορία που ανταλλάσσεται μεταξύ των πρακτόρων μπορεί να καθυστερεί ή να 
στρεβλώνεται από θόρυβο κατά τη διάρκεια της επικοινωνίας, και σε κάθε περίπτωση, καθώς το 
περιβάλλον εξελίσσεται, η πληροφορία αλλάζει κατ’ ανάγκη. 
Οι αλληλεπιδράσεις μεταξύ των πρακτόρων σε ένα πολύ-πρακτορικό σύστημα, συνήθως, 
ελέγχονται από κανόνες. Αυτοί μπορεί να αναφέρονται σε περιορισμούς των μέσων επικοινωνίας 
μεταξύ των πρακτόρων, σε ιδιαίτερους μηχανισμούς συντονισμού, στην ασφάλεια του συστήματος 
κ.α. Σε μερικές περιοχές εφαρμογής, όπως το ηλεκτρονικό εμπόριο, μπορεί ενδεχομένως, 
επιπρόσθετοι κανόνες να διέπουν τη συμπεριφορά των πρακτόρων, οι οποίοι προκύπτουν από 
συμφωνίες στην οποίες ο πράκτορας εισέρχεται κατά βούληση, και πιθανώς από πρωτόκολλα τα οποία 
διέπουν την ηλεκτρονική αγορά. Οι κανόνες υπαγορεύουν στους πράκτορες τι υποχρεούνται, 
επιτρέπεται, απαγορεύεται, έχουν εξουσιοδότηση κ.α., να πράξουν κατά τη διάρκεια της παρουσίας 
τους στο συγκεκριμένο περιβάλλον. Οι αυτόνομοι πράκτορες αποφασίζουν για τον εαυτό τους σε 
ποιούς κανόνες υπάγονται και εάν θα υπακούουν στους κανόνες τους περιβάλλοντος τους. Αυτή η 
απόφαση αποτελεί, ακόμα μεγαλύτερη πρόκληση, όταν οι πράκτορες θα πρέπει να τη λάβουν σε 
συνθήκες όπου κατέχουν πληροφορία μη πλήρη/μη ακριβή/μη ορθή.  
Αυτή η διατριβή ασχολείται με την ανάγκη και την απαίτηση για πράκτορες κοινής λογικής στα 
ανοικτά υπολογιστικά περιβάλλοντα. Συζητάμε και απεικονίζουμε τις προτάσεις μας αναφορικά με 
ένα παράδειγμα ηλεκτρονικού εμπορίου. Αρχικά, βάση του πρότυπου σεναρίου, καθορίζουμε τις 
απαιτήσεις για την αναπαράσταση των κανόνων που διέπουν το περιβάλλον και τις προδιαγραφές του 
περιβάλλοντος καθαυτού. Ωστόσο, οι προτάσεις μας είναι γενικότερα εφαρμόσιμες σε κάθε 
περίπτωση όπου πολλαπλοί πράκτορες αλληλεπιδρούν και οι αλληλεπιδράσεις τους καθορίζονται από 
μια συμφωνία που δρα ως μηχανισμός συνεργασίας και συντονισμού.  
Πρωτίστως, η διατριβή εξετάζει και αποτελεί κίνητρο της ανάγκης των πρακτόρων να καλύψουν 
κενά στην πληροφορία που κατέχουν μέσω υποθέσεων. Οι πράκτορες οφείλουν να είναι ικανοί να 
προσδιορίζουν και να χρησιμοποιούν υποθέσεις δυναμικά, σε κάθε ανοιχτό υπολογιστικό περιβάλλον, 
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όπως και στο συγκεκριμένο πλαίσιο εφαρμογής του παραδείγματος του ηλεκτρονικού εμπορίου. 
Παρουσιάζουμε μια νέα προσέγγιση στο δυναμικό προσδιορισμό των υποθέσεων και τον υποθετικό 
μη-μονότονο συλλογισμό, η οποία είναι εμπνευσμένη από το συντακτικό και της σημασιολογία της 
Λογικής Προεπιλογής, χωρίς όμως να καταφεύγουμε στην αποδεικτική διαδικασία, η οποία είναι 
υπολογιστικά, αξιοσημείωτα, δύσκολη. Συζητούμε με λεπτομέρειες τους παράγοντες που διακρίνουν 
την προσέγγιση μας από άλλες προσεγγίσεις, συγκεκριμένα δεν καταφεύγουμε σε προκαθορισμένα 
σύνολα υποθέσεων, ούτε χρησιμοποιούμε τους στόχους ενός πράκτορα ως μέσο προσδιορισμού των 
υποθέσεων του. Με αυτό τον τρόπο, ισχυριζόμαστε πως, ο πράκτορας είναι αυτόνομος στην απόφασή 
του για το ποιες υποθέσεις είναι κατάλληλες, βάση των απαιτήσεων του σε γνώση-υποθέσεις σε κάθε 
χρονική στιγμή. Προτείνουμε συμβολικές και σχηματικές αναπαραστάσεις για να χαρακτηρίσουμε 
τυπικά την πιθανή κατάσταση γνώσης-υποθέσεων του πράκτορα, και χρησιμοποιούμε τις ιδιότητες 
αυτών για να χαρακτηρίσουμε τη δυναμική τους. Για αυτούς τους τυπικούς χαρακτηρισμούς 
σχεδιάζουμε και παρουσιάζουμε αλγορίθμους οι οποίοι υποστηρίζουν την προσέγγιση μας, την οποία 
έχουμε υλοποιήσει σε ένα πρωτότυπο. 
Επιπλέον, η διατριβή αυτή ασχολείται και με άλλα θέματα της κοινής λογικής των πρακτόρων, 
όπως την ανάγκη για χρονικό συλλογισμό και συλλογισμό σχετικά με τις ενέργειες και το αποτέλεσμα 
αυτών ή τη διαχείριση των κανονιστικών συγκρούσεων. Είναι αναμενόμενο, σε πραγματικά σενάρια, 
ο πράκτορας να βρεθεί σε θέση όπου θα έχει την ανάγκη να καθορίσει, για τον ίδιο ή άλλους 
πράκτορες, τι είναι υποχρεωτικό (επιτρεπτό, απαγορευμένο, θεσμικά ισχύον κ.α.) να πράξει σε 
δεδομένη χρονική στιγμή, να καθορίσει εάν, ο ίδιος ή άλλοι πράκτορες, συμμορφώνονται με τη 
συμφωνία, και εάν παρατηρηθεί απόκλιση από την υπαγορευμένη συμπεριφορά, να καθορίσει ποιος, 
εάν υπάρχει, θεραπευτικός μηχανισμός θα μπορούσε να επιστρέψει τη συναλλαγή στην κανονική 
πορεία, και εν τέλει, να καθορίσει ποίοι κανόνες πυροδοτούν ή τι ισχύει τη δεδομένη χρονική στιγμή, 
διότι πολλαπλοί, πιθανώς αλληλοσυγκρουόμενοι, κανόνες θα εφαρμόζονται. 
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One does not discover new lands 
without consenting 
to lose sight of the shore for 
 a very long time.1,2 
 
André Gide  
Κανείς δεν ανακαλύπτει νέα εδάφη 
αν δεν είναι πρόθυμος 
να απομακρυνθεί από την ακτή 
 για μεγάλο χρονικό διάστημα.  
  
Αντρέ Ζιντ 
 
                                                 
1 L. Minkin, Exits and Entrances: Political Research as a Creative Art, Sheffield Hallam University 
Press, 1997 
2 P. Dunleay, Authoring a PhD. How to plan, draft, write and finish a Doctoral Thesis or Dessertetion, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003   
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1 Introduction 
An observation on the recent call for papers either for international conferences or 
special issues in scientific journals in the broader area of Artificial Intelligence and 
Computer Science signifies a wide and intense interest on issues such as: 
• Heterogeneous and dynamic systems. The Web and the Multi-agent 
Systems are two characteristic examples, though not the only ones, of such 
environments. 
• Autonomous and rational decision making, action and behaviour of 
system components. Commercial and business applications and 
applications on virtual communities are some characteristic examples 
where the need of such reasoning is essential. 
• Self-knowledge, self-regulation, self-organization and self-management. 
Autonomic or Ubiquitous Computing and Adaptive Systems are 
characteristic examples that behave in this manner. 
This thesis addresses such requirements by presenting representation and 
reasoning approaches and techniques for autonomous rational agents consisting in 
open computational environments that are governed by norms. 
This chapter is organized as follows: section 1.1 describes the motivation of this 
work; section 1.2 presents the objectives of this thesis and it discusses briefly its 
contributions; section 1.3, provides a brief introduction to the major definitions and 
considerations that are either adopted or proposed in this thesis; finally, section 1.4 
provides an outline of the rest of this thesis. 
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1.1 Motivation 
This thesis concerns with symbolic knowledge representations and common-sense 
reasoning techniques for intelligent autonomous software agents that populate open 
computational environments. An environment is characterized as open, in Hewitt’s 
sense [118], when it is dynamic, continuous, unobservable or partially observable and 
non-deterministic.  
Agents is such environments possess, unavoidably, information that is 
incomplete, imprecise, maybe even incorrect, due to the very fact that the 
environment is open and, at the very least, agents join and leave it as they please. The 
information exchanged between agents may be delayed, or distorted by noise during 
its communication, and in any case, as the environment evolves, it is bound to 
change. 
The interactions among agents in any multi-agent system are typically governed 
by norms. These may refer to restrictions on communication means among agents, or 
to particular coordination mechanisms, liveness and safety properties of the system 
etc. In some application areas, such as e-commerce, additional norms may regulate 
the agents’ behaviours, resulting from agreements into which the agents enter 
willingly, and possibly from the protocol that governs the e-market. Norms prescribe 
what each agent is obliged, permitted, prohibited, empowered and so on, to do during 
its life in the particular environment. Autonomous agents decide for themselves 
which norms to subject itself to and whether to comply with the norms of their 
environment. This decision-making is all the more challenging when an agent has to 
perform it in circumstances where its available knowledge is 
incomplete/imprecise/incorrect.  
As a result, the specific characteristics of such environments comprise the 
motivation of the work presented in this thesis. Particularly, in such environments: 
• An agent will need to establish at a given time point, the state of its 
transaction with other agents, in order to check and regulate its own 
behaviour with respect to the commitments it has engaged itself towards 
other agents, and plan its activities accordingly.  
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• It is expected that agents will find themselves in a situation where 
multiple, possibly conflicting, norms apply. The agent will need some way 
to detect that such conflicts exist, so that subsequently, it may deploy 
some resolution mechanism, in order to infer what it should do at a given 
point in time. 
• Unavoidably in open environments agents have incomplete knowledge 
about their world, and about other agents, yet they must somehow plan 
their activities, and they must somehow preserve their autonomy and 
rationality, i.e. decide for themselves which behaviour serves their private 
or shared goals in the best way. We believe that the degree of agent 
autonomy is related to the extent to which an agent is ‘free’ to make 
assumptions about anything it does not know about, either these concern 
the future or the past and present. We see that, it is essential to support, 
first, dynamic assumption identification and usage, without a priori 
restrictions on the agent, and without resorting to proof, which is 
prohibitive computationally, and second, non-monotonicity when 
information that becomes available at some time point confirms or 
disproves assumptions made at previous times, and consequently 
conclusions drawn on their basis. 
1.2 Objectives 
This thesis addresses the need and requirement of agents for common-sense 
reasoning and knowledge representation in open computational environments. We 
discuss and illustrate our proposals with reference to an e-commerce example 
scenario, although our proposals are generally applicable to any case where multiple 
agents interact and their interaction is governed by some contract as a coordination or 
collaboration mechanism. 
First, we aim to analyse the application area and to specify requirements for both 
knowledge representation and reasoning with norms that govern the environment. 
Towards this scope we identify several specifications that the environment and its 
components should meet. The rest of this thesis, concerns either with addressing 
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directly some of these requirements via the introduction of novel approaches for 
representation and novel techniques for reasoning or with discussing the way our 
proposals are also capable in addressing other requirements. Through this attempt we 
have surveyed related literature. Thus, a critical review of other research approaches 
towards e-contracting, dynamics of logic theories, hypothetical reasoning, non-
monotonic reasoning and autonomous reasoning is presented throughout this work.    
Primarily, this thesis aims to examine and motivate the need of agents to fill in 
information gaps by resorting to assumptions. Agents need to be able to identify and 
use assumptions dynamically, in any open computational environment, as well as in 
the particular application context of an e-commerce example. Towards this scope, we 
present a novel approach to dynamic assumption identification and hypothetical non-
monotonic reasoning inspired by the syntax and semantics of Default Logic, without 
however resorting to proof, which is notably computationally hard. We discuss in 
detail what distinguishes our approach from other work on dynamic assumption based 
reasoning, namely that we do not resort to a pre-specified pool of assumptions, nor to 
goal-orientation as a means to identify candidate assumptions. We, also, propose 
symbolic and schematic representations to characterize formally the possible 
knowledge-hypotheses status and knowledge-hypotheses space of an agent, and we 
use their properties to characterize their dynamics. From these formal 
characterizations we derive and present the algorithms that support our approach, 
which we have implemented in a prototype. Furthermore, we concern, particularly, 
with the management of an agent’s knowledge/hypotheses space and reasoning 
procedure. In this way, we claim, an agent, first, is autonomous in deciding which 
assumptions are appropriate to fill in information gaps, and, second, is rational in its 
reasoning, given its knowledge-hypotheses requirements at any given time. 
Moreover, this thesis aims to address other issues of common-sense reasoning 
agency, such as the need for temporal reasoning and reasoning about actions and their 
effects or the need for normative conflict management. Ιt is expected that in realistic 
scenaria an agent will find itself in a situation where it needs to establish, for itself or 
other agents, what is obliged (permitted, prohibited, empowered etc.) to do at a given 
point in time; to determine whether, itself or other agents, comply with the 
agreement; whether deviation is detected from the prescribed behaviour, to determine 
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what, if any, remedial mechanisms might return the transaction to a normal course; 
and finally, to establish which norms apply or what holds at a given time point, 
because multiple, possibly conflicting, norms apply. To this end, we claim and show 
how our proposals towards hypothetical non-monotonic reasoning, first, facilitate 
conflict management, i.e. conflict detection and resolution, and, second, is capable for 
reasoning with time, actions and deontic modalities.  
To sum up, this thesis aims to address the requirement for reasoning in open 
environments by presenting a proposal where agents: have self-knowledge of the 
limits of their knowledge; are capable of self-regulation, i.e. to develop for 
themselves the norms according to which they regulate their behaviour; and are, also, 
capable of self-management, i.e. to make their own reasoning and to rely on their own 
knowledge and strategy. 
1.3 Introductory Definitions and Considerations 
Autonomous Agents: In this thesis we take the most recent perspective on 
autonomy and address it relevant to an agent’s reasoning process, within the context 
of an open computational system. In this context, our agent is expected to make 
inferences about which beliefs to adopt about its environment, other agents and norms 
in force, which goals to commit to, and which actions to perform, in the presence of 
incomplete or inconsistent information, and it is expected to be independent from 
external intervention in this reasoning process. Specifically, in this thesis we examine 
the relation between an agent’s ability to identify and employ assumptions 
independently, and its autonomy. We claim that an agent that answers the reasoning 
problem, addresses also the autonomy problem and present techniques that enable 
agents to ‘develop for themselves the laws and strategies according to which they 
regulate their behaviour (in the spirit of [234]) and to ‘make their own inferences and 
reasoning and to rely on their own conclusions’ (in the spirit of [40]). A detailed 
discussion is available in chapters 2 and 7. 
Open Multi-agent Systems: In this thesis, our motivation is influenced by 
Hewitt’s and de Jong’s work on Open Systems. They see agents that [122]:  
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“…need to have self-knowledge in order to function 
effectively in Open Systems in order to understand its own 
abilities as well as the limits of its knowledge and power. As 
knowledge is added incrementally to a subsystem, it must 
relate the new knowledge to its existing knowledge. Any 
subsystem can have only partial knowledge of the overall 
system, and partial power to affect other subsystems.”  
 
We accept, that agents in Open Multi-agent Systems possess, unavoidably, 
incomplete information about the environment and other agents in it, have self-
knowledge of the limits of their knowledge and need to reason in the presence of 
information gaps via self-management and self-regulation. A detailed discussion is 
available in chapter 2 and 7. 
Operational Computation of Extensions: In this thesis, in order to facilitate 
common-sense reasoning in an open world where the environment and whatever is 
associated with it are matters of continuous change, we do not require or expect from 
the agent to either accept worlds that belong to the distance future or reject them, in 
advance. It seems rational and realistic to us, to require from an agent to reason in a 
process-oriented and step-wise manner and on the basis of its current knowledge and 
some plausible and rational assumptions. Such an agent would compute all possible 
worlds, examine the state that these worlds reveal (consistent/inconsistent, 
rational/irrational, eligible/non-eligible, desirable/non-desirable etc) and finally 
decide to either to follow or not a specific course of action. In other words, we see 
that common-sense reasoning in open computational systems calls for an iterative 
reasoning process where the agent gains knowledge about its current state in the 
available world, commit itself to this world, produce entailments either on factual or 
on hypothetical basis and re-examine its world for any changes due to exogenous or 
endogenous factors. A detailed discussion is available in chapters 3 and 5. 
Open Default Assumption: The Open Default Assumption is the presumption 
that the truth-value of a statement that is not currently known may considered to be 
true if this does not cause an inconsistent view of the world. It refers, not only, to the 
ability of agents to identify and employ assumptions dynamically, on the basis of 
their current knowledge, but also to their ability to manage their inference on the 
basis of these assumptions and any available knowledge at previous or future time 
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points. It is inspired by the syntax and semantics of DfL and uses some of its several 
variations along with Dynamic Default Logic, i.e. a variation of DfL presented here, 
towards dynamic hypothetical non-monotonic reasoning. A detailed discussion is 
available in chapter 5. 
Dynamic Default Logic: Dynamic Default Logic accepts the Open Default 
Assumption. With Dynamic Default Logic it is possible to reformulate, appropriately 
and when needed, the initially given rules. As a result, inferencing is possible on a 
totally hypothetical basis via the dynamic identification and employment of 
appropriate candidate assumptions, i.e. extended versions of extensions are possible 
to be computed. A detailed discussion is available in chapter 5. 
e-Contracts: The term contract is used to refer both to a legally binding 
agreement between two or more parties and to the document that records such an 
agreement. A contract creates mutual legal relations between the parties involved and 
determines what actions are obligatory/permissible/forbidden to be performed by the 
parties. The term e-contract is used to refer to the electronic document that is 
determined by reference to an individual computer-generation transaction. The term 
e-contracting is used to encompass all activities concerned with this transaction and 
e-contracts [9, 54, 150]. The whole contractual life cycle comprises of two different 
phases, namely contract formation and contract performance. In this thesis we 
broadly refer to three application sub-areas, where electronic agreements play a 
central role: e-commerce, i.e. purchase contracts, business process modelling and 
automation, i.e. cooperation contracts, and virtual communities, i.e. social contracts. 
A detailed discussion is available in chapters 2 and 4. 
1.4 Thesis Outline 
This thesis consists of four core sections. The first section, i.e. chapters 2 and 3, 
provides a review of the background of this work. In chapter 2, we discuss intelligent 
agents, multi-agent interactions, and the systems where agents interact. These systems 
are considered as open computational environments that are governed by norms. In 
chapter 3, we discuss logic languages and reasoning patterns that we exercise in this 
thesis in order to address the issue of common-sense reasoning in open norm- 
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governed multi-agent environments. Moreover, during this review we also discuss 
research questions that arise in these settings and motivate our viewpoint. 
The next sections present the main contributions of this thesis. Specifically, the 
second section, i.e. chapter 4, provides an analysis of the application area of this 
thesis. First, we introduce several example scenaria of this area. These examples 
motivate a discussion about the requirements and specifications for common-sense 
reasoning in open environments, and to this end we introduce and discuss a list of 
requirements for representation languages and specifications for the development of 
tools. This chapter concludes, with a critical review on previous logic-based 
approaches towards e-contract modelling and performance monitoring. 
The third section, i.e. chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8, introduces our approach to common-
sense reasoning with incomplete knowledge. In chapter 5, we discuss the reasoning 
problem by identifying several research questions, and our viewpoint for reasoning 
within the context of open environments. Chapter 6 presents a first approach to 
assumption-based reasoning in open normative systems and discusses issues towards 
implementation by presenting algorithms and a prototype. Chapter 7 discusses the 
limitations of the first approach and presents a second one towards autonomous 
hypothetical non-monotonic reasoning. This chapter, mainly concerns with the 
management of an agent’s knowledge space and reasoning procedure. We claim that, 
in this way we enhance the agent’s autonomous and rational behaviour and enable its 
reasoning within open environments when it possesses incomplete knowledge. 
Finally, chapter 8 consists of a critical review on various approaches, found in the 
literature, and the way these approaches address the issues discussed in the previous 
chapters 5, 6 and 7, such as the dynamics of logic theories, assumption-based 
reasoning, non-monotonic reasoning, and autonomous agency. 
The fourth section, i.e. chapters 9 and 10, explain the way our primary proposal 
on hypothetical non-monotonic reasoning is also suitable to address other various 
issues of interest, such as conflict management and temporal reasoning. Specifically, 
in chapter 9, we address the agent’s need to detect normative conflicts and to deploy 
some resolution mechanism, in order to infer what it should do at a given point in 
time. Chapter 10 discusses how our proposal facilitates temporal reasoning, reasoning 
about actions and their effects and reasoning with deontic modalities. 
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Finally, chapter 11 provides a summary and discussion of the thesis core chapters, 
presents a listed view of the contributions of this thesis and its relation to other 
research approaches, and concludes with directions for future research on both 
theoretical and practical issues discussed in this thesis. 
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2 Artificial Intelligence, Agency 
and Law 
2.1 Introduction 
Russell and Norvig in [215] note about the different fields of Artificial 
Intelligence (AI): 
 
“The main unifying thing is the idea of an intelligent agent. 
We define AI as the study of agents that receive percepts 
from the environment and perform action.” 
 
The notion that relates agents with AI is rationality. Various definitions for AI 
where based on this relation [215]: 
• “The study of mental faculties through the use of computational models.” 
[42] 
• “The study of the computations that make it possible to perceive, reason 
and act.” [253] 
• “Computational Intelligence is the study of the design of intelligent 
agents.” [197] 
• “AI … is concerned with intelligent behaviour in artifacts.” [186]  
In the next sections we discuss rational agents (or, in other words, intelligent 
agents), multi-agent interactions, and the environments where agents interact. We see 
agent environments as open systems that are governed by norms and discuss research 
questions that arise in these settings.  
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2.2 Intelligent Agents and Multi-agent Systems 
The concept of autonomy is central to the notion of agent-hood and has been 
addressed by many researchers in the AI community. Wooldridge and Jennings in 
[255, 254] note: 
 
“An agent is a computer system that is situated in some 
environment and that is capable of autonomous action in this 
environment in order to meet its design objectives.” 
 
This definition reflects various properties of software agents. An agent perceives 
the environment in which it is situated, and interacts with it by performing certain 
actions towards its design goals. Additionally, following this definition, results that a 
rational agent is an agent that does the “right thing” given what it knows [215].  
Of course, agents interact with other agents. Today’s AI, i.e. Distributed Artificial 
Intelligent (DAI), concerns with the study and the applications of Multi-agent 
Systems (MAS). A MAS is an electronic society of software agents which 
communicate and interact with each other. Each agent (or, groups of agents) 
represents/acts on behalf of different representatives, i.e. agents have different roles. 
This means that, agents may have the same interests and act in cooperation, or may 
have different (possible conflicting) interests and act as competitors. In both cases 
interactions and goal achievement requires negotiation. Moreover, in such 
environments, agents may need to be equipped with higher utilities (utility factor) 
beside their goals, or even with what is called an internal state, i.e. beliefs, desires 
and intentions (BDI). 
2.2.1 Autonomy in the context of Agency 
Etymologically the term ‘autonomy’ (auto=self + nomos=law) refers to the ability 
of an entity to choose its own norms and regulate its own behaviour accordingly. In 
common usage the term ‘autonomy’ is defined as the quality or state of being self-
governing (especially the right of self-government), self-directing freedom (especially 
moral independence), and a self-directing state [67]. Since autonomy is a key 
characteristic of an agent, all researchers in the MAS community address this issue. A 
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
09/12/2017 01:19:12 EET - 137.108.70.7
Symbolic Representations and Common-sense Reasoning in Open Multi-agent Systems
 
 17
 
study of the relevant literature during the past twenty years, suggests that autonomy 
has been examined from various perspectives, initially in relation to an agent’s goals, 
and more recently in relation to an agent’s reasoning. Specifically, in [21, 32, 78, 168, 
255, 160, 169, 38, 40, 161, 18, 224] autonomy is defined as freedom from external 
intervention or control, where ‘external’ refers to humans and/or other agents. In early 
work [78, 81, 160] this freedom from external intervention is specifically examined in 
relation to an agent’s ability to choose its own goals and to act towards them 
independently. Barber and Martin in [19] distinguish external interventions that affect 
an agent’s environment, from those that affect its beliefs, and moreover from those 
that affect its decision-making process, and consider independence from the latter ‘as 
the most salient dimension of the concept of autonomy’; according to Barber and 
Martin an agent’s decision-making process establishes how the agent should pursue a 
particular goal, i.e. it is action-oriented. Castelfranchi [40] and Verhagen [246] take a 
more general view of autonomy and relate it to an agent’s reasoning, i.e. to its ability 
to make its own inferences and to rely on its own conclusions, where such inferences 
may result in choosing an action to perform, or a belief or goal to adopt, or 
establishing and evaluating motives for a particular course of action. Moreover, 
Castelfranchi [39] considers the concept of initiative as important and relevant to an 
agent’s autonomy. Finally, in [50, 247] autonomy is examined in relation to an 
agent’s ability to choose which norms to subject itself to, and to decide whether to 
comply with them or not. 
In this thesis we take the most recent perspective on autonomy and address it 
relevant to an agent’s reasoning process, within the context of an open system. In this 
context, our agent is expected to make inferences about which beliefs to adopt about 
its environment, other agents and norms in force, which goals to commit to, and 
which actions to perform, in the presence of incomplete or inconsistent information, 
and it is expected to be independent from external intervention in this reasoning 
process. A detailed discussion is available in chapters 5 and 7. 
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
09/12/2017 01:19:12 EET - 137.108.70.7
2. Artificial Intelligence, Agency and Law
 
 18 
2.2.2 Open Systems 
Open Systems (OS), in the sense of Hewitt and colleagues [122, 123, 118, 119, 
120, 121], that consist mainly of computers, users and software, are characterized of 
the following properties: 
• Continuous Change and Evolution: Always new components, such as 
computers, users and software are being added in the systems. Thus, 
systems should be able to change their components and even more 
important, to evolve their components in order to perform their work. 
• Asynchrony and Late Arriving Information: Asynchrony enables the 
components to operate on the basis of local circumstances. When late-
arriving information becomes available, components are able to take into 
account the new information and affect their decision making process. 
• Inconsistent Information: Information that becomes available to the 
components, either form outside or from inside the system, may be 
inconsistent. 
• Arm’s-length relationships: The internal operation, organization and 
state of computers, users and software are not always known to other 
computers, users and software.     
• Decentralized control: The above properties call for some kind of 
decentralized and distributed decision making mechanism.  
• Negotiation: Components, i.e. computers, users or software, can not 
control or use directly the resources of another component. A negotiation 
mechanism is imperative to support the interchange of resources among 
the components.  
AS and MAS are considered to be open systems, i.e. Open Agent Systems (OAS) 
and Open Multi-agent Systems (OMAS), respectively. Thus, OAS and OMAS are: 
dynamic (agents may join or leave the system at any given time), non deterministic, 
continuous, unobservable (or, at best, partially observable), heterogeneous, and 
finally, their members do not share a global utility, i.e. members may work towards 
different (possible conflicting) directions.  
In this thesis, our motivation is influenced by Hewitt’s and de Jong’s work on OS. 
They see agents that [122]:  
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“…need to have self-knowledge in order to function 
effectively in Open Systems in order to understand its own 
abilities as well as the limits of its knowledge and power. As 
knowledge is added incrementally to a subsystem, it must 
relate the new knowledge to its existing knowledge. Any 
subsystem can have only partial knowledge of the overall 
system, and partial power to affect other subsystems.”  
 
We accept, that agents in OMAS possess, unavoidably, incomplete information 
about the environment and other agents in it, have self-knowledge of the limits of 
their knowledge and need to reason in the presence of information gaps via self-
management and self-regulation.  
2.2.3 The Closed World Assumption and the Open World 
Assumption 
In order to support reasoning with incomplete knowledge we could adapt one of 
the general presumptions called the Closed World Assumption (CWA) [207] or Open 
World Assumption (OWA). 
Under the CWA the following presumption is conceded:  
 
“An atomic formula is assumed false, unless it is explicitly 
known to be true.” 
 
An agent that uses its incomplete representation essentially admits into its knowledge 
base negative literals ¬A that correspond to assumptions it makes under CWA about 
the falsity of certain atomic formulae A if A cannot be proved from its current 
knowledge base and continues its inference.  
Under the OWA the following presumption is conceded: 
 
“An atomic formula is assumed to be unknown by default.” 
 
In other words, the OWA limits an agent’s inference ability only on the basis of 
statements that are explicitly known to the agent to be true, contrary to the CWA that 
expands an agent’s inference ability by considering statements that are not currently 
known to be true as false. 
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For example, according to the knowledge base: 
{ Has(Eagle,Feathers), Lays(Penguin,Egges),  Is(x,Bird) ← ∀x (Has(x,Feathers) ∧ Lays(x,Eggs))} 
for an agent, in order, to entail that the eagle or the penguin is a bird, must decide on 
whether an eagle lays eggs or a penguin have feathers. Under the CWA answers to 
these questions are negative, i.e., Has(Penguin,Feathers), Lays(Eagle,Eggs) truth values are set to 
false. Under the OWA answers to these questions are unknown, i.e., Has(Penguin,Feathers), 
Lays(Eagle,Eggs) truth values are set to unknown. 
Hewitt and de Jong in [122] note: 
 
“…the ‘closed world assumption’ is intrinsically contrary to 
the nature of Open Systems. …  Systems based on the 
‘closed world assumption’ typically assume that they can 
find all the instances of a concept that exist by searching their 
local storage. In contrast we desire that subsystems be 
accountable for having evidence for their belief and explicitly 
aware of the limits of their knowledge.” 
 
 
In other words, agents under the CWA are atheist agents which dictate that an 
information gap should be treated as negative information. In the same spirit, agents 
under the OWA are agnostic agents which treat information gaps as potentially 
positive or negative information. In many realistic scenaria, however, this 
indecisiveness is undesirable and, furthermore, it is important to be able to make 
assumptions about the truth (rather than the falsity) of certain formulae, i.e., to treat 
information gaps for what they are (absence of definite information) as potentially 
positive information.  
In this thesis, in order to facilitate reasoning with incomplete and inconsistent 
knowledge, we adopt agents of none of the above two kinds. We see that agents 
should be able to identify and employ appropriate hypotheses dynamically, especially 
when the agents are engaged in business transactions and may violate a norm that 
regulates their behaviour, inadvertently. Specifically, we are interested in situations 
where the agent needs to make specific assumptions about the truth, rather than the 
falsity, of certain formulae. We claim that such reasoning may be useful in two cases:  
• Best-guess reasoning: An agent cannot know the future, yet it may need to 
plan its activities on the basis of hypotheses that concern the future.  
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• No-risk reasoning: An agent may not know everything about the past and 
present, i.e., the history of its environment, other agents and itself so far, 
yet it may need to plan its activities on the basis of hypotheses that 
concern the past and present. 
2.3 Agency and Law 
Several approaches have been proposed in order to provide formal tools for the 
specification, modelling, monitoring and execution of MAS. Normally, approaches 
are based on ideas and follows directions of the design-by-contact approach on 
software engineering. We classify these approaches into three application areas: (i) 
normative systems, (ii) electronic institutions and (iii) virtual organizations. 
Typically, all approaches involve a representation of deontic notions (such as 
obligation, permission, prohibition and power), their associated meta-level notions 
(such as violation, sanction, compliance and normative conflict) and domain-
independent concepts such as time, actions and their effects. In this section we 
discuss, briefly, issues that concern these approaches, and specifically, e-contracts 
which is the application area of this thesis. 
2.3.1 Normative Systems and Deontic Logic 
Normative systems can be considered as the intersection of Law and AI, and 
therefore, OMAS may be viewed as instances of normative systems. Jones and Sergot 
in [135] note about normative systems: 
 
“We use the term to refer to any set of interacting agents 
whose behaviour can usefully be regarded as governed by 
norms. Norms prescribe how the agent ought to behave and 
specify how they are permitted to behave and what their 
rights are. Agents may be human individuals or collection of 
human individuals, or computer systems or collection of 
computer systems. Normative systems include systems of 
law, abstract models of computer systems, and hybrid 
systems consisting of human and computer agents in 
interaction.” 
 
In the same spirit Carmo and Jones in [36] note: 
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“… sets of agents whose interactions are norm-governed; the 
norms prescribe how the agents ideally should and should not 
behave what they are permitted to do and what they have 
right to do. Importantly, the norms allow for the possibility 
that actual behaviour may at times deviate from the ideal, i.e. 
that violations of obligations, or of agents’ rights, may 
occur.” 
 
Jones and Sergot argued for the need for a formal representation of such 
environments, i.e. a representation capable to express the distinction between the 
actual and the ideal. Appropriate, representations, first, should provide a way to 
formalize and reason about what it is obligatory, permitted or prohibited for an agent, 
and, second, should address issues such as normative violation, contrary to duty 
structures, i.e. the specification of a primary obligation, along with the specification 
of a secondary obligation that obtains if the primary one is violated [44, 200], and 
institutionalized power [136]. To this end the use of Deontic Logic was proposed 
[135, 200, 136, 36]. 
Deontic Logic is a form of modal logic used to reason about norms and was first 
presented by Ernst Mally (1926), while later, in 1951, von Wright established deontic 
notions as are known today in Standard Deontic Logic (SDL) [249, 250, 176, 177]. 
Deontic Logic introduces one primitive operator to represent expressions such as “it 
is obligatory”, and two dual operators that derive from the primitive one to represent 
expressions such as “it is permitted” and “it is forbidden”. 
According to Standard Deontic Logic the following inter-definability relations 
hold among operators for Obligation (O), Permission (P) and Prohibition (F): 
It is obligatory that a: Oa 
It is permitted that a: Pa ≡ ¬O¬a 
It is prohibited that a: Fa ≡ ¬Pa ≡ O¬a 
2.3.2 e-Contracts 
During the last decade a rapid growth on research activity related to normative 
systems, electronic institutions or virtual communities has occurred. Such domains 
were considered as open normative electronic environments that provide a framework 
for brokering, negotiation, agreement establishment and subsequently agreement 
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monitoring. Agreements, the so called contracts, are reached in order to regulate the 
activity of autonomous agents. Their scope depends on the exact application area, i.e 
[35]: 
• Purchase Contracts are used in e-commerce applications within e-
marketplaces. 
• Cooperation Contracts are used to model and manage enterprise business 
processes, also known as workflows. 
• Social Contracts are considered as a set of norms, rules, commitments or 
conventions that coordinate and manage a virtual society. 
Generally, the term contract is used to refer both to a legally binding agreement 
between two or more parties and to the document that records such an agreement. 
Generally, a contract creates mutual legal relations between the parties involved and 
determines what actions are obligatory/permissible/forbidden to be performed by the 
parties. In Information Technology, contracts are considered as electronic documents 
that describe, regulate and enable automation of business processes. The term e-
contract is used to refer to the electronic document that is determined by reference to 
an individual computer-generation transaction. Researchers agree that contracts are 
instances of documents classes called contract templates. Those templates are generic 
documents containing obligatory and optional contract clauses, that each one 
addresses a specific point of interest of the business interaction. The term e-
contracting is used to encompass all activities concerned with this transaction and e-
contracts [9, 54, 150]. 
The whole contractual life cycle comprises of two different phases, namely 
contract formation and contract performance (Figure 2.1). During the former, parties 
communicate with each other, exchange needed information and negotiate the terms 
and conditions of their agreement. During the latter, once an agreement has been 
established; contract execution takes place, during which violations of contract 
clauses may occur, thus raising the need for reparatory mechanisms to be deployed, if 
any such are stipulated in the agreement. 
Consequently there are two classes of service tools that are involved with 
contractual activity:  
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e-Marketplace
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Enforcement
Execution
 
Figure 2.1 E-contract life cycle 
 
• Contract Formation Service Tools: 
o Brokering tool, where a partner matching service is enabled.  
o Negotiation tool, where negotiation with the matched partner and the 
document lodging take place. 
o Drafting tool, where contract establishment occurs. 
• Contract Performance Service Tools: 
o Execution tool, where actions planning, behaviour advisory and 
execution occur.  
o Monitoring tool, where monitoring of parties’ compliance with the 
agreement occurs and factual or potential states of the transaction are 
examined for counter intuitive and conflicting situations. 
o Enforcement tool, where, in case of contract violations, suggestions 
for recovery actions or advices for the possible consequences are 
provided, while, in cases of conflicts a resolution strategy is chosen and 
applied.  
It is obvious that the whole contractual procedure is too complicated and consists 
of different, iterative and interrelated multi-party interactions. Because of this, the 
separation of the drafting procedure is imperative. In [57, 54] two sequential contract 
drafting procedures were proposed. Here, we redefine the role, the attributes and the 
procedures that were formerly ascribed in the two-level proposed contract drafting 
workflow:    
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• Contract drafting at the macro-level. During this phase the drafting tool 
aims to formulate the overall structure of the document by choosing all or 
some of the predefined clauses of the contact template and optionally by 
adding new clauses as enhancements. The role of an e-contract is to define 
a legal interaction framework. Therefore, the formulated electronic 
contractual document should be:  
o Well-structured: A predefined form should be met. 
o Expressive: All contractual parties, goods, services and interactions 
should be recorded. 
o Complete: All possible circumstances should be considered. 
o Consistent: All contractual clauses should be coherent. 
o Compendious: No redundant clauses should be met. 
• Contract drafting at the micro-level. During this phase the drafting tool 
focuses in drafting a well-formed and performable document. Due to this, 
all previously selected contractual clauses should be represented and 
combined in a formal way. In [57, 54] a non exhausted list of clauses 
features were presented. Specifically, contract provisions should be: 
o Descriptive: To define particular contract terms and items.  
o Prescriptive: To determine contractual parties’ behaviours. 
o Procedural: To specify procedures that need to be followed when 
specific states are established or when a specific state needs to be 
established. 
o Algebraic: To calculate contract parameters and avoid redundancy. 
o Effective: To specify conditions under which other provisions apply.  
2.4 Summary 
In this chapter, we discussed intelligent agents, multi-agent interactions, and the 
systems where these interactions take place. Systems were considered as open 
computational environments that are governed by norms. Especially, we referred: to 
the role of autonomy in the context of agency; the special characteristics of open 
systems; two approaches (CWA and OWA) that deal with information gaps in these 
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settings and the reasons that motivate us to differentiate. Finally, we provided, in 
brief, the essential characteristics of normative systems and introduced what e-
contracts and e-contracting are. 
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3 Common-sense Reasoning 
3.1 Introduction 
Elio in [75] concludes that: 
 
“…it is through careful, reasoned rationality that we discover 
the ‘truth’ and through unreflective common sense that we 
make judgments that are ‘sound enough’ for dealing with 
matters that arise in the everyday world.” 
 
McCarthy in a series of papers, such as [171, 170, 174], works towards the 
understanding the common-sense capability. He divides common-sense capability in 
common-sense knowledge (CSK) and common-sense reasoning (CSR). CSK concerns 
the information that is available about a scenario and its appropriate representation in 
order to common-sense reason with and about it. Key issues about CSK are [174, 
183]:  
• the ability to identify fundamentals objects/entities that are involved in the 
scenario and the ability to determine their properties. 
• the ability to situate the scenario on a temporal basis and the ability to 
represent the properties of the world that change over time. 
• the ability to represent actions or events, their preconditions and their 
effects (direct or indirect effects, context-sensitive effects, 
nondeterministic effects, delayed effects, triggered effects) on the world. 
• the ability to capture the Common-sense Law of Inertia, i.e. the axiom that 
the world stays the same unless it is affected by some action or event. 
• the ability to represent the space of the scenario. 
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• the ability to represent the mental states, such as knowledge, beliefs, goals, 
likes and dislikes, intentions and abilities, of partners or competitors 
(human or software agents) in the scenario. 
McCarthy notes that the ability to use CSK depends on the ability to use CSR. In 
most realistic scenaria, rarely we have complete knowledge and static world. Key 
issues about CSR are [174, 183]: 
• the ability to fill in gaps in available information. 
• the ability to take decisions with incomplete and uncertain knowledge. 
• the ability to revise believes and decisions when complete knowledge 
becomes available. 
In this thesis, supplementary to all of the above issues, we espouse the following 
description of CSR as presented by Mueller in [183]: 
 
“Commonsense reasoning is a process that involves taking 
information about certain aspects of a scenario in the world 
and making inferences about other aspects of the scenario 
based on our commonsense knowledge, or knowledge of how 
the world works. Commonsense reasoning is essential to 
intelligent behavior and though. It allows us to fill in the 
blanks, to reconstruct missing portions of a scenario, to figure 
out what happened, and to predict what might happen next.” 
 
“A method for automated commonsense reasoning must 
support several types of commonsense reasoning. The first is 
temporal projection or prediction, in which we start with an 
initial state and some events and then reason about the state 
that results from the events. … The second type for reasoning 
is abduction, in which we start with an initial state and a final 
state and then reason about the events that lead from the 
initial state to the final state. … The third type of reasoning is 
postdiction, in which we start with some events that lead to a 
state and then reason about the state prior to the events.”    
 
In the next sections we discuss logic languages and reasoning patterns that we 
exercise in this thesis in order to address the issue of CSR.  
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3.2 Reasoning about Time, Actions and Effects 
Many different logic languages are met in the AI literature for temporal projection 
and reasoning in dynamic domains, such as, the McCarthy’s Situation Calculus [172], 
the Kowalski’s and Sergot’s Event Calculus [149], the Thielscher’s Fluent Calculus 
[240], and the action languages C/C+ [103, 101, 151], amongst others. In the next 
section we discuss logic representation in Event Calculus. 
3.2.1 Event Calculus 
The Event Calculus (EC), introduced by Kowalski & Sergot in 1986 [149], is a 
formalism for representing and reasoning about actions and their outcomes. The basic 
elements of this logic language are time points, fluents and actions (or else events). 
A time point time corespond to each state of the world, while time < time + 1 indicates 
that time point time is before time point time + 1. A fluent fluent is a fact or predicate 
whose value can be altered over time. Actions, denoted as action, are considered all 
possible events that occur at some point time.  
 
Table 3.1 The Event Calculus Predicates 
PREDICATE INTERPRETATION 
Initiates(action, fluent, time) 
/ Terminates(action, fluent, time) 
 
Initiates(event, fluent, time) 
/ Terminates(event, fluent, time) 
fluent starts/stops to hold after action occurs at time. 
 
fluent starts/stops to hold after event occurs at time. 
HoldsAt(fluent, time) fluent holds at time. 
Happens(action, time) action occurs (instantaneously) at time. 
Clipped(time1, fluent, time2) 
/ Declipped(time1, fluent, time2) fluent is terminated/activated between time1 and time2. 
 
In this thesis we adopt the EC formalism as explained in [180, 228]. This work is 
based on examples taken from literature and presents how EC applies in various 
domains in order to represent actions with indirect or non-deterministic effects, 
compound or concurrent actions and continuous change. Specifically, we adopt and 
adapt the so called simple EC, which introduces some basic predicates such as (Table 
3.1):  
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• Initiates(action, fluent, time) represents that fluent fluent starts to hold after action action 
occurs at time point  time, 
• Terminates(action, fluent, time) represents that fluent fluent stops to hold after action 
action occurs at time point time, 
• HoldsAt(fluent, time) represents that fluent fluent holds at time point time, 
• Happens(action, time)  represents that action action occurs at time point time, 
• Clipped(time1, fluent, time2) represents that fluent fluent is terminated between time 
points time1 and time2, 
• Declipped(time1, fluent, time2) represents that fluent fluent is activated between time 
points time1 and time2. 
In [180, 228] six domain independent axioms (Clipped, Declipped, HoldsAt and ¬HoldsAt) 
were defined as shown in Table 3.2: 
 
Table 3.2 The Event Calculus domain-independent axioms 
Axiom INTERPRETATION 
Axiom 1 Clipped(time1, fluent, time2) ≡ ∃action,time [ (Happens(action, time) ∧ Terminates(action, fluent, time) 
                                                                                                                                            ∧ time1≤ time<time2 ] 
Axiom 2 Declipped(time1, fluent, time2) ≡ ∃action,time [ (Happens(action, time) ∧ Initiates(action, fluent, time) 
                                                                                                                                            ∧ time1≤ time<time2 ] 
Axiom 3 HoldsAt(fluent, time2) ← (Happens(action, time1) ∧ Initiates(action, fluent, time1) ∧ time1<time2                                                                                                                              ∧ ¬Clipped(time1, fluent, time2) 
Axiom 4 ¬HoldsAt(fluent, time2) ← (Happens(action, time1) ∧ Terminates(action, fluent, time1) ∧  time1<time2                                                                                                                          ∧ ¬Declipped(time1, fluent, time2) 
Axiom 5 HoldsAt(fluent, time2) ← (HoldsAt(fluent, time1)  ∧ time1<time2 ∧ ¬Clipped(time1, fluent, time2)) 
Axiom 6 ¬HoldsAt(fluent, time2) ← (HoldsAt(fluent, time1) ∧ time1<time2 ∧ ¬Declipped(time1, fluent, time2)) 
 
The first definition for HoldsAt above reflects the establishment of a fluent as a result 
of an action, while the second one reflects the Common-sense Law of Inertia. The 
predicates Happens, Initiates and Terminates are domain dependent therefore they are defined 
circumstantial. 
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3.3 Non-monotonic Reasoning 
Entailment in most formal logics, such as the Propositional Logic (PL) and the 
First-order Logic (FOL), or reasoning patterns, such as Deductive Reasoning, is 
monotonic. Monotonicity says that, if KB ⊨ a then KB ∧ b ⊨ a, i.e. new knowledge that is 
added in the knowledge base KB can only produce new entailments.  
However, in CSR, sometimes it is not necessary that new knowledge validates all 
previous entailments. This property is called non-monotonicity and the corresponding 
reasoning pattern is called Non-monotonic Reasoning (NMR). Non-monotonicity says 
that, new knowledge that is added in the knowledge base may invalidate previous 
entailments. 
Strongly related with the pattern of NMR, are the two other reasoning patterns 
called Default Reasoning (or reasoning by default) and Defeasible Reasoning. 
Reasoning by default is the ability to jump to a non-monotonic conclusion, when 
there is no absolute knowledge about the world. Sometimes it is necessary to make 
certain assumptions in order to proceed with inference. For instance, reasoning by 
default enables us to capture rules such as “A bird typically flies, in the absence of the 
knowledge of the contrary”. Such inference on the basis of certain assumptions, also 
afford us the ability: (i) to relate certain conclusions to certain assumptions, and (ii) to 
retract certain conclusions when required. Thus, Defeasibility is the ability to 
invalidate previous drawn conclusions when it is desirable.  
In this thesis, we are engaged in such CSR, i.e. assumptions are made in order to 
facilitate reasoning with incomplete knowledge, certain defeasible conclusions are 
drawn on the basis of these assumptions, and finally, when new knowledge becomes 
available, that renders previous made assumptions or drawn conclusions false, certain 
assumptions and conclusions are being retracted. For example, consider that on the 
basis of currently available knowledge and in the absence of knowledge of the 
contrary the name of a cartoon bird is assumed to be ‘Tweety’. In this case, we may 
conclude that the bird is a canary and is able to fly. But, at a later time point we found 
out that the name is ‘Mubble’, so we are no longer allowed to rely on this assumption 
and consequently, we are required to retract any conclusion on its basis, and conclude 
that the bird is a penguin and does not fly. 
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Many approaches have been proposed during the last thirty years to non-
monotonic reasoning such as Reiter’s Default Logic [208], McCarthy’s 
Circumscription [173], Moore’s Autoepistemic Logic [182], Gelfond’s and 
Lifschitz’s Logic Programs (with stable model or answer set semantics) [83, 84], and 
Nute’s Defeasible Logic [187]. In the next section we discuss reasoning with Default 
Logic. 
3.3.1 Default Logic 
Default Logic (DfL) [208], introduced by Reiter in 1980, is arguably the most 
notable formulation for default reasoning (cf. [14, 154]). A default rule (henceforth 
default) has the form3: 
P 
: 
J1,J2,…Jn 
C 
where P is the prerequisite, J={J1,J2,… Jn} is a set of justifications and C is the derived 
consequent. The sets P, J and C contain PL or closed FOL formulae. The semantics of 
a default rule is: If P holds and the assumption J is consistent with our current 
knowledge, then C may be inferred. For instance, for the following default rule: 
Bird 
: 
¬Flies, Swims 
IsPenguin 
its interpretation is as follows: for Bird if it is consistent to assume that it does swims 
and does not flies then we may conclude that Bird is a penguin. In the case of a first-
order language, i.e. logic formulae that contain free variables, the rule has the 
following form: 
Specie(x,Bird) 
: 
¬Flies(x), Swims(x) 
Is(x,Pengiun) 
Let us call these rules default schemata. Default schemata represent a set of possible 
defaults that emerge when computing the possible ground substitutions that assign 
values to the free variables that appear in the default schema. In other words, it is 
considered that free variables of default schemata are universally quantified over the 
                                                 
3 Prerequisite-free default rules are defaults of the form  true : J1,J2,…Jn / C. Justification-free default rules 
are defaults of the form  P : true / C. 
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whole schema. For instance, for the above default schema and given the facts that 
Specie(Tweety,Bird) and Specie(Mumble,Bird) the corresponding defaults are: 
Specie(Tweety,Bird) 
: 
 ¬Flies(Tweety), Swims(Tweety) 
Is(Tweety,Pengiun) 
and 
Specie(Mumble,Bird) 
: 
¬Flies(Mumble), Swims(Mumble) 
Is(Mumble,Pengiun) 
A Default Theory (DfT) is a pair of the form (W, D), where W is a set of PL or FOL 
formulae that represent currently available knowledge, and D is a set of defaults. 
Rules may be used to compute extensions E of the default theory. A default is 
applicable to a deductively closed set of formulae W⊆E if and only if P∈E and ¬J1,…, ¬Jn∉E. 
In this case, the set E is called extension of the default theory. Extensions are the most 
complicated concept of Reiter’s default theory because it is hard to determine an 
accurate belief set for which justifications should be consistent. In the Reiter’s initial 
paper for DfL [208] three important properties of extensions were referred. In 
particular, an extension E of a default theory (W, D):  
• should contain W,  
• should be deductively closed and  
• for a default rule of the form P: J1,J2,… Jn / C, if P∈E and ¬J1,…, ¬Jn∉E then C∈E.  
3.3.1.1 Skeptical and Credulous Reasoning 
For an agent that reasons on the basis of a DfT, extensions represent possible 
world views. Whenever multiple extensions are computed, for a DfT, these represent 
multiple possible world views. Depending on its chosen action an agent is committed 
to a particular extension. 
There are two classical approaches to perform such inference on the basis of DfL. 
In the first one, the skeptical reasoning, a formula is entailed by a theory, if it is 
entailed by all its extensions. This is a strict approach and requires the computation of 
all possible extensions and the subsequent check to determine if this formula belongs 
in all of the extensions. In the second approach, the credulous reasoning, a formula is 
entailed by a theory, if it is entailed by at least one extension. In this case, there is no 
need to compute all possible extensions. 
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For example, consider the following computed extensions as shown in Figure 3.1: 
• Extension #1: { C1, C2, C3 } 
• Extension #2: { C1, C2 } 
• Extension #3: { C1, C3 } 
• Extension #4: { C1 } 
According to the skeptical reasoning approach an agent may only infer that C1 holds, 
because it appears in all possible computed extensions. On the contrary, according to 
the credulous reasoning approach, an agent may infer that: C1 holds when it chooses 
extensions 1, 2, 3 and 4; C2 holds when it chooses extensions 1 and 2; and finally, that, 
C3 holds when it chooses extensions 1 and 3. 
 
Agent
Extension #1
{ C1, C2, C3 }
Extension #2
{ C1, C2 }
Extension #3
{ C1, C3 }
Extension #4
{ C1 }
 
Figure 3.1 Skeptical and credulous reasoning 
 
3.3.1.2 Operational Computation of Extensions 
In this thesis, we adopt an operational process-oriented technique for the 
computation of extensions as presented by Antoniou in [12, 14]. Antoniou proposed 
an operational definition of extensions and an incremental technique for their 
computation, maintaining consistent sets of formulae whose conditions part 
(prerequisites and justifications) is interpreted conjunctively and the conclusions part 
(consequent) is interpreted disjunctively, as in sequent calculus [132]. Thus, an agent 
that derives conclusions on the basis of assumptions, by applying defaults, constructs 
the extension of its grounded DfT incrementally. Let Π represent a default reasoning 
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process by recording the order in which defaults from D apply. At each step i of the 
reasoning process Π(i), i.e. after the application of each default P:J1, J2,…,Jn/C, the 
extension computed is a set of ground sentences In(i)=In(i-1) ∪ {C}, and the set of 
assumptions employed, which should not turn out to be true, is Out(i) = Out(i-1) ∪ {¬J1…, ¬Jn}. 
As a result, Π(i)= Π(i-1) ∪ {Di | Di is the default rule which applied at step i}. Initially In(0)=W, Out(0)=∅ and Π(0)=∅ 
for i=0. The default reasoning process Π(i) is successful iff In(i) ∩ Out(i)= ∅, otherwise it is 
failed. Moreover, the process Π(i) is closed iff every default rule that belongs in the D 
set and is applicable in In(i) already occurs in Π(i). According to [14] a set of formulae E 
is a DfT extension  if there is a closed and successful process Π(i) of the DfT such that 
E=In(i). 
Example 1 
In order to illustrate this interpretation consider the following DfT (W, D): 
W={ P1, P2, P3 } 
D={ D1 ≡ P1:J1/C1,  D2 ≡ P2:J2/C2 } 
 
Π(1) = { D1 }, 
In(1) = { P1, P2, P3, C1 }, 
Out(1) = { ¬ J1 } S1
W={ P1, P2, P3 }
D={ D1=P1:J1/C1,  D2=P2:J2/C2 }
Π(0) = { }, In(0) = W, Out(0) = { }
Default D1 fires
Π(2) = { D1, D2 }, 
In(2) = { P1, P2, P3, C1, C2 }, 
Out(2) = { ¬ J1, ¬ J2 } S2
Default D2 fires
S0
 
Figure 3.2 Operational computation of extensions - Example 1 
 
For this theory the following sets are computed In(2)={P1, P2, P3, C1, C2},  Out(2)={ ¬J1, ¬J2}, 
where Π(2)={D1, D2}4. An abstract description of the computation of extensions as a state 
                                                 
4 We may also consider the process Π(2)={D2, D1}. 
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diagram is shown in Figure 3.2, where a double line node denotes the initial state 
where Π(0)={}; and a bold line node denotes that process Π(i) is a closed and successful 
process, i.e. Π(i) is an extension, as defined by Antoniou. 
Example 2 
Consider the following DfT (W, D): 
W={ P1, P2, P3 } 
D={ D1 ≡ P1:J1/C1,  D2 ≡ P2: ¬C1/C2 } 
 
Π(1) = { D1 }, 
In(1) = { P1, P2, P3, C1 }, 
Out(1) = { ¬ J1 } S1
W={ P1, P2, P3 }
D={ D1=P1:J1/C1,  D2=P2:¬C1/C2 }
Π(0) = { }, In(0) = W, Out(0) = { }
Default D1 fires
Π(1) = { D2 }, 
In(1) = { P1, P2, P3, C2 }, 
Out(1) = { C1 }
S2
Default D2 fires
S0
Π(2) = { D2, D1 }, 
In(2) = { P1, P2, P3, C2, C1 }, 
Out(2) = { C1, ¬ J1 }
S3
Default D1 fires
 
Figure 3.3 Operational computation of extensions - Example 2 
 
For this theory the following sets are computed: In(1)={P1, P2, P3, C1}, Out(Π)={¬J1} for Π(1)={D1}; 
and In(2)={P1, P2, P3, C2, C1}, Out(2)={ C1, ¬J1} for Π(2)={D2, D1}. An abstract description of the 
computation of extensions as a state diagram as shown in Figure 3.3, where a double 
line node denotes the initial state where Π(0)={}; a bold line node denotes that process Π(i) 
is a closed and successful process, i.e. Π(i) is an extension; and, finally, a discontinuous 
bold line node denotes that process Π(i) has failed, as defined by Antoniou. At state S3 
the process Π(2) is a failure due to the fact that In(2) ∩ Out(2) ≠ ∅. Thus, there is only one 
extension for the DfT. 
Example 3 
Now, consider the following DfT (W, D): 
W={ P1, P2, P3 } 
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D={ D1 ≡ P1:J1/C1,  D2 ≡ P2:J2/C2 } 
where C1 and C2 are formulae that render the knowledge base inconsistent when both 
of them hold simultaneously. In this case there are various computations (possible 
extensions) for In and Out sets: In(1)={P1, P2, P3, C1}, Out(1)={¬J1} for Π(1)={D1}; In(1)={P1, P2, P3, C2}, 
Out(1)={¬J2} for Π(1)={D2}; and In(2)={P1, P2, P3, C1, C2},  Out(2)={ ¬J1, ¬J2}, for Π(2)={D1, D2}5.  According to 
Antoniou, the processes Π(1)={D1} and Π(1)={D2} are not extensions of the DfT, due to the 
fact that these processes are not closed processes. On the contrary, the processes 
Π(2)={D1, D2} and Π(2)={D2, D1}, are considered to be extensions (successful and closed 
processes) of the DfT. But in this case, an inconsistency arises in an agent’s world.   
 
Π(1) = { D1 }, 
In(1) = { P1, P2, P3, C1 }, 
Out(1) = { ¬ J1 } S1
W={ P1, P2, P3 }
D={ D1=P1:J1/C1,  D2=P2:J2/C2 }
Π(0) = { }, In(0) = W, Out(0) = { }
Default D1 fires
Π(1) = { D2 }, 
In(1) = { P1, P2, P3, C2 }, 
Out(1) = { ¬ J2 }
S2
Default D2 fires
S0
 
Figure 3.4 Operational computation of extensions - Example 3 
 
In this thesis, in order to facilitate CSR in an open world where the environment 
and whatever is associated with it are matters of continuous change, we should not 
require or expect from the agent to either accept worlds that belong to the distance 
future or reject them, in advance. It seems rational and realistic to us, to require from 
an agent to reason in a process-oriented step-wise manner on the basis of its current 
knowledge. Such an agent would compute all possible worlds, examine the state that 
these worlds reveal (consistent/inconsistent, rational/irrational, eligible/non-eligible, 
desirable/non-desirable etc) and finally decide to either to follow or not a specific 
course of action. Specifically, with respect to the above example 3, our agent may 
accept the processes Π(1)={D1} and Π(1)={D2} as theory extensions, on the criteria that: (i) the 
next step in inference, i.e. applying defaults D2 or D1 respectively, if followed, would 
                                                 
5 We may also consider the process Π(2)={D2, D1}. 
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turn itself into an irrational agent, and (ii) to ground itself in a protracted period of 
idleness is not the reason of its development (Figure 3.4). Thus, the agent may place 
itself in either one of the two states (S1 or S2) and continue with inference from this 
state on a new basis, i.e. a new current world that probably contains different factual 
and prescriptive knowledge. We further discuss this issue and motivate our choice on 
extensions when we discuss the overall reasoning problem in chapter 5. 
3.3.2 Variations of Default Logic 
Since the publication of the Reiter’s initial paper for Default Reasoning, many 
variations of Default Logic, such as the Normal Default Theory (NDfT) [208], the 
Semi-normal Default Theory (SnDfT) [77], the Justified-DfL (JDfL) [163], the 
Constrained-DfL (CDfL) [225], the Rational-DfL (RDfL) [178], the Cumulative-DfL 
(CuDfL) [28], the Pre-constrained-DfL (PcDfL) [226, 13], the Stratified-DfL (SDfL) 
[45, 46] and the Prioritized-DfL (PDfL) [29, 30], amongst others, have been proposed 
for various reasons and applications. In this subsection we discuss some of them in 
turn.  
3.3.2.1 Normal – Semi-normal Default Theories  
A Normal Default Theory (NDfT) [208] is a DfT where all defaults are normal. A 
default rule is called normal if its justification coincides with its consequent, i.e. a 
normal default has the form6: 
P 
: 
C 
C 
The semantics of this default rule is: If P holds and is consistent with our current 
knowledge to assume C, then C may be inferred. Note that, every closed NDfT always 
has an extension. 
A Semi-normal Default Theory (SnDfT) [77] is a DfT where all defaults are semi-
normal. A default rule is called semi-normal if all its justifications imply its 
conclusion, i.e. a semi-normal default has the form: 
P 
: 
J∧C 
C 
                                                 
6 Supernormal defaults are prerequisite-free normal default rules of the form true: C /C. 
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Note that, every SnDfT does not always have an extension. 
3.3.2.2 Constrained Default Theories 
A Constrained Default Theory (CDfT) [225] is a DfT that avoids running into 
inconsistencies and ensures the joint consistency of all justifications involved in 
reasoning. A default is applied only if its justifications and consequences are 
consistent with the background theory, i.e., In(i)∪¬Out(i). This is tantamount to saying that 
the possible world models inferred by the agent contain, besides previous knowledge, 
both the consequents and the assumptions of the applied defaults. 
Example 4 
Consider the following CDfT (W, D): 
W={ P1, P2, P3 } 
D={ D1 ≡ P1:J1/C1,  D2 ≡ P2:J2/C2,  D3 ≡ P3:J3/C3 } 
 
Π(1) = { D1 }, 
In(1) = { P1, P2, P3, C1 }, 
Out(1) = { ¬ J1 } S1
W={ P1, P2, P3 }
D={ D1=P1:J1/C1,  D2=P2:J2/C2,  D3=P3:J3/C3 }
Π(0) = { }, In(0) = W, Out(0) = { }
Default D1 fires
Π(1) = { D2 }, 
In(1) = { P1, P2, P3, C2 }, 
Out(1) = { ¬ J2 }
S2
Default D2 fires
S0
Π(2) = { D2, D3 }, 
In(2) = { P1, P2, P3, C2, C3 }, 
Out(2) = { ¬ J2, ¬ J3 }
S4
Default D3 fires
Π(2) = { D1, D3 }, 
In(2) = { P1, P2, P3, C1, C3 }, 
Out(2) = { ¬ J1, ¬ J3 } S3
Default D3 fires
 
Figure 3.5 Operational computation of extensions - Example 4 
 
where the pairs C1 - C2 and J1 - J2, are formulae that render the knowledge base 
inconsistent when both members of the pairs hold simultaneously. For this CDfT 
there are two accepted extensions:  In(2)={P1, P2, P3, C1, C3}, Out(2)={ ¬J1, ¬J3} for Π(2)={D1, D3}; and 
In(2)={P1, P2, P3, C2, C3}, Out(2)={ ¬J2, ¬J3} for Π(2)={D2, D3}; due to the restrictions, i.e. one due to the 
joint consistency of assumptions, and one due to the consistency of the computed 
world (Figure 3.5). 
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3.3.2.3 Pre-constrained Default Theories 
A Pre-constrained Default Theory (PcDfT) is a triple of the form (W, D, PC), where 
(W, D) is a CDfT and PC is set of formulae that are considered as the initial constraints of 
the theory [226]. For the first step of the process, i.e., for i=1, In(0)=W and Out(0) = PC. 
Example 5 
Consider the following PcDfT (W, D): 
W={ P1, P2, P3 } 
D={ D1 ≡ P1:J1/C1,  D2 ≡ P2:J2/C2,  D3 ≡ P3:J3/C3 } 
PC={ J3 } 
 
Π(1) = { D1 }, 
In(1) = { P1, P2, P3, C1 }, 
Out(1) = { ¬ J1 } S1
W={ P1, P2, P3 }
D={ D1=P1:J1/C1,  D2=P2:J2/C2,  D3=P3:J3/C3 }
PC={ J3 }
Π(0) = { }, In(0) = W, Out(0) = { J3 }
Default D1 fires
Π(1) = { D2 }, 
In(1) = { P1, P2, P3, C2 }, 
Out(1) = { ¬ J2 }
S2
Default D2 fires
S0
 
Figure 3.6 Operational computation of extensions - Example 5 
 
where the pairs C1 - C2 and J1 - J2, are formulae that render the knowledge base 
inconsistent when both members of the pairs hold simultaneously and J2 is a formulae 
acting as a pre-constrain of the theory. For this PcDfT there are two accepted 
extensions:  In(1)={P1, P2, P3, C1}, Out(1)={ ¬J1} for Π(1)={D1}; and In(1)={P1, P2, P3, C2}, Out(1)={ ¬J2} for 
Π(1)={D2}; due to the restrictions, i.e. one due to the joint consistency of assumptions, 
one due to the consistency of the computed world and, finally, one due to the pre-
constrain (Figure 3.6). 
3.3.2.4 Stratified Default Theories 
A DfT is called Stratified Default Theory (SDfT) [45, 46] iff there exists a 
stratification function s that assigns a natural number to each default and composes 
strata from the initial D set. If the consequent of the rule D’ (default rule in case of DfL) 
is used by another rule D’′ then we apply D’ before D’’ i.e., s(D’) ≤ s(D’’ ). The formal 
characterization of this property for any defaults D’ and D’’ is as follows: 
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if  prop(cons(D’)) ∩ prop(pre(D’’ ) ∪ just(D’’ )) ≠ ∅   then   s(D’) ≤ s(D’’ ) 
if  prop(cons(D’)) ∩ prop(cons(D’’ )) ≠ ∅   then   s(D’) = s(D’’ ) 
where pre(D’), just(D’) and cons(D’) denote the prerequisites, justifications and consequents 
part of  D’, respectively, and prop(D’) denote the set of all atoms occurring in D’ [13]. 
According to this definition D’ and D’’ are mapped into different strata because s(D’) ≤ s(D’’ ) 
holds. In this way, an agent ensures that D’ applies before D’’ and no knowledge is lost. 
Example 6 
Consider the following SDfT (W, D): 
W={ P1, P2, P3 } 
D={ D1 ≡ P1:J1/C1,  D2 ≡ P2∧C1:J2/C2,  D3 ≡ P3∧C2:J3/C3 } 
 
Π(1) = { D1 }, 
In(1) = { P1, P2, P3, C1 }, 
Out(1) = { ¬ J1 } S1
W={ P1, P2, P3 }
D={ D1=P1:J1/C1,  D2=P2    C1:J2/C2, 
                                D3=P3   C2:J3/C3 }
Π(0) = { }, In(0) = W, Out(0) = { }
Default D1 fires
Π(2) = { D1, D2 }, 
In(2) = { P1, P2, P3, C1, C2 }, 
Out(2) = { ¬ J1, ¬ J2 } S2
Default D2 fires
S0
Π(3) = { D1, D2, D3 }, 
In(3) = { P1, P2, P3, C1, C2, C3 }, 
Out(3) = { ¬ J1, ¬ J2 , ¬ J3 } S3
Default D3 fires
V
V
 
Figure 3.7 Operational computation of extensions - Example 6 
 
where the pairs C1 - C2 and J1 - J2, are formulae that render the knowledge base 
inconsistent when both members of the pairs hold simultaneously. For this SDfT 
there is only one accepted order to apply the defaults, i.e. there is only one possible 
extension:  In(3)={P1, P2, P3, C1, C2, C3}, Out(2)={ ¬J1, ¬J2, ¬J3} for Π(2)={D1, D2, D3}; due to the fact that 
defaults D1, D2 and D3 are placed in different strata according to the stratification 
function s (Figure 3.7). 
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3.3.2.5 Prioritized Default Theories 
Brewka in [29, 30] defines a Prioritized Default Theory (PDfT) as a triple (W, D, 
name), where name is a function that assigns names to default rules D. The extension of a 
PDfT is derived in the same way as in a DfT. Priorities over defaults can either define 
preference on extensions that are, eventually, preferred transaction plans when 
dealing with the query “Which norm should I apply?”, or define preference on 
normative relations that already hold, that is an answer to the query “Which 
normative relation should I concede?” based on the priorities of defaults that entailed 
these normative relations. 
Example 7 
To illustrate this interpretation consider the following PDfT (W, D): 
W={ P1, P2, P3 } 
D={D1 ≡ P1:J1/C1,  D2 ≡ P2:J2/C2,  D3 ≡ P2:¬C1/C3} 
 
Π(1) = { D1 }, 
In(1) = { P1, P2, P3, C1 }, 
Out(1) = { ¬ J1 } S1
W={ P1, P2, P3 }
D={ D1=P1:J1/C1,  D2=P2:J2/C2,  D3=P3:¬C1/C3 }
Π(0) = { }, In(0) = W, Out(0) = { }
Default D1 fires
Π(1) = { D2 }, 
In(1) = { P1, P2, P3, C2 }, 
Out(1) = { ¬ J2 }
S2
Default D2 fires
Π(2) = { D2, D3 }, 
In(2) = { P1, P2, P3, C2, C3 }, 
Out(2) = { ¬ J2, ¬ C1 }
S4
Default D3 fires
Π(2) = { D1, D2 }, 
In(2) = { P1, P2, P3, C1, C2 }, 
Out(2) = { ¬ J1, ¬ J2 } S3
Default D3 fires
S0
 
Figure 3.8 Operational computation of extensions - Example 7 
 
where the priority relation among default is D1<D2<D3 7. For this PDfT there are two 
possible sequences for the application of defaults, i.e. there are two possible 
extensions:  In(2)={P1, P2, P3, C1, C2}, Out(2)={ ¬J1, ¬J2} for Π(2)={D1, D2}; and In(2)={P1, P2, P3, C2, C3}, Out(2)={ 
¬J2, ¬C1} for Π(2)={D2, D3} (Figure 3.8). Note that, the preference on defaults determines the 
                                                 
7 < notation describes a priority relation. a< b means that the right part (b) takes priority over the left part 
(b) of this relation, i.e. b is preferred to a. 
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order that these defaults apply in the theory. Moreover, the priority relation that holds 
among the defaults determines a preference over the two possible extensions, i.e. 
extension computed for Π(2)={D2, D3} is the preferred extension over the extension 
computed for Π(2)={D1, D2}. 
3.4 Summary 
In this chapter, we discussed logic languages and reasoning patterns that we adopt 
and adapt in this thesis in order to address the issue of CSR in open norm-governed 
multi-agent environments. First, we referred to the meaning of CSR in AI and 
Computer Science, and then, we discussed specific issues that are related to the 
representations and reasoning techniques which will be presented in the following 
chapters. Specifically, we: showed the EC language that we use in order to reason 
with time, actions and their effects; explained Reiter’s DfL and Antoniou’s work 
towards the computation of extensions; and reminded some of the major variations of 
DfL. Moreover, during this chapter we discussed research questions that arise in such 
settings and motivate our viewpoint. 
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4 Application Area Analysis 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we analyze the application area of this thesis, i.e. electronic 
agreements. We broadly refer to three application sub-areas, where electronic 
agreements play a central role: e-commerce, business process modelling and 
automation, and virtual communities. Specifically, first we discuss various example 
scenaria and present a set of requirements that a representation of electronic 
agreements should meet, in order to facilitate the development of tools for contract 
performance monitoring. We then review research efforts related to contract 
representation and contract performance monitoring that have emerged during the last 
decade and are based on logic and present the open issues that each approach deals 
with and the characteristic techniques that have been employed to this scope. 
Typically approaches involve a representation of deontic notions (such as obligation, 
permission, prohibition and power), their associated meta-level notions (such as 
violation, sanction, compliance and normative conflict), mental notions (such as 
beliefs, desires, intentions and trust) and domain-independent concepts such as time, 
actions and their effects. Furthermore, we comment which of the noted requirements 
are met.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: section 4.2 introduces several 
example scenaria of the application area of this thesis; section 4.3 introduces and 
discusses a list of requirements for representation languages and specifications for the 
development of computational tools; section 4.4 provides a critical review on 
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previous logic-based approaches that deal with purchase, cooperation and social 
contracts; and finally, section 4.5 provides a summary. 
4.2 e-Contract Example Scenaria 
In this thesis, for the purposes of illustration, we consider various example 
scenaria of business transactions between different parties of interest (e.g. a Buyer, a 
Retailer, a Wholesaler, a Mediator, an Importer and a Carrier). Business transactions 
take place in electronic marketplaces that are populated by software agents. Each 
agent acts as a representative for one contracting party. The multi-party scenario 
outlines the manner in which a business interaction is being carrying out, taking into 
account normative positions that hold among contracting parties, actions that can be 
performed during the commercial transaction and their effects on the different states 
of this transaction.  
Let the set Agents={Agent1, Agent2, Agent3,…..} denote distinct identifiers for the various 
agents, and the set Roles={BA, RA, WA, CA, MA, IA, …} denote distinct roles that agents may 
assume in the e-market (where BA, RA, WA, CA, MA, IA denote buyer, retailer, wholesaler, 
carrier, mediator and importer respectively). Assume, now, that a buyer requests a 
product. The buyer, in order to order successfully the requested product, should 
provide to its representative agent (agent: Agent1, role: BA) all essential knowledge for 
its request. For instance, Agent1 who acts as a BA is aware of the amount of the requested 
goods, their type, the time and the form of the delivery and the bounds of the 
acceptable price. Correspondingly, the buyer’s agent communicates with the retailer’s 
agent (agent: Agent2, role: RA) and settles down an agreement that fulfils its request. 
Furthermore, the agreement is enhanced with additional information such us address 
of delivery, the way of payment, guarantee of normal execution, the way of possible 
compensation in case of violations and the commission in case of mediating. Note 
that during this work we do not aim to examine the way that agents negotiate, but we 
focus on the contract drafting phase, its electronic representation and contract 
performance monitoring. The retailer’s agent is, either, able to satisfy immediately its 
contract with the buyer’s agent by selling goods from its stock or defines a new 
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request from its point of view towards possible wholesaler partners (agent: Agent4, role: 
WA).  
Taking into account the first option (case A) the business transaction embodies 
two contracting parties, i.e. the buyer (agent: Agent1, role: BA) and the retailer (agent: 
Agent2, role: RA). Apart from this agreement, another agreement should be established to 
complete the whole transaction. The new agreement is related to the transportation of 
the requested goods from one contractual party to another. Thus, the retailer should 
communicate with a carrier agent (agent: Agent3, role: CA) and establish another 
agreement with it for the timely and safe delivery of goods towards the buyer (Figure 
4.1). 
 
Buyer Retailer
Carrier
Agent1 Agent2
Agent3
 
Figure 4.1 Case A: Contracts between Buyer – Retailer and Retailer – Carrier 
 
Buyer Retailer
Carrier
Wholesaler
Carrier
Agent1 Agent2
Agent3
Agent4
Agent5
 
Figure 4.2 Case B: Contracts between Buyer – Retailer, Retailer – Carrier, Retailer - 
Wholesaler and Wholesaler – Carrier 
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Based on the second option Agent2 has a dual role. It can act either as a retailer 
(agent: Agent2, role: RA) (case B) – that is to establish a new agreement with the 
wholesaler, purchase requested goods in any form, transform them in the desirable 
package and resell them to the buyer, or act as a mediator (agent: Agent2, role: MA) (case 
C) – that is to mediate among the buyer and the wholesaler in order to come to a new 
agreement and request a commission. According to the first option the business 
transaction embodies five contractual parties, connected with contracts as shown in 
Figure 4.2. Here, two transportation contracts have been established: the first between 
the wholesaler and a carrier (agent: Agent5, role: CA) and the second, between, the 
retailer and another carrier (agent: Agent3, role: CA), in order to deliver goods from the 
wholesaler to the retailer and from the retailer to the buyer, respectively. According to 
the later option the business transaction embodies four contractual parties, connected 
with contracts as shown in Figure 4.3. Here, one transportation contract have been 
established between the wholesaler and a carrier (agent: Agent5, role: CA) in order to 
deliver goods from the wholesaler to the buyer directly. 
 
Buyer
Mediator
Wholesaler
Carrier
Agent1
Agent2
Agent4
Agent5
 
Figure 4.3 Case C: Contracts between Buyer – Mediator, Mediator – Wholesaler, Buyer - 
Wholesaler and Wholesaler – Carrier 
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Of course, we may extend this scenario with more contracting parties, e.g. an 
importer (agent: Agent6, role: IA) and another carrier (agent: Agent7, role: CA) as shown in 
Figure 4.4. On the basis on the above analysis for a realistic commercial agreement, it 
is clear that the whole process could be separated in sub-processes of two contracting 
parties. In other words, we may focus on a two-party contract that includes all the 
essential characteristics of a contractual agreement and is a representative example of 
complex agreements that take place in e-marketplaces. In the next section, we present 
in more detail a case study three-party scenario, which contains two independent two-
party contracts. 
 
Buyer Retailer
Carrier
Wholesaler
Carrier
Agent1 Agent2
Agent3
Agent4
Agent5
Importer
Carrier
Agent7
Agent6
 
Figure 4.4 Case D: Contracts between Buyer – Mediator, Mediator – Wholesaler, Buyer – 
Wholesaler, Wholesaler – Carrier, Wholesaler – Importer and Importer - Carrier 
 
4.2.1 A three-party business transaction 
For the purposes of illustration consider an electronic marketplace, populated by 
software agents that establish and perform e-contracts on behalf of some real world 
parties (Figure 4.5).  
Let the set Agents={Agent1, Agent2, Agent3,…..} denote distinct identifiers for the various 
agents, and the set Roles={BA, SA, CA, …} denote distinct roles that agents may assume in the 
e-market (where BA, SA, CA, denote buyer, seller and carrier respectively). A buyer 
(agent: Agent1, role: BA) communicates with a seller (agent: Agent2, role: SA) and 
establishes an agreement with it for purchasing a certain product. Consequently, the 
seller communicates with a carrier agent (agent: Agent3, role: CA) and establishes 
another agreement with it for the timely and safe delivery of goods toward the buyer. 
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Buyer Seller
Carrier
Agent1 Agent2
Agent3
 
Figure 4.5 A three-party business transaction 
 
The first agreement (between BA and SA) is to be conducted on the following 
terms8: SA should see to it that the goods be delivered to BA within 10 days from the 
date BA’s order happens. BA, in turn, should see to it that payment be made either in 
cash on delivery or within 21 days from the date it receives the goods, via a deposit in 
a bank account, at an additional cost. The agreement may specify sanctions and 
possible reparations in case the two agents do not comply with their obligations, 
which we refer here explicitly. If SA does not deliver on time, then a fixed amount is 
to be deducted from the original price of the goods for each day of delay and it should 
see to it that delivery be made by a new deadline, say within the next 3 days. If BA 
does not perform payment on delivery, then an additional cost is added to the original 
price of the goods and payment is arranged to take place within 21 days from the date 
BA receives the goods, via a deposit in a bank account, at this additional cost. If BA 
does not perform payment within 21 days, then a 2% surcharge is to be added to the 
price of the goods for each day of delay. In the same spirit, the second agreement 
(between SA and CA) specifies obligations, deadlines and possible sanctions/reparations 
in case of violations. In Table 4.1, we present a non-complete list of normative 
positions, such as obligations, prohibitions, permissions and institutionalized powers, 
that are raised among contracting parties in such a business transaction: 
                                                 
8 For the purposes of simplicity and without loss of generality, we discuss the example scenario 
without noting the distinction between agents and their roles. We consider that each agent having a 
single role acts on behalf of its representative and we refer to agents by mentioning their roles.  
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Table 4.1 Normative positions for contracting parties 
NORMATIVE 
POSITION BUYER SELLER CARRIER 
Obliged 
- to accept 
requested goods in 
case of successful 
delivery 
- to pay the seller in 
case of successful 
product delivery 
via the carrier 
agent for the case 
of the cash on 
delivery option or 
via a deposit in a 
bank account 
within 21 days  
 
- to formulate 
goods in the 
desired form as 
requested from the 
buyer and agreed 
in the contract 
- to arrange the way 
and the time of the 
delivery, i.e. to 
settle down a new 
agreement with a 
carrier that meets 
the same 
requirements of its 
contract with the 
buyer 
- to ensure quality 
of service, e.g. the 
on time delivery, 
in the desired 
form and in 
acceptable 
condition 
- to pay the carrier 
in the pre-agreed 
time point/period 
in the case of a 
successful 
delivery of 
products to the 
buyer  
- to deliver the 
requested goods  
- to ensure quality 
of service, e.g. the 
on time delivery, 
in the desired 
form and in 
acceptable 
condition 
- to accept payment 
on behalf of the 
seller in the case 
of the cash on 
delivery option 
Permitted 
- to ask for discount 
or return goods 
(the whole amount 
or a part of it) in 
the case of 
contrary to duty 
actions or 
delinquencies 
- to cancel the 
agreement with 
the seller at an 
- to ask for discount 
in case of contrary 
to duty actions or 
delinquencies, 
- to cancel its 
agreement with 
the retailer or the 
carrier at an early 
time  
- to cancel its 
agreement with 
the seller at an 
early time  
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early time  
Prohibited 
- not to accept 
products after 
successful 
delivery 
- to cancel the 
agreement at a 
delayed time  
- to cancel the 
agreement with 
the buyer or the 
carrier without 
informing the 
third contractual 
party 
- to cancel its 
agreement with 
the buyer or the 
carrier at a 
delayed time  
- to deliver/resell 
the transported 
products to 
another buyer 
- not to accept 
payment on behalf 
of the seller in the 
case of the cash 
on delivery option 
- to cancel its 
agreement with 
the seller at a 
delayed time  
Institutional 
Empowered 
- to require product 
delivery in case of 
ordering 
- to return the 
delivered product 
- to negotiate the 
seller’s (and the 
carrier’s) contrary 
to duty actions or 
delinquencies, 
such as delayed 
delivery or bad 
condition of goods
- to require 
payment for its 
services, e.g. in 
the case of  a 
successful 
delivery of 
products 
- to entrust and 
authorize a third 
party (e.g. the 
carrier) to deliver 
products  
- to entrust and 
authorize another 
party (e.g. the 
carrier or a bank) 
for product 
payment  
- to negotiate the 
seller’s (and the 
carrier’s) contrary 
to duty actions or 
delinquencies, 
such as delayed 
payment or bad 
condition of 
delivered goods 
- to require 
payment for its 
services, e.g. in 
the case of  a 
successful 
delivery of 
products 
- to deliver a 
product on behalf 
of the seller 
- to get paid on 
behalf of seller in 
case of the cash 
on delivery option 
- to negotiate the 
retailer’s contrary 
to duty actions or 
delinquencies, 
such as delayed 
payment 
 
Following [55], we may take an informal, process view of the business 
transaction that is regulated by the two agreements. Each state offers a (possibly 
partial) description of the factual and normative propositions that hold true in it. A 
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transition between states corresponds to an event that takes place, i.e., an action that 
one of the parties performs or omits to perform. An abstract description of the 
business exchange as a state diagram is shown in Figure 4.6, where a double line 
node denotes the initial state; a bold line node denotes a total successful ending of the 
agreement; a discontinuous bold line node denotes a total unsuccessful ending of the 
transaction; and finally, a single line node denotes a midway state of the business 
transaction. 
 
S0
S2
S1
S4 S5
S8 S9
S3
Order
Delivery
Payment No payment
No delivery
………….
Payment No payment
S6 S7
Delivery No delivery
S10 S11
S12 S13
Payment
No payment
………….
Payment No payment
 
Figure 4.6 E-contract transition diagram 
 
A more detailed part of such a description of the business exchange as a state 
diagram is shown in Figure 4.7. Initially, at time point T0, the transaction is in state S0 
where the two agreements have been established and no events have occurred yet. If 
BA places an order at some time after T0, the transaction will move to a state S1, where 
SA is obliged towards BA to deliver goods within 10 days. Also, CA’s obligation towards 
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SA, to deliver goods to BA on SA’s behalf within 10 days, is active. If CA delivers within 
the specified time bounds, then the business exchange will move to a state S2, where 
CA’s obligation (and SA’s obligation towards the BA for delivery, which is related to it) 
is successfully discharged, and BA’s obligation towards SA to pay becomes active (as 
does SA’s obligation to pay CA). If, when the transaction is at state S1, CA does not 
deliver on time, then the transaction will move to some state S3, where SA must 
compensate BA as specified by their agreement (and CA must compensate SA as 
specified by their agreement). In the same manner we may discuss other states of the 
business exchange. 
 
S0
CA has delivered.
BA is obliged to see to it that 
   payment to CA (SA) 
   be made in cash on delivery.
etc.
S2
BA has ordered. 
SA is obliged to see to it that 
   goods be delivered to BA within 10 days.
SA and CA agreement has commenced. 
CA is obliged towards SA to deliver 
   goods to BA within 10 days.
S1
BA has paid SA.
etc.
S4 S5
S8 S9
BA has not paid CA (SA).
BA is obliged to see to it 
  that payment to SA  
  be made within 21 days 
  at an additional cost.
etc.
S3
An order happens by BA.
………….
On time delivery by 
CA (SA) happens.
Payment on delivery 
by BA happens
No payment on delivery
 happens by BA.
No delivery happens 
by CA (SA)
………….  
Figure 4.7 Part of the e-contract transition diagram 
 
4.3 Requirements Analysis and Specification 
Although the three-party business transaction is superficially simple, it puts on 
view several important features that are met on more sophisticated and realistic 
scenaria of transactions, and motivates a discussion about the requirements of 
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appropriate electronic agreement representations in order to facilitate the 
development of tools that support CSR in OS, such as the e-marketplaces, business 
environments or virtual communities, and specifically for tools that support contract 
performance monitoring.  
Table 4.2 presents a list9 of requirements for representation languages and 
specifications for the development of tools that are essential for CSR in OMAS. Next 
we discuss each one in turn. 
 
Table 4.2 Requirements and specifications  
for common-sense reasoning in open environments 
ID TITLE 
R1 Ontology representation  
R2 Temporal information representation 
R3 Deontic Modalities 
R4 Legal and Physical ability 
R5 The representation of normative violation 
R6 Contrary to Duty Structures 
R7 Normative conflict representation and resolution 
R8 Auxiliary calculations 
R9 Default, Defeasible and Nonmonotonic Reasoning 
R10 Autonomous and Adaptive Reasoning 
 
R1. Ontology representation: The concepts of the application domain as well 
as their relations need to be represented explicitly, so that such information may 
be used during inference.  
R2. Temporal information representation: We need a proper formalization of 
time and temporal information, as noted by many researchers, for instance 
[248]. Here are some examples that show that temporal reasoning is required. 
Expressions such as: 
“BA places an order at time point T”, or  
                                                 
9 This list is neither exhaustive nor its items are presented in a certain order.  
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“SA is obliged towards BA to deliver ordered goods within 10 days from the date 
BA’s order happens”, or  
“At state S1 the CA agent is obliged to delivery goods to the BA agent by time 
point T+10”, 
show that we are not only interested in the actual time points at which an action 
happens or a (normative or descriptive) proposition holds but also in deadlines. 
Indeed, specifically for norms [166] note the distinction between their so called 
internal and external times.  We may also need to represent periodic 
information, for instance: 
 “RA is obliged to perform installment payment each month”.  
Specific issues that arise concern the commonsense law of inertia, the 
representation of the indirect effects of actions, the representation of non-
deterministic actions, concurrent actions and so on. 
R3. Deontic Modalities: We need to determine what normative relations obtain 
between parties during a business transaction. Deontic Logic studies such 
notions, i.e., obligations, permissions, prohibitions and their interrelation [43, 
176]. Deontic Logic allows us to disconnect what is the case from what ought 
to be the case. Such distinction enables us to determine explicitly whether the 
actual behavior of contractual parties complies with the prescribed behavior.  
[134, 252, 177]. 
R4. Legal and Physical Ability: We need to distinguish between the 
legal/institutional and the actual/physical ability of involved parties to perform 
actions in order to meet their obligations [165, 136]. Such notions are essential, 
because they affect which actions are considered as valid and consequently 
which actions’ effects obtain the domain [136]. 
R5. The representation of Normative Violation: In realistic domains, such as 
electronic marketplaces, along with the notion of obligation comes the notion of 
violation. Their relation is obvious. Given a specifications of the agents’ 
obligations during a business transaction, which typically involve deadlines, the 
e-contract representation ought to facilitate the automated determination of 
agreement violations. There are many ways in which an agent may violate its 
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obligation to perform an action A by time T, e.g. the agent may perform A but not 
within the deadline, or the agent may not perform A at all, or the agent may 
perform some other action B which renders performance of A impossible etc. 
Similar concerns arise in the case of prohibitions, which, again, may be violated 
in more than one ways.  
R6. Contrary to Duty Structures: Contrary to duty structures are the 
specification of a primary obligation, along with the specification of a 
secondary obligation that obtains if the primary one is violated. One may see 
them as a priori (to contract violation) determinations of recovery mechanisms 
[44, 200].  
R7. Normative Conflict representation and resolution: According to [222] a 
conflict arises when “(possibly) valid norms establish incompatible 
qualifications for the same concrete state”. A norm set may be either 
inconsistent, if a contradiction is logically derivable from it, or potentially 
inconsistent, if it may lead to contradiction in an upcoming state. In similar 
spirit in [127, 128] moral conflicts are defined as states where an agent ought to 
do an action A and, at the same time, it ought to do another action B, but it is 
impossible to do both. Such situations are often met in business transactions 
where agents either are in conflict and need a resolution or face a potential 
conflict and need a plan to overcome this situation or to deal with it in a self-
serving manner.  
R8. Auxiliary calculations: We need to be able to define and use formulae and 
procedures that enable the dynamic calculation and re-recalculation of domain 
concepts, such as deadlines based on relative times, or amount of money for 
payment. 
R9. Default, Defeasible and Nonmonotonic Reasoning: The need for 
reasoning by default, defeasibly and non-monotonically in legal domains is 
strongly argued in many research papers, i.e., [223, 66, 41, 114, 199] among 
others. Different dimensions and interpretations of this kind of reasoning have 
been discussed in various approaches with respect to the underlying logic that 
each approach adopts. 
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R10. Autonomous and Adaptive Reasoning: In norm-governed OMAS, that 
replicate real world scenaria, reasoning in the presence of incomplete or 
inconsistent knowledge is usually the case. In such circumstances an agent 
either needs to plan its future activities based on several cases about 
events/actions that will occur, and that its partners’ actions will be valid (best-
guess reasoning) or even though it may not know everything about the past and 
present, it may need to infer information, in order to protect itself from an 
undesirable situation in the future (no-risk reasoning). Thus an agent, first, 
needs to posses self-knowledge, and, second, needs to self-manage and self-
regulate its reasoning by employing appropriate assumptions that fill in 
information gaps. When more information becomes available, possibly 
rendering some of these assumptions false, the agent must be able to retract 
conclusions drawn previously, on the basis of these assumptions. In other 
words, for an agent in order to perform autonomous and adaptive reasoning, 
which is also adjusted to its current knowledge, some kind of NMR based on 
assumptions is required. 
4.4 Related Work 
In this section we present research efforts that are based on logic and have been 
proposed during the last decade. The research community that has been concerned 
with electronic agreements has focused not only on e-commerce applications but also 
on business process modeling and automation and social norms that govern virtual 
communities. Our aim is to commit to this paper the fundamental features that each 
proposed framework contributes. We classify all gathered research approaches in 
subsections based on the application domain (e-commerce, e-business, virtual 
communities) and the specific characteristics/features that distinguish them from 
other frameworks. In the subsection 4.4.1 we record approaches that refer to e-
commerce applications, while in subsections 4.4.2 and 4.4.3 we record approaches 
that refer to applications for business process modeling and automation and virtual 
communities. 
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4.4.1 E-commerce 
4.4.1.1 Dynamic Logic  
In this part we discuss efforts presented in [219, 55, 56, 218, 217]. Those 
approaches are grouped together due to the common inspiration, which originate from 
Meyer’s dynamic logic formalisation of deontic notions [175], to address reasoning 
with time and actions.  
Santos and Carmo, in [219], propose a set of deontic operators in order to specify 
the intended set of behaviours that are related with contractual parties. Deontic 
operators are combined with dynamic operators to represent actions. Furthermore 
operators present a temporal dimension through their semantics. Desirable behaviours 
of contractual parties are based on the concept of obligation. Obligations were 
defined by a special kind of norm, in the juridical context, called prescription. 
According to [249] a prescription is a command or permission, settled by someone in 
an authoritative position, towards agents with the intention of inducing or allowing 
them certain behaviours or conducts. Obligations are examined from the point view 
of their fulfillment and/or their violation through an a posteriori verification of the 
actual behaviour. On the whole, the proposed logic mainly addresses compliance with 
the agreement that is requirements R2, R3 and R5. This work is the first approach in 
the analysis and representation of contractual obligations and set the basis for 
subsequent proposals. 
In [55, 56] a Modal Action Logic combined with Deontic Logic operators 
approach was proposed by Daskalopulu et al.. A contract is modelled as a process 
whose state at a given time is determined by the legal relations that stand between 
contractual parties. Transitions between states are affected by parties’ actions. 
Depending on whether parties’ actions comply or violate contractual behaviours, the 
resulting state is defined as acceptable or unacceptable. An unacceptable state either 
sets the abnormal ending of the business transaction or is unacceptable in a tolerable 
way because reparation is possible. Moreover, reparations associated with the 
violation of obligations are studied and a suitable representation of contrary to duty 
structures in fault tolerant systems is proposed. To sum up, this approach mainly 
concerns requirements R2, R3, R5 and R6. 
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In [217, 218, 216] an electronic agent-based contract framework layered on top of 
existing B2B frameworks is presented by Sallé et al.. The framework was designed to 
support the whole life-cycle of the contract, which consists of three phases: (i) 
drafting, (ii) formation, and (iii) fulfilment. In this work, contracts were defined as 
sets of statements of participant’s intentions. The contract specifies the behaviour of 
contractual parties in ideal worlds as well as in sub-ideal worlds where parties’ do not 
fulfil their commitments. Contract structure was separated in two main parts: (i) an 
informative section that contains information such as identification number, identities 
and roles, validity period and a normative system of reference, and (ii) a behavioural 
specification section which is a set of informative statements that describes the 
expected behaviour of participants. All contractual obligations are associated with 
sanctions. This characteristic gives the agent the advantage of a deliberative decision 
on fulfilling or not a normative statement based on positive or negative effects. Two 
types of sanction norms were proposed. Endogenous sanctions, i.e., contrary to duty 
structures, and exogenous sanctions that apply when violations with no specific 
endogenous sanction occur. To sum up, this approach mainly concerns requirements 
R2, R3, R5 and R6. 
4.4.1.2 Event Calculus 
Here we discuss two frameworks presented in [79, 143]. Both approaches adopt a 
contract representation in Event Calculus (EC) for temporal reasoning and reasoning 
with actions and their effects [149, 228]. EC is also used in [261, 211, 212] but we 
discuss these approaches later in subsection 4.4.1.4 because they have another 
important distinguishing feature. 
In [79] Farrell et al. present an ontology and a tool to capture issues that are 
related with contract state tracking for Service Level Agreements. The presented 
framework is implemented using the Java programming language and is constructed 
on an XML-based formalization of the Event Calculus, called ecXML. Their main 
intention is the implementation of a tool, called Event Calculus State Tracking 
Architecture (ECSTA), which is able to track the effects of various events on 
different contractual states and to define what normative relations hold between 
parties on those states. Moreover, a detailed discussion about notions such as 
obligation, permission (vested permission) and institutionalized power (vested power) 
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and their role in the business transaction is presented. Based on the above analysis, 
three types of contractual norms are proposed: contract management norms, 
obligation norms and privilege norms. We discuss the third type which concerns with 
actions that are permitted to be performed and are not explicitly recorded in the 
contract. According to Farrell et al. any action that is not permitted is considered to 
be an illegal action. This fact leads us to the conclusion that there is no need for 
explicit prohibition norms or in other words the absence of permission is considered 
as the presence of prohibition. On the whole, requirements R2, R3, R4 and R8 are 
explicitly discussed; we believe that requirements R5 and R6 are also met by this 
approach, although the authors do not explicitly discuss them. 
Knottenbelt and Clark, in [143], introduce a simple Event Calculus representation 
of contracts and a BDI architecture that supports contract performance. The proposed 
architecture was built on top of the AgentSpeak(L) [202] agent architecture and 
enables agents to respond to events in a reactive or a proactive manner based on their 
active contracts and temporal conditions. During this work two types of contracts 
were studied. Short-term contracts like the one presented in our example scenario and 
long-term contracts that define requirements of short-term contract drafting. 
Communication between agents is possible by exchanging events. An event is 
considered as the act of sending messages. A well-formed message consists of a time 
stamp, an identifier, the identifier of the message to which it is a reply, a sender, a 
receiver, content, context, and the interaction protocol. During messaging exchange 
an agent is able to evaluate a contract by placing a query on the Event Calculus HoldsAt 
predicate [149, 228]. To sum up, this approach deals with requirements R2, R3 (only 
obligations are discussed), R4 (only institutionalized power is discussed) and R5. 
Moreover, the authors claim that conflict detection and resolution is possible through 
the work presented in [31]. 
4.4.1.3 Non-monotonic Reasoning 
In this section we discuss approaches that deal with defeasible and non-monotonic 
reasoning with e-contracts [112, 204, 113, 111, 22, 104, 105, 191, 189]. In what 
follows we present the main points of those proposals. Note that although the 
underlying logic language and theory are different, these approaches present many 
common features due to the interrelation of the adopted logics. 
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In a series of papers, such as [112, 204, 113, 111, 22] Grosof et al. presented a 
comprehensive approach to the representation of business rules and a series of tools 
that are integrated in the WWW framework. Specifically, in [112] a declarative 
approach to the representation of e-contracts rules that is based on Courteous Logic 
Programs (CLP) is introduced. CLP is an extension of Ordinary Logic Programs 
(OLP) with prioritized conflict handling. The central purpose of this work is to 
present declarative contract semantics, to handle potential conflicts with priorities, to 
represent contract rules with an XML-based encoding and to present a prototype 
called Common Rules. This works is mainly concerned with the contract negotiation 
phase and particularly with a suitable contract rule representation for communication 
during this phase. Moreover, in [112] an XML formalism of CLP rules called 
Business Rules Markup Language (BRML) and a prototype implementation named 
Common Rules was also introduced. This work was extended in [204] and an 
auction-based negotiation tool called ContractBot was introduced. Here a contract 
representation in CLP rules that consists of two subsets is presented. The first subset, 
called, proto-contract, contains rules that determine facts and conditions of the overall 
transaction, such as ways of delivery, payment or reparation, while the other subset 
contains negotiation-level rules, that describes of what and how will be negotiated. In 
[111] an overview of all previous efforts is available plus an extension, of the 
previous work on business rules representation, which is based on Situated Courteous 
Logic Programs (SCLP) is also introduced. SCLP is the Situated extension of CLP 
that is characterized of features such as non-monotinicity, that are negation as failure 
and prioritized conflict handling as presented above and furthermore, procedures for 
querying on contracts and representing actions. Note that conflict detection is 
facilitated with the use of mutual exclusions statements, which are statements (pair of 
literals) that determine contradictory or inconsistent transaction states. On the whole, 
this approach deals well with requirements R5, R7, R8 and R9, but no temporal 
representation was adopted in order to facilitate reasoning with time.  
In [104, 105] an architecture to represent and reason about e-contracts is 
introduced by Governatori et al.. The system is called DR-Contract and extends the 
DR-Device architecture (a system for defeasible reasoning on the Semantic Web 
[20],) with the Defeasible Deontic Logic of Violation (DDLV) [104, 107]. The aim of 
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this approach is to analyze the expected behaviour of the contractual parties and to 
identify what normative relations arise from an e-contract. Contracts are considered to 
comprise provisions that determine obligations, permissions, entitlements and other 
mutual normative positions that hold among contractual parties. Contract clauses are 
separated in two different types: (i) definitional clauses that define contractual 
concepts such as “who is a privileged customer” or “what is a special order”, and (ii) 
normative clauses that contain deontic notions and intend to regulate the whole 
transaction. The underlying logic that is adopted is Nute’s Defeasible Logic [187]. 
According to this theory four types of knowledge are considered: (i) facts, (ii) strict 
rules, which are rules in the classical sense (iii) defeasible rules, which are rules that 
can be defeated by other rules, and, finally, (iv) superiority relations, which define 
priority relations among rules. Another point worth mentioning is the fact that this 
approach also deals, in detail, with the issue of violation of primary obligations and 
their reparation mechanisms. Contrary to duty structures were represented by 
introducing a new non-classical connective ⊗ [104, 107]. The interpretation of the 
formula OA⊗OB is “Obligation B is the reparation of the violation of obligation B”. This 
connective allows the combination of primary and reparatory obligation in a single 
regulation and satisfies important properties such as associativity, duplication and 
contraction on the right that enable reasoning with CTDs. Note that, according to 
Governatori, the Courteous Logic Programs of the previous presented approach is a 
notational variable of Defeasible Logic and thus the integration of properties of both 
approaches is possible. To sum up, this approach covers requirements R3, R5, R6, R7 
and R9. No temporal dimension is given via the integration of some temporal logic, 
but an extension to this direction is feasible as shown in [108, 106, 109].  
In [191, 189, 190] Paschke et al. presented the ContractLog system, an Extended 
Logic Program with negation-as-finite-failure and explicit negation. This approach 
deals with execution and monitoring of Service Level Agreements. SLAs are 
represented via reactive Event-Condition-Action rules that are enhanced with EC 
predicates and other special predicates for deontic notions. This work, also, uses 
Nute’s Defeasible Logic in combination with integrity constrains that express a 
condition which must always hold. Specifically, ContractLog supports four basic 
types of integrity constraints: a) Not-constraints that express that none of the stated 
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conclusions should be drawn, b) Xor-constraints that express that the stated 
conclusions are mutual exclusive, c) Or-constraints that express that at least one of 
the stated conclusions should be drawn and d) And-constraints that express that all of 
the stated conclusion should be drawn. Moreover, other logic formalisms such as 
Description Logic are used to integrate ContractLog to Semantic Web. On the whole, 
this approach presents ideas that are similar to both previous presented approaches, 
e.g. ideas for dealing with conflict resolution and nonmonotonic reasoning, but differs 
on implementation level and seems to address requirements R2, R3, R5, R6, R7, R8 
and R9.  
4.4.1.4 Commitments 
In this section we have gathered and discuss approaches that see e-contracts from 
a commitment-based perspective [257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 49, 64, 241, 211, 212, 
153, 244]. Although the perspective is similar, they vary in what commitments 
denote.  
In [257, 258] monitoring requirements for e-marketplaces and a system 
architecture are presented. Specifically, in [258], Xu proposed an approach for 
contract modelling that is based in Temporal Logic. This work aims to facilitate pro-
active monitoring and violation prevention. This is accomplished by proposing 
workflow constrains and guards of workflow constrains that describe different 
complex relationships among actions and make possible to take the initiative to 
anticipate and avoid contract violations. Moreover a guard and a pro-active detection 
algorithm are presented to dynamically monitor business processes. Supplementary to 
previous papers, in [259] the notion of commitments is added to the formal 
representation of the electronic contract. A commitment is considered not as a distinct 
obligation but as a guarantee by one party towards other parties that some action 
sequence shall be executed completely. This fact is the main difference with the next 
three approaches. Next to the notion of commitment, the commitment graph is 
presented that is an overview of commitments between agents. So the commitment 
graph is a graphical encoding of contract clauses. This graph in cooperation with the 
two algorithms may point out which partner is responsible for which violations as 
shown in detail in [260]. On the whole, this approach deals with requirements R2, R3 
(via commitments, not via classical deontic notions) and R6.  
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Yolum and Singh presented in [261] an approach for specifying and executing 
protocols that regulate multi agent interactions. Such protocols define a set of social 
commitments (or else commitments) that are assigned to agents. Conceptually, 
commitments capture obligations arising for an agent towards another agent to bring 
about a certain property. The business transaction is viewed as a finite state machine 
where operations (actions) on commitments and business rules are being represented 
in the circumscriptive version of the Event Calculus language as explained in [229]. 
Two basic commitment types are considered [230]: (i) Base-level commitments 
meaning that an agent is committed towards another agent to bring about condition, 
and (ii) Conditional commitments meaning that if a condition is satisfied then an 
agent will be committed towards another agent to bring about another condition. Six 
operations on commitments are used here [230]. Possible transitions in the business 
protocol can be specified in terms of the Event Calculus language. Once again this 
approach addresses requirements R2, R3 and R5 and moreover it addresses 
nonmonotonic reasoning through the circumscriptive version of the Event Calculus. 
In [49] Chopra and Singh introduce a method to contextualize commitment protocols 
by modifying them via different transformations. Contrary to previous work [261], 
protocols are now represented in C+ [102] and illustrated as transition systems. The 
nonmonotonic and causal character of the C+ action language supports elaboration 
tolerance. This means that, protocol transformations (accessions, removals or both) 
are possible simply by adding axioms to an existing protocol specification. 
Transformers are also protocol specifications and as a result in order to apply a 
transformation we simply append it to the target protocol specification. Furthermore, 
in [64], Desai et al. propose a more general way to represent and reason about 
commitments by addressing issues such as (i) complex and nested commitment 
conditions and (ii) concurrent commitment operations. This is possible, firstly, by 
specifying business processes as choreographies [82] that can support more complex 
interaction patterns, and secondly by considering choreographies as commitment 
protocols. On the whole, the work in [49, 64] deals with requirements R2, R5 and R7 
and can been seen as an extension or a supplement to the work presented in [261]. 
Finally, in [241] an approach to formalize contracts and Virtual Organizations (VO) 
based on commitments is presented. This work focuses on the interrelation of e-
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contracts, as a way to model agents’ interactions, and VO formed among contracting 
agents, where commitments, policies and goals form agents’ relationships. Contracts 
are considered as static entities that capture relationships among two or more agents, 
while, VOs are considered as dynamic entities whose membership and structure 
might evolve, and within which commitments and contracts are manipulated via 
operations on contracts and commitments. This view of VOs as contexts of agents 
and contracts facilitates addressing requirements R5 and R7.  
In [211] and [212] Rouached et al. present (i) a layered contract model, (ii) an 
approach for regulating Web Services to support cross-organizational collaborations, 
and (iii) how the integration of contact management services into the overall business 
process may be facilitated. This work, also, uses the Event Calculus language as 
presented in [149] to specify the contract state at particular time points. A point that is 
worth mentioning is that, special terms, expressing temporal relations, are used to 
express the relation between the occurrences of different events (composite events). 
As in [230, 261] this work accepts three types of commitments. The third type is the 
Persistent commitment expressing that an agent is committed towards another agent 
that some condition holds on all future time points. Here, deontic clauses, such as 
obligation, permission and prohibition, are defined in terms of operations on 
commitments using both commitments and EC axioms [229]. With respect to the 
specified requirements, this approach deals with issues R2 and R3. 
In [153] another approach that considers contracts as protocols that regulate 
business agreements by specifying a set of commitments is proposed by Letia and 
Groza. Contracts are represented by Defeasible Commitments Machines (DCM), 
which is a theory in the Normative Defeasible Logic (NDL) presented in [108]. The 
theory consists of two parts. The first part captures the representation of standard 
commitments and the possible operations on them in terms of (NDL).  The second 
part includes all contract dependent rules. As in previous commitment-based 
approaches, this work accepts two types of commitments (Base-level and Conditional 
commitments). Temporalized Defeasible Logic in combination with time constraints 
for commitments (deadlines for fulfilment) facilitates the entailment of conclusions 
about commitment states over time. In this way, besides the gain of reasoning 
temporally, agents are also able to reason with incomplete knowledge. To conclude, 
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this approach addresses requirements R2, R3 but there is no mention about 
permission or prohibition, R7 but there are no particular conflict patterns specified, 
and R9 via Defeasible Logic. In [244], Vartic and Letia intend to verify all stages of a 
commercial interaction via presenting an agent model based on rules. Agents beside 
contracts and commitments also possess a set of pre-contacts and pre-commitments 
that illustrate the interaction during the negotiation stage. Beliefs, goals, obligations, 
permissions, rights, actions and violations are expressed in a non-monotonic logic, 
i.e. defeasible logic [16], where only defeasible rules and no strict rules are 
considered. Furthermore, as in [104, 105, 191, 189] static priorities for rules with 
contradictory conclusions are used for conflict resolution. This approach seems to 
addresses requirements R2, R3, R5, R7, R8 and R9 but very little technical detail is 
available. 
4.4.1.5 Linguistic Aspects of e-Contracts 
In this section we discuss the work presented in [238, 239]. The particular feature 
of the work of Tan and Thoen is the fact that it specifies the need for directed deontic 
notions. It deals with e-contracts from a linguistic perspective and, therefore, this 
approach mainly concerns with issues R110 and R3. [238] addresses some 
unanswered questions of their previous work where a formal model, called Deontic 
Deep Structure Model, was presented. According to [238] (i) the ambiguities that 
derive from the underlying logic for directed obligation [117, 220], as adopted in their 
previous work, and (ii) its shortcoming to express directed permissions, raised the 
need for improvement.  An alternative definition for directed obligations is presented 
and a definition for directed permission is proposed. These definitions are based on a 
conditional operator interpreted as “count as” and an attempt operator, as presented in 
[136, 221], respectively. Moreover, a different interrelation between directed 
obligation and directed permission form the one that holds in SDL for obligation and 
permission is proposed. In their later work, [239], an approach to deal with 
                                                 
10 Note that without any distinction, all gathered approaches, use specific terms in order to deal with e-
contacts. Those terms are domain-specific and facilitate dealing with specific open problems. This is 
the main reason we do not refer in detail the way each approach address the first issue of interest (i.e. 
ontology). For a more detailed analysis, someone has to study other research approaches which address 
e-contracting from the perspective of ontologies. This is out of the scope of this thesis. 
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requirement R2 is presented. Towards this direction a contract representation in the 
Formal Language for Business Communication (FLBC) [142] was proposed. 
4.4.1.6 Hypothetical Reasoning 
Alberti et al. in [7] adopt the SCIFF abductive logic language to specify business 
contracts. SCIFF logic language is a mixture of the Abductive Logic Programming 
(ALP) [4] and the Constraint Logic Programming (CLP) [130]. The primary entities 
of the language are events, which are used to represent contractual notions such as 
actions or timeouts, and expectations that describe the desired behaviour in terms of 
events. Deontic operators such as obligations, permission and prohibition are related 
to abductive expectations via a proposed mapping [8]. Their primary goal is to 
address the problem of runtime verification of contract policies. However, an 
extension of SCIFF, named g-SCIFF, is defined in order to reason with contract 
specifications at design time, too. A contract in the SCIFF logic language is described 
by a knowledge base that captures domain-specific knowledge and by a set of 
integrity constrains that describe contract clauses. This approach captures the notions 
of violation and recovery and as stated by the authors conflicts and contradictions are 
possible to detect at run-time by the proposed notions of E-conistency and ⌐-
consistency, but no specific normative conflict patterns are discussed. 
ALP extends normal Logic Programming by allowing some predicates to be 
declared as abducible predicates. Thus, reasoning is based on employing hypotheses 
on these abducible predicates as possible solutions of problems to be solved. 
Problems can be either observations that need to be explained or goals to be achieved. 
The work presented in [6] follows the latter direction on verifying that a requested 
web service, provided specific input, will lead to a desired state that satisfies a 
requested goal. Although this approach does not meet directly our requirement R10 
on autonomous and adaptive reasoning, we see that it can be used towards this scope. 
Finally, a representation of contract rules in RuleML is proposed in order to 
integrate SCIFF to Semantic Web, and an inference engine called SCIFF Reasoning 
Engine (SRE) is given. 
This approach addresses directly requirements R2, R3 and R5. Also, it seems to 
addresses requirement R7, but very little technical detail is available, and we believe 
that it partially addresses requirement R10. Finally, we see that it is possible to 
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address requirement 9 via the relation of ALP with (general) Logic Programs (under 
stable model semantics [83]) or with extended Logic Programs (under answer sets 
[84]). 
4.4.2 E-business 
In this section we have gathered approaches that see contracts from the enterprise 
perspective. Specifically, in [58, 59, 167, 162] contracts are used to model and 
manage enterprise business processes, also known as workflows. As can be observed, 
the main issue those approaches address is temporal reasoning within business 
processes, while some of them adopt and represent deontic modalities.  
In [58], Davulcu et al. propose the Concurrent Transaction Logic (CTR) [25] as a 
language for specifying, analysing and scheduling of workflows. CTR is a 
conservative extension of the classical predicate logic and as argued, CTR is capable 
for (i) representing control flow graphs with transition conditions, (ii) representing 
triggers, i.e. event-condition-action rules, and is (iii) reasoning temporally. The main 
idea of this approach is a transformation procedure, called Apply, which accepts a 
workflow specification, consisting of control flow graphs, triggers and temporal 
constraints, and constructs an equivalent specification in CTR. In [59] an extension, 
called CTR-S, is presented. CTR-S extends CTR with certain concepts borrowed 
from the Game Theory. The problem this approach deals with is adversarial situations 
that arise in service contracting. A typical case is where contractual parties such as 
buyers and sellers have conflicting goals. For example, the buyer needs to be assured 
that goods will either be delivered or money will be returned, while the seller needs to 
be assured in case of contract break the down-payment can be kept. 
Marjanovic and Milosevic, in [167], describe some ideas for e-contract modelling. 
Formal modelling includes (i) modelling of deontic constraints and verification of 
deontic consistency, (ii) modelling of temporal constraints and verification of 
temporal consistency.  They use the Reference Model of Open Distributed Processing 
(RM-ODP) [1] that introduces concepts and terminology to produce an enterprise 
specification. The basic concepts are: (i) the community, i.e., group of people/agents 
and resources. Precise behaviour is possible in terms of roles; (ii) the contract that 
defines obligations, permission and prohibitions. Temporal and deontic constraints 
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are combined to verify temporal and deontic consistency. In this direction, 
visualization and verification of deontic constraints and their consistency is possible 
via role windows, while verification of deontic consistency is done through time 
maps. 
The Simple Obligation and Right Model (SORM) is presented by Ludwig and 
Stolze in [162]. SORM provides an abstract and domain independent model for 
contractual content representation and management of promises denoted in e-
contracts. The cornerstone of this approach is the notion of promise. Promises are the 
matter of subject in the electronic contract. Specifically, the party that promises enters 
an obligation, while the party that receives the promise holds a right. As mentioned in 
[162], although a Deontic Logic contract representation is suitable for reasoning 
about promises and consistency checking, it does not tell us how and when to check 
entailments for a request or when to check promises. Those issues are addressed in 
this paper. The main objective of the SORM is to provide a model that supports the 
monitoring of compliance and fulfilment of the contractual obligations. Towards this 
direction, contractual obligations and respectively contractual rights are distinguished 
in (i) state obligation and right, that are obligation and right of parties to maintain a 
particular state, (ii) obligation to perform a certain action and right to have an action 
performed, and (iii) option obligation and right to act, that are obligation of a party to 
tolerate an action performed by another party that has the corresponding right. A 
suitable representation of those obligations and right types is proposed in the SORM 
framework. Finally, certain operations performed on the set of active obligations and 
rights are discussed in order to capture the dynamics of the domain. This approach 
should be seen with respect to previous works, such as [110, 126], where the 
CrossFlow architecture is presented. CrossFlow is a contract-based framework that 
supports the dynamic establishment and enactment of a business relationship between 
two organizations. 
Cardoso and Oliveira, in [33, 34, 35], describe how to represent and use norms in 
order to formalize cooperation agreements and operational contracts and to ensure 
contract monitoring and enforcement. The whole approach takes place in an 
electronic institution and specifically refers to the B2B field, mainly regarding the 
formations and handling of Virtual Organizations. In such an environment they 
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distinguish three types of norms. Institutional norms regulate the behaviour of agents 
in the institution; constitutional norms describe the foundation of agents’ Virtual 
Organization, which thereby commit to a certain agreement; and finally, operational 
norms specify contracts by indicating actions to be performed by contractual agents. 
Note that institutional norms pre-exist, while constitutional norms are created when 
agents reach an agreement and operational norms come into existence only when 
executable contracts are signed. An important notion in this work is the “institutional 
reality” [227]. Brute fact and institutional facts are considered along with constitutive 
rules that define “count-as” relations in order to distinguish between what is said and 
what is taken for granted, always in a specific context. Contract Law “default rules” 
[53] are also used allowing contracts, firstly, to be underspecified by defining default 
clauses, and secondly, to address CTD structures by defining default procedures [56]. 
Moreover, timestamps, directed obligations and fulfilment and violation detection 
rules are considered towards a complete contract norm representation. 
4.4.3 Virtual Communities 
Here we discuss approaches that see contracts as a way to regulate agent societies 
[63, 70, 31, 69, 23, 256, 5, 251]. Social contracts are considered as a set of norms, 
rules, commitments or conventions that coordinate and manage the society behaviour. 
Generally, social contracts are dynamically determined and stipulated by autonomous 
agents according to their own internal aims and architecture. It is out of our scope to 
study the problems and specifications of agent societies, thus we examine only what 
those approaches consider as contracts and the way they use them. 
Dellarocas, in [63], presented a system, called Contractual Agent Societies (CAS), 
where agents may configure themselves and manage their activities through social 
contracts. Here contracts include beliefs, values, objectives, protocols and policies. 
Specifically, a social contract is a social commitment, which is agreed and established 
among agents, and it forms a particular social relationship and, more importantly, it 
regulates agents’ behaviour [37, 133, 230]. An important part of this approach is the 
social control system, which is responsible for avoiding, detecting and resolving 
deviations from ideal behaviour via incentives (positive or negative sanctions) and 
sentinels (commitment monitors). 
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In [69, 70], Dignum et al., presented a framework for agent societies, called 
OperA (Organizations per Agents). It consists of three different models. The 
interrelations between models are described by means of contracts. Here, two types of 
contacts are described: (i) social contracts that specify commitments between an 
agent and the society, and (ii) interaction contracts that specify agreements between 
individual agents. Note that, in this approach, the notion of the social contract differs 
from the one presented in Dellarocas [63] where both social and interaction contracts 
are merged into the social contract notion. Both types of contracts are represented 
through the Logic for Contract Representation (LCR) language [71], that is based on 
the Temporal and Deontic Logic (BTLcont) [68] and the branching-time temporal 
logic (CTL*) [76]. Based on this logic, formulae are represented as branching 
structures where nodes represent states and arcs represent events. The logic is 
extended with special operators to address issues such as (i) what is the agent’s view 
on the consequents of actions, (ii) deontic modalities, e.g. obligations, and their 
violations, (iii) conditional obligations with deadlines, and (iv) CTD imperatives [69]. 
In the same spirit, Boella and van der Torre [23], address the problem of 
regulating societies of agents and agents via contracts. Here, contracts are modelled 
as legal institutions [214]. Boella and van der Torre present three reasons to argue 
that although most normative systems identify norms with obligations, permissions 
and prohibitions, this approach is not efficient for complex normative systems. Thus, 
they formalize obligations in terms of desires and goals, and constitutive rules as 
beliefs. Constitutive rules create obligations when a contract is stipulated or when 
some relevant event happens. This notion is close to the conditional obligations as 
presented in [70]. In an earlier work, Broersen et al. are interested in conflicts arising 
between an agent’s beliefs, obligations, intentions and desires [31]. In this approach 
they use normal default rules [208] to detect conflicts, and priorities that stand among 
mental states to accomplish conflict resolution. However, they do not address 
conflicts in a temporal setting. 
Wooldridge and van der Hoek, in [256], investigate the relationship between 
Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL) [10] and Deontic Logic that is the link 
among ability and obligations. Towards this direction, they introduce a variation of 
ATL called Normative ATL* (NATL*). In this logic, powers and coalitions of agents 
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are seen through the perspective of a normative system, which is a set of rules that 
constrain the actions of the agents in the system in certain states. They introduce 
indexed modal operators for permission and obligation and, more importantly, they 
show how these operators shall be interpreted in terms of normative ability. NATL* 
is used to formalize the model of the social contract, i.e. the multi-agent system and 
the social law. Later, Ågotnes et al., in [5], present a descendent of NALT* called 
Normative Temporal Logic (NTL). NTL is simpler than NALT* and a generalization 
of the temporal logic called Computational Tree Logic (CTL) [76]. In the same spirit, 
the path quantifiers – quantifier A “on all paths” and quantifier E “on some path”- are 
replaced by contextual deontic operators for permission and obligation. Thus, in, 
both, NALT* and NTL, the deontic operators are contextualized and have a temporal 
dimension. To conclude, the main issue this work focuses is the link of requirements 
2 and 3. Furthermore, in their future work section, they argue about the need to 
examine under the scope of NATL* the CTDs structures. This remark is based on 
Prakken’s and Sergot’s [200] argument that many of the CTDs paradoxes can be 
solved within a temporal perspective. Finally, Walther et al., in [251] introduce 
Alternating-time Temporal Logic with Explicit Strategies (ATLES) as a variant of 
Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL) [10] and as an extension of Counterfactual 
ATL (CATL) [242] and Action Logic [26]. In this work, the cooperation modalities 
of ATL are being extended with a commitment function, which ensures that agents 
cooperate according to a specific strategy. 
4.5 Summary 
In this chapter, a survey and classification of logic-based approaches that have 
emerged during the last decade for contract representation and performance 
monitoring, was attempted. Through this attempt, besides the critical review, we have 
also derived and recorded requirements that a tool for e-contacting should attend. 
In the Appendix A we provide a summary of surveyed approaches that have 
emerged during the last decade, are related to contract performance monitoring and 
are based on logic. Each approach is summarized with respect to (i) its goal and main 
aspects of interest, (ii) the recorded requirements for efficient reasoning with 
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electronic contracts and (iii) its integration to Semantic Web and tool presentation. 
Furthermore, Appendix A, contains a review and summary of the research presented 
in this thesis as it is attempted to place this thesis in the overall context of the e-
contracting research approaches. 
Research discussed in this chapter has been published or is under review in [96, 
88]. 
 
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
09/12/2017 01:19:12 EET - 137.108.70.7
Symbolic Representations and Common-sense Reasoning in Open Multi-agent Systems
 
 77
 
5 Reasoning with Incomplete 
Knowledge 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we identify and discuss explicit research questions that arise in 
open norm-governed environments, where agents seek to establish missing 
information, and present the Open Default Assumption. The notion of the Open 
Default Assumption refers, not only, to the ability of agents to identify and employ 
assumptions dynamically, on the basis of their current knowledge, but also to their 
ability to manage their inference on the basis of these assumptions and any available 
knowledge at previous or future time points. It is inspired by the syntax and semantics 
of DfL and uses some of its several variations along with Dynamic Default Logic, i.e. 
a variation of DfL presented here, towards dynamic hypothetical non-monotonic 
reasoning. In the next chapters we show how this proposal applies in open norm-
governed multi-agent systems and facilitate agents to reason autonomously either 
hypothetically or non-monotonically. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: section 5.2 examines the reasoning 
problem in open norm-governed multi-agent environments and identifies research 
questions and situations that preoccupy the following chapters of this thesis; section 
5.3 presents the reasons that determined our decision to adopt DfL and our viewpoint 
in the usage of default reasoning in open environments; and, finally, section 5.4 
provides a summary. 
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5.2 The Reasoning Problem 
Consider an OS populated by software agents, whose behaviour is regulated by 
norms in which some temporal logic is employed. For the sake of simplicity and 
without loss of generality, in this chapter, we need not relate the discussion that 
ensues to a specific temporal language, since any temporal logic may be used11. We 
can take an abstract view of the norms and regard them as sentences of sequent 
calculus [132], i.e. as sentences of the form: 
Y←X1∧X2∧…∧Xk                                                                                                                (1) 
where Y and Xi (1 ≤ i ≤ k) are positive or negative literals (any variables are assumed 
universally quantified) representing the rule conclusion and conditions, respectively. 
Obviously agents in any system (not necessarily open) do not possess information 
about the future. In order for an agent to meet its design goals, though, and plan its 
course of action at any given time, it needs to employ assumptions about the future. 
In OS, even the historical information available to an agent when it poses its query 
may be incomplete, for various reasons: Information may be lost, or distorted by 
noise, and in a truly open system, where agents join or leave the system at different 
times, information delivery from agent to agent may simply be delayed. In order to 
reason in the presence of incomplete historical knowledge, agents must be able to fill 
in information gaps, by employing assumptions about the past and the present. 
We see that, the reasoning problem faced by an agent in this context, when it does 
not possess complete knowledge about the past, present or the future, involves the 
following issues of interest: 
1H. Assumptions Identification and Usage: How can agents make assumptions, 
i.e.: 
a. When assumptions are needed in order to continue with inference?  
b. What assumptions are applicable to fill in information gaps? 
c. How assumptions should be employed in the inference process? 
2H. Assumptions and the World: What is the relation between the assumptions 
and the current or future world, i.e.: 
                                                 
11 Issues that concern reasoning with time, action and their effects are discussed in chapter 10, where 
we adopt a contract representation in EC [149]. 
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a. How do assumptions, employed at some time point, are allied with 
currently available knowledge? 
b. How do assumptions, employed at some time point, affect subsequent 
inferences, either supporting some or frustrating others?  
3H. Assumptions and New Information: What happens when new information 
becomes available at some time point, i.e.: 
a. How does new information affect previously employed assumptions and 
drawn conclusions on their basis, either confirming some or disproving 
others? 
b. How does new information affect subsequent inferences, either enabling 
some or disabling others? 
Essentially, to answer question 1H the agent in an open environment, where 
knowledge is dynamically become known or unknown, seeks to establish some way 
that identifies possible assumptions and indicates the appropriate ones when needed. 
In order to answer question 2H the agent needs to employ some way that commits its 
reasoning to specific assumptions. Finally, in order to answer question 3H the agent 
needs to reason non-monotonically.  
In order to support reasoning with incomplete knowledge an agent could use some 
of the general approaches such as the CWA or the OWA, as already discussed in the 
subsection 2.2.3 Assumptions made under the CWA concern the falsity of certain 
missing formulae, rather than their truth. Under the OWA an information gap is 
assumed to be unknown by default. In this work we are concerned with situations that 
an agent may find itself in many realistic computer applications (e.g. distributed 
problem solving, task/resource allocation scenaria, joint planning, autonomic 
computing, risk management, e-contracting, e-auctions, services negotiation and 
composition, amongst others) where its indecisive is undesirable.  
Specifically, we are interested in situations where the agent needs to make specific 
assumptions about the truth, rather than the falsity, of certain formulae. We claim that 
such reasoning may be useful in two cases:  
• Best-guess reasoning: An agent cannot know the future, yet it may need to 
plan its activities on the basis of hypotheses that concern the future, i.e., 
on the assumption that certain events or other agents’ actions will occur, 
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or that certain causal relations will be effected in the environment, or that 
it will bear a certain normative status (obligations, permissions, 
prohibitions, powers) towards other agents. 
• No-risk reasoning: An agent may not know everything about the past and 
present, i.e., the history of its environment, other agents and itself so far, 
yet it may need to plan its activities on the basis of hypotheses that 
concern the past and present, i.e., on the assumption that certain events or 
other agents’ actions have occurred, or that certain normative relations 
have obtained between itself and other agents, in order to protect itself 
from an undesirable situation in the future.  
To illustrate these cases, consider a 3-party business transaction that takes place in 
an electronic marketplace populated by software agents. A buyer agent (BA) 
communicates, at time point T (T0<T<T1), with a seller agent (SA) and establishes an 
agreement with it for purchasing a certain product. Consequently, SA communicates 
with a carrier agent (CA) and establishes another agreement with it for the timely and 
safe delivery of goods to BA. A reasonable query that the buyer might have is “When 
will I, potentially, have to pay for this order, assuming all goes well and I receive the 
goods in due time, so that I plan to have adequate available funds?” To derive an 
answer the buyer needs to reason on the basis of hypotheses, i.e. best-guess 
reasoning. Moreover, consider the case where, at time point T2, the buyer agent does 
not yet know that the carrier agent has performed delivery, still it needs to plan its 
business activity so that it may be able to fulfil an obligation to pay the seller agent in 
due time, should it later be informed that the carrier agent delivered at T’ (T1<T’<T2). This 
situation corresponds to no-risk reasoning, i.e., an agent should be able to derive a 
conclusion even though this is based on assumptions, because alternatively it might 
find itself in an undesirable situation. Therefore, it is clear that an agent should be 
able to establish potential conclusions on the basis of hypotheses. 
There are, of course, various other approaches to dynamic assumption-based 
reasoning, which we discuss, in relation to our work, in chapter 8. At this point 
though, note that these approaches rely either on the existence of a pre-specified 
space of assumptions or on pre-specified criteria for the identification of assumptions. 
In the first case, assumption identification is not really dynamic, rather assumption 
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usage, i.e. the management of the pre-specified assumption space, may be dynamic. 
In the second case assumption identification is dynamic, only in the sense that the 
appropriate assumption is chosen at run-time, but since this choice is made on pre-
specified criteria, it is in a sense static. What distinguishes, therefore, our work from 
these approaches, is that we propose a way in which both identification and usage of 
appropriate candidate assumptions are done dynamically.  
Moreover, since, under CWA or OWA, any assumptions employed at some point 
of the inference process are not retained for future reference, there is no way to relate 
them to future inferences. Hence with CWA or OWA we cannot address 2H 
satisfactorily. When new information becomes available, possibly refuting some of 
the assumptions that were employed at earlier points in the inference process, there is 
no way to retract previously drawn conclusions, that is CWA or OWA does not 
address 3H satisfactorily. Of course, one may argue that such questions can be 
addressed, in a domain-specific manner, via the use of special purpose predicates (e.g. 
by recording assumptions used during the inference of each specific conclusion). 
However, we argue that by resorting to Open Default Assumption we obtain a more 
general-purpose solution to the problem of dynamic assumption identification, which 
is also compatible with our common intuitions. 
The Open Default Assumption (ODA) is the presumption that the truth-value of a 
statement that is not currently known may considered to be true if this does not cause 
an inconsistent view of the world. With respect to other presumptions (CWA and 
OWA) the proposed one can be seen as an opposite assumption to the CWA, i.e. we 
accept the truth rather than the falsity of statements, and as a particularization of the 
OWA, i.e., we focalize on the truth rather than the unknown state. Under the ODA, an 
agent reformulates all initial norms that regulate an OMAS into DfL rule schemata 
[208]. 
5.3 Why Default Logic? 
DfL is arguably the most notable formulation for default reasoning (cf. [14, 154]) 
and addresses general issues, such as negation by default, the frame problem and 
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causal reasoning, satisfactorily [154]. Also, it is suitable for prototypical, no-risk, and 
best-guess reasoning, all of which interest us [14]. 
In this thesis, we were inspired by the DfL due to the following three main reasons:  
• The syntax of DfL offers a intuitive way to relate knowledge (i.e. information 
about which an agent is certain) with hypotheses (i.e. information that the 
agent may employ tentatively) during the inference process; the schema of 
DfL rules comprises three distinct parts, namely prerequisites, justifications 
and consequents, that is it helps in addressing issue 1H. 
• The semantics of DfL and its variations offers the ability to preserve the 
relation between an assumption and inferences drawn on its basis, as well as 
the relation of new information that becomes known, possibly necessitating 
the revision of past assumptions and conclusions drawn on their basis (in the 
sense of argumentation [198]) and to maintain consistency and rationality, that 
is it helps in addressing issues 2H and 3H. 
• We can implement the inference mechanism of DfL without resorting to 
theorem proving, but by maintaining syntactically consistent sets of formulae, 
whose conditions part (prerequisites and justifications) is interpreted 
conjunctively and the conclusions part (consequent) is interpreted 
disjunctively, as in sequent calculus. 
5.3.1 Default Logic for Common-sense Reasoning in the 
Context of Open Environments 
Consider the following DfT (W, D) with W={ P1, P2, P3 } and D contains the following 
defaults (Example 3, Section 3.3): 
D={ D1 ≡ P1:J1/C1,  D2 ≡ P2:J2/C2 } 
where C1 and C2 are formulae that render the knowledge base inconsistent when both 
of them hold simultaneously. In this case there are various computations (possible 
extensions) for In and Out sets: In(1)={P1, P2, P3, C1}, Out(1)={¬J1} for Π(1)={D1}; In(1)={P1, P2, P3, C2}, 
Out(1)={¬J2} for Π(1)={D2}; and In(2)={P1, P2, P3, C1, C2},  Out(2)={ ¬J1, ¬J2}, for Π(2)={D1, D2}12.  
This example sets some research questions when using DfL for CSR. A first 
question that arises is “Which of the above computations may be considered to be 
                                                 
12 We may also consider the process Π(2)={D2, D1}. 
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successful and closed?”. A second question that arises is “In order to facilitate CSR, 
which of the above computations may be considered as a theory extension?”.  
According to Antoniou, the processes Π(1)={D1} and Π(1)={D2} are not extensions of the 
DfT, due to the fact that these processes are not closed processes. On the contrary, the 
processes Π(2)={D1, D2} and Π(2)={D2, D1}, are considered to be extensions (successful and 
closed processes) of the DfT. But in this case, an inconsistency arises in an agent’s 
world.   
We see that the answers to the above questions are related to the type of the agent 
one needs to adopt and use in its framework. For instance, a bureaucrat13 agent, that 
computes extensions as proposed by Reiter or Antoniou, accepts as theory extensions 
only the processes Π(2)={D1, D2} and Π(2)={D2, D1}, despite the inconsistency. On the contrary, 
a non fault-tolerant agent would reject both processes (Π(2)={D1, D2} and Π(2)={D2, D1}) due to 
the semantic inconsistency that arises.  
In this thesis, in order to facilitate CSR, we adopt agents of none of the above two 
kinds. We see that agents should be open-minded, i.e. to be: (i) rational, in the sense 
that, to be able to avoid inconsistencies, and (ii) autonomous, in the sense that, to be 
able to compute and examine possible worlds on the basis of their currently available 
knowledge and direct their reasoning accordingly. Moreover, our agent aims to 
reasons with common-sense in a non-sense world, i.e. a world that is incomplete and 
possibly inconsistent. In such environments, first, we should not blame the agent for 
the lack of extensions due to the non-sense of the world. In fact a DfT may not have 
any extensions at all, but we see this not as a shortcoming. Second, although the 
possibility of the non-existent of extensions, our agents attempts to search its future 
worlds or tries to explain it current state on the basis of hypothetical previous worlds. 
In an open world where the environment and whatever is associated with it are 
matters of continuous change, we should not require or expect from the agent to 
either accept worlds that belong to the distance future or reject them, in advance. It 
seems rational and realistic to us, to require from an agent to reason in a step-wise 
manner and on the basis of its current knowledge and some plausible and rational 
assumptions. Such an agent would compute all possible worlds, examine the state that 
these worlds reveal (consistent/inconsistent, rational/irrational, eligible/non-eligible, 
                                                 
13 A bureaucrat agent is an agent that lacks of rationality and autonomy. 
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desirable/non-desirable etc) and finally decide to either to follow or not a specific 
course of action. In other words, we see that CSR in OS calls for an iterative 
reasoning process where the agent gains knowledge about its current state in the 
available world, commit itself to this world, produce entailments either on factual or 
on hypothetical basis and re-examine its world for any changes due to exogenous or 
endogenous factors. A schematic representation of this process is shown in Figure 
5.1. The overall reasoning process is represented like an Archimedean Spiral where 
the agent performs: 
• Initialization/Position/Reposition: The agent gets its initial world; position 
itself in it by gaining self-knowledge. Whenever changes are being detected 
the agent is able to reposition itself in the world. 
• Inference: The agent derives conclusions either on the basis of factual 
knowledge or hypotheses. 
• Update: The agent checks if the world has changed either due to endogenous 
or due to exogenous reasons.  
 
Update the 
World
Inference
Initialization / 
Position /
Reposition  
Figure 5.1 Agent reasoning in open environments 
 
Specifically, with respect to the above example, our agent may accept the 
processes Π(1)={D1} and Π(1)={D2} as theory extensions, on the criteria that: (i) the next step 
in inference, i.e. applying defaults D2 or D1 respectively, if followed, would turn itself 
into an irrational agent, and (ii) to ground itself in a protracted period of idleness is 
not the reason of its development (Figure 5.2). Thus, the agent may place itself in 
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either one of the two states (S1 or S2) and continue with inference from this state on a 
new basis, i.e. a new current world that probably contains different factual and 
prescriptive knowledge. 
 
Π(1) = { D1 }, 
In(1) = { P1, P2, P3, C1 }, 
Out(1) = { ¬ J1 } S1
W={ P1, P2, P3 }
D={ D1=P1:J1/C1,  D2=P2:J2/C2 }
Π(0) = { }, In(0) = W, Out(0) = { }
Default D1 fires
Π(1) = { D2 }, 
In(1) = { P1, P2, P3, C2 }, 
Out(1) = { ¬ J2 }
S2
Default D2 fires
S0
 
 
Figure 5.2 Extensions in an open environment 
 
5.3.2 Dynamic Default Logic 
Dealing with incomplete information, calls for assumptions employment in the 
inference process in order to fill in information gaps. In this thesis we propose and 
use the Dynamic Default Logic (DDfL). DDfL accepts the ODA, hence, in DDfL it is 
possible that the initial default rules to be reformulated appropriately when needed. 
As a result, inferencing is possible on a totally hypothetical basis via the dynamic 
identification and employment of appropriate candidate assumptions, i.e. extended 
versions of extensions are possible to be computed.  
Specifically, in DDfL starting from a default rule of the form X1∧X2∧…∧Xk  : true / Y, (i.e., 
a justification-free default rule where X1…Xk are propositional terms) 2k-1 new possible 
defaults may be derived by augmenting its justifications (the J set) with prerequisites 
(members of the P set) whose truth-value can not be established on the basis of 
current knowledge. That is, for each initial default rule that has k prerequisites in the 
set P correspond 2k-1 new possible reformulated defaults.  
To illustrate this idea, schematically, consider the following initial defaults:  
D1 = X1 ∧ X2 ∧ X3 : true / Y1, and   
D2 = X4 ∧ X5 : X6  / Y2  
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The corresponding sets of alternative defaults for each one of initial defaults are: 
D1: { D11 = X1 ∧ X2 ∧ X3 : true / Y1,  D12 = X1 ∧ X2 : X3 / Y1,    D13 = X1 ∧ X3 : X2 / Y1,   D14 = X2 ∧ X3 : X1 / Y1 ,  
          D15 = X1 : X2, X3 / Y1, D16 = X2 : X1, X3 / Y1,  D17 = X3 : X1, X2 / Y1 , D18 = true : X1, X2, X3 / Y1 } 
 
D2: { D21 = X4 ∧ X5 : X6 / Y2, D22 = X4 : X6, X5 / Y2,  D22 = X5 : X6, X4 / Y2,  D23 = true : X6, X4, X5 / Y2 } 
Dlnumber denotes an identification number within the defaults and it is used to facilitate 
reference. 
Hence, for DDfL a Dynamic Default Theory is a pair of the form (W, D), where W is 
a set of logic formulae that represent currently available knowledge, as in original 
Reiter’s DfT, but D is a set that contain sets of defaults, each containing the possible 
reformulations of the initial defaults. Note that, during reasoning for each initial 
default rule only one of many candidate reformulated defaults may be employed.  
Reasoning starts with the initial form of the defaults, by applying as many as 
possible given the initial current knowledge. Each time a default applies its 
conclusions are included in the current extension that is being computed. Until now, 
the inference procedure is identical to inference with classical DfL.  
When there are no more defaults that can be applied, this signals that further 
worlds can, only, be computed on the basis of new assumptions. Thus inference 
continues by examining the alternative default formulations that exist in the set of 
alternative defaults for each initial default that have not fired, already. The algorithm 
is shown as a flowchart in Figure 5.3 (Algorithm 1). At this point we do not provide 
more details of how the alternative defaults are being computed or the way these are 
applied in the theory. Such issues are discussed in the next chapters. 
To illustrate the reasoning process, consider the previous example with the two 
norms D1, D2 and the corresponding sets. Here are some possible scenaria, with 
different initial knowledge available each time, in the beginning of the reasoning 
process: 
• if W={ X1, X2, X3} then according to classical DfL the only extension that is 
computed is In(1)= W ∪ {Y1}, Out(1)=Ø by applying defaults D11. In contrast, allowing 
hypothetical reasoning with DDfL then we may initially compute the previous 
extension In(1) on a factual basis and the extension In(2) = In(1) ∪ { Y2}, Out(2)= Out(1) ∪  {¬ 
X6, ¬ X4, ¬ X5} by applying defaults D11 and D23  respectively on a hypothetical basis. 
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• if W={ X1, X3, X4, X5} then according to classical DfL the only extension that is 
computed is In(1)= W  ∪ { Y2 }, Out(1)= {¬ X6} by applying defaults D21. In contrast, under 
DDfL also the extension In(2)= In(1) ∪ { Y1}, Out(2)= Out(1) ∪ {¬ X2} is computed by making 
an additional assumption that X2 holds and by applying defaults D21 and D13 
respectively. 
 
NO
YES
YES
END
START
COMPUTE 
EXTENSION RULE APPLIES
NO
HYPOTHETICAL BASIS
COMPUTE 
EXTENSION
COMPUTE 
ALTERNATIVE DEFAULT 
FORMULATIONS
YES
NO
RULE APPLIES
WRITE 
WORLD
READ
DEFAULT 
THEORY
 
Figure 5.3 Algorithm 1: Default reasoning in open environments 
 
For FOL language we need to identify a substitution instance for each prerequisite 
chosen as an appropriate assumption before employing it in the inference procedure. 
To this end, we may adopt Herbrand semantics for the FOL language [137, 138]. The 
Herbrand universe of a FOL language is the set of all ground terms. The Herbrand 
base of a FOL language is the set of all ground atoms formed using elements of the 
Herbrand universe as arguments. Thus, we may identify possible grounded 
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assumptions by searching among grounded formulae computed on the basis of the 
Herbrand semantics. 
Consider the following theory consisting of default schemata of the form:    
D1 = Has(x,Hair) ∧ Produce(x,Milk) : true / Specie(x,Mammal), 
D2 = Specie(x,Mammal) ∧ Color(x,Brown-Orange) : Has(x,Stripes) / Is(x,Tigger) 
and initial knowledge: 
 W= { Has(Animal,Hair) } 
On the basis of this knowledge and without resorting to any assumptions inference is 
not possible with classical DfL. In contrast, under the DDfL we are able to compute a 
possible world: 
• In’(2)= W ∪ { Has(Animal,Hair),  Specie(Animal,Mammal), Is(Animal,Tigger) } on the basis of the 
assumptions that Animal produces milk, its color is brown-orange and has 
stripes, i.e., Out’(2)={ ¬Produce(Animal,Milk), ¬Color(Animal,Brown-Orange), ¬Has(Animal,Stripes) } 
Naturally, whenever we compute ground instances for potential assumptions, under 
the Herbrand semantics, we are forced to ground inference to whatever is recorded in 
the current logic language we use. In other words we accept the Domain Closure 
Assumption [137, 138]. A question that arises is whether under this assumption we 
are truly capable to deal with OS? For instance, consider an OMAS where agents join 
and leave the environment in an ad hoc manner. An agent, in order to employ 
assumptions about other agents, first needs to know that other agents exist. Thus, we 
see that, in order to facilitate hypothetical reasoning we may accept and consider the 
Domain Closure Assumption as putting the world in quarantine temporarily. In this 
case we accept a partially open environment, even temporarily. Of course, an agent 
may also be allowed to make assumptions about the existence of other agents by 
naming them explicitly and by augmenting its logic language. In this case, we allow 
inference in a truly open system. 
During inference, we need to remember which default formulation we chose for 
each of the norms that we reason with. When new information becomes available, 
either merely augmenting the knowledge base or updating some part of it, we need to 
update the choice of default formulations. 
Although, initially, it seems that this mechanism gives a blow up in the search 
space of possible defaults to apply, we see that this space is manageable. Indeed, in 
the next sections we propose and show various techniques to manage this space. 
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
09/12/2017 01:19:12 EET - 137.108.70.7
Symbolic Representations and Common-sense Reasoning in Open Multi-agent Systems
 
 89
 
Moreover, note that, with DDfL we extend the extensions of DfL, e.g. in the case a 
theory has no extensions (besides its initial world) under DDfL extensions are 
possible on a hypothetical basis. As a result, in DDfL the problem of the existence of 
extensions is downsized only on the requirement of a process Π to be a successful one 
and that depends only on whether In(i)∩Out(i)=∅ or not. The requirement of the closed 
process has no meaning due to the ability of DDfL to apply more rules on a 
hypothetical basis and under consistency maintenance. 
Finally, note that the process-oriented technique to compute extensions as 
presented in [14], along with the technique to employ dynamically additional 
justifications in the reasoning process as presented here, afford an agent the ability to 
reason:  
• with incomplete knowledge in open environments, by deriving conclusions 
that are based not only on the justifications of the initial default rules, as 
occurs in classical DfL, but also on the basis of additional consistent 
assumptions engaged from the rule prerequisites. This is possible by 
reformulating, dynamically, the theory initial default rules. Towards this 
scope, in the next sections, we address assumption-based reasoning in open 
systems where the norms that govern the environment are sentences of the 
form (1). This fact, first, enable an agent to construct autonomously its norms/ 
defaults of inference from initial temporal norm representations, and second, 
to avoid any misinterpretations on the semantics of the alternative defaults 
that correspond to an initial norm. 
• hypothetically and non-monotonically in an autonomous and argumentation-
like manner by maintaining syntactically consistent sets of formulae. Towards 
this scope, in the next sections, we show how various symbolic and schematic 
representations of an agent knowledge/hypothesis space facilitate the 
management of both hypothetical and non-monotonic reasoning. 
5.4 Summary 
In this chapter we examined the reasoning problem in open norm-governed multi-
agent environments. Towards this scope, we identified three research questions (1H-
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
09/12/2017 01:19:12 EET - 137.108.70.7
5. Reasoning with Incomplete Knowledge 
 
 90 
3H) that concerns the identification and usage of assumptions and the manner these 
assumptions are related to the currently available knowledge and any possible 
changes of the world. Moreover, we claimed that in some realistic situations where 
best-guess or non-risk reasoning is needed, it is essential for an agent to be able to 
make specific consistent assumptions about the truth, rather than the falsity, of certain 
formulae. We called this behaviour as the Open Default Assumption. Then we 
discussed the reasons that determined our decision to adopt DfL along with our 
differentiations in the usage of default reasoning in open environments; and, finally, 
we presented Dynamic Default Logic which accepts the Open Default Assumption, 
and hence, it is possible for an agent to reformulate, appropriately, its world 
representation when needed. 
In the following chapters we show how these ideas facilitate both hypothetical and 
non-monotonic reasoning. 
Research discussed in this chapter has been published or is under review in [90, 97, 
98, 86]. 
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6 Assumption-based Reasoning in 
Open Normative Environments 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we address dynamic assumption-based reasoning in open agent 
systems, where, unavoidably, agents have incomplete knowledge about their 
environment and about other agents. The interactions among agents in such systems 
are typically subject to norms, which stipulate what each agent is obliged, permitted, 
prohibited, empowered etc. to do, while it participates in the system. In such 
environments agents need to resort to assumptions, in order to establish what actions 
are appropriate to perform, and they need to do so dynamically, since the 
environment, the agents that exist in it, the information that is exchanged between 
them, and the normative relations between them change over time. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: section 6.2 provides a preliminary 
discussion, presents, in brief, a first approach on assumption-based reasoning and 
discusses its limitation with respect to a computational implementation; section 6.3 
proposes a second and alternative way to reason hypothetically, which is appropriate 
for the implementation of a computational tool; section 6.4 presents a prototype as 
proof of concept for this technique and for experimentation; section 6.5 presents an 
example that illustrates this technique, and, finally, section 6.6 provides a summary. 
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6.2 Preliminaries 
Initially, we represent norms as sentences of the form (1). This representation 
employs the predicates of the temporal logic augmented with some special predicates 
to denote normative relations (obligation, prohibition, permission, power).  We view 
normative relations as properties that are initiated or terminated by the occurrence of 
agents’ actions or events. The norms that can be expressed in such a representation 
take the form, for example “agent Agent2 is obliged/permitted/prohibited towards agent 
Agent1 to perform action Action2 by time Time2, if agent Agent1 performs action Action1, at time 
Time1”.  
The initial representation of an e-contract may be characterized as a triple (H, R, A). H 
corresponds to historical information and is a possibly empty or incomplete set of 
domain-dependent definitions for currently available information, i.e. H is a set of 
propositional or predicate formulae representing events that have occurred and facts 
that holds. R corresponds to domain-dependent causal information and is a possibly 
empty or incomplete set of sentences of the form (1). A is a non-empty set of 
sentences of the form (1) expressing the domain–independent knowledge. 
In [90], we proposed the construction of a DfT, by mapping a sentence of the form 
(1) to any one of the following defaults: 
X1∧X2∧…∧Xk : true / Y                                (justification-free default rule) 
X1∧X2∧…∧Xk : Y / Y                                                  (normal default rule) 
X1∧X2∧…∧Xk-1 : Xk / Y 
X1∧X2∧…∧Xk : Xk-1 / Y 
... 
X2∧…∧Xk : X1 / Y 
X1∧X2∧…∧Xk-2 : Xk-1, Xk / Y 
X1∧X2∧…∧Xk-1 : Xk-2, Xk / Y 
… 
X2∧…∧Xk-1 : X1, Xk / Y 
… 
true : X1,X2,…,Xk-2, Xk-1, Xk / Y                  (prerequisite-free default rule) 
That is, each sentence of the initial norm representation, which involves k conditions, 
corresponds to any one of 2k+1 defaults. The question that arises for the agent 
constructing the DfT is, which one of these 2k+1 defaults should be chosen and 
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employed in the inference procedure. This is tantamount to seeking to establish what 
assumptions are appropriate in order to fill in information gaps. 
A first answer to this question and at the same time a proposal for the formal 
characterization of the DfT construction, relative to the currently available knowledge 
H∪R, were presented in [95]. An e-contract can be represented as a DfT ≡ (W, D) by 
translating/reformulating its initial representation. The construction of W and D sets is 
carried out as follows:  
• The currently available knowledge W is constructed from the domain-specific 
part of the initial contract representation. Specifically, the W part of the DfT, is 
a copy of H, the possibly empty or incomplete historical information of the 
initial contract representation which contains all currently available 
knowledge about what holds and what happened.  
• The set of defaults D of the DfT is constructed from the domain-independent 
definitions of the initial representation and domain-dependent definitions for 
causal relations. Specifically, D is constructed from sets A and R which contain 
sentences of the form (1) as follows: The conclusion of each such sentence is 
mapped to the consequent part of each default, while its conditions may be 
mapped to the prerequisite or the justification part of each default, depending 
on what information is defined in the initial knowledge base H∪R: conditions 
that can be derived from H∪R are mapped to the prerequisite, while conditions 
that cannot be derived from H∪R are candidates for assumptions, and are 
mapped to the justifications. That is, each initial axiom of the form (1) does 
not correspond uniquely to a default. Although this may seem unsettling, it 
affords an agent flexibility in the construction of the DfT, as it can identify the 
set of candidate assumptions for its reasoning, dynamically, depending on the 
knowledge it possesses.  
As a result, an e-contract (and normative systems in general) may be characterized 
formally as the pair (W, D), where W=H and D contains, for each definition (Y←X1∧…∧Xk)∈A∪R, 
(possibly semi-grounded) defaults of the form P1∧…∧Pm : J1,J2,…Jn / C, such that m+n=k and 
Pi=SUBST(θ, Xj) if H∪R⊦SUBST(θ, Xj), Ji=SUBST(θ, Xj) if H∪R⊬SUBST(θ, Xj), and finally C=SUBST(θ, Υ). 
This formal characterization is not amenable to computational implementation, 
since the agent that constructs the DfT must attempt to prove literals from its 
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knowledge base, in order to decide whether to use them in the prerequisite or the 
justification part of each default. In other words, the agent needs to attempt to prove 
literals (and fail in doing so) in order to determine which of these are candidate 
assumptions.  
In order to overcome this limitation we describe, in the next section, an alternative 
procedure by which an agent may determine assumptions, and consequently construct 
the DfT, dynamically. This technique does not require the agent to prove literals from 
its current knowledge base, and therefore, it is suitable for implementation. 
6.3 Theory Construction and Inference 
6.3.1 Rule mapping  
We may think of the 2k possible defaults for a single norm of the form (1) as 
representations of the possible mental states in which the agent may find itself14. Each 
such state is characterized by what is known and what is not known to the agent, i.e. it 
represents what we may call the single-norm knowledge/hypothesis (KH) status of the 
agent. These possible states are organized in a multi-level hierarchy, which we depict 
as a triangle, such as the one shown in Figure 6.1. The top of the triangle denotes the 
direction in which the agent’s mental state evolves over time. Each level of the KH 
structure contains one or more of the 2k defaults, depending on the number of 
assumptions that these defaults employ. Level 0 contains the single assumption-free 
default, level 1 contains the k one-assumption defaults, and so on, until the top level 
which contains the single, knowledge-free default. That is, for a an agent which 
possesses an initial rule of the form (1), moving upwards in a stepwise manner until it 
reaches the top level of the single-norm KH structure, is tantamount to identifying 
possible assumptions among the conditions that are included in the initial rule. 
Defaults contained in the same level have the same number of assumptions; the 
defaults of any given level contain one more assumption than the defaults of the 
immediately lower level, and one fewer assumption than the defaults of the 
immediately higher level. Let | L | denote the total number of defaults contained at 
                                                 
14 For the moment we omit the normal default rule. We discuss normal defaults separately in 
subsection 6.3.3. 
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level L, where 0 ≤ L ≤ k, and k is the total number of conditions in an initial rule of the 
form (1). Then, it is easy to verify that the following properties hold: 
• | L | = 1  if  L = 0 
• | L | = ( k – L + 1)  *  | L-1|  /  L  if L ≠ 0 
 
no 
assumptions
1 assumption
all assumptions
ground 
level (0)
level 1
top level    
      (k)
 
Figure 6.1 Single-norm KH structure of an agent’s mental states 
 
To illustrate this idea consider the following rule, which involves four conditions 
(k=4):  
Y ← X1∧X2∧X3∧X4 
The corresponding 5-level triangle is15: 
Level 0: { X1,X2,X3,X4 : true / Y } 
Level 1: { X1,X2,X3 : X4 / Y,      
    X1,X2,X4 : X3 / Y,       
    X1,X3,X4 : X2 / Y,  
    X2,X3,X4 : X1 / Y          } 
Level 2: { X1,X2 : X4, X3 / Y,      
     X1,X3 : X4, X2 / Y,       
     X2,X3 : X4, X1 / Y,  
     X1,X4 : X3, X2 / Y, 
     X2,X4 : X3, X1 / Y, 
     X3,X4 : X2, X1 / Y       } 
Level 3: { X1 : X4, X3, X2 / Y,      
     X2 : X4, X3, X1 / Y,   
                                                 
15 Note that, in sequent calculus, comma separated prerequisites are interpreted conjunctively. 
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     X3 : X4, X2, X1 / Y,         
     X4 : X3, X2, X1 / Y       } 
Level 4: { true : X4,X3,X2,X1 / Y } 
Table 6.1 Algorithm 2: Computation of the single-norm KH structure 
 
Of course, contracts (and normative systems in general) include multiple norms, 
for each of which a structure, such as the one described above may be constructed. 
The construction is done according to Algorithm 2 (Table 6.1). This algorithm needs 
to identify all possible combinations of knowledge and assumptions for the 
construction of the KH structure for a single norm. This is tantamount to computing 
the power set P(S) of a given set S. For instance, given a set S = {a, b, c, d} of n=4 elements, 
the corresponding power set is the set P (S) that contains 2n elements as follows: 
P(S) = { {}, {a}, {b}, {c}, {d}, {a,b}, {a,c}, {a,d}, {b,c}, {b,d}, {c,d}, {a,b,c}, {a,b,d}, {a,c,d}, {b,c,d}, {a,b,c,d} } 
Algorithm 2  
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
 PROCEDURE DefaultsForANorm(R) 
  
 VARIABLES 
          INTEGER: i, j, k, d 
          LIST: R   // list representing the initial rule R, where the first element is the conclusion  
                             and the rest elements are the conditions 
                    PS   // list of lists representing the power set 
                    TempL   // list of integers representing a binary number 
 
 START 
  
          k=Size(R)-1;   // Size(LIST R) returns the number of elements in a list R,  
                                     i.e. k is the number of conditions in a rule 
                                      
          PS ← PowerSet(k) // PowerSet(INTEGER k) returns the integers from 0 up to 2k-1 as a list of 2k  
                                           elements in binary format, e.g. returns 0 as [0,0,0,0,…,0], 1 as [0,0,0,0,…,1] etc 
          d=2^k   // representing the number of elements contained in PS 
  
          FOR i=0 TO i=d-1 STEP 1 DO {  
  
                   Element GetMember(R,0) is the Consequent // GetMember(LIST R,INTEGER x) returns the   
                                                                                                element of a list R at the specified position x 
                   TempL ← PS[i] 
                   FOR j=0 TO j=k-1 STEP 1 DO { 
 
                              IF ( TempL[j] = = 0) THEN { 
                                         Element GetMember(R, j+1) is a Prerequisite 
                              } ELSE IF ( TempL[j] = = 1) THEN { 
                                         Element GetMember(R, j+1) is a  Justification 
                              }   // end of IF 
 
                    }   // end of FOR 
  
            }   //end of FOR 
 
 END_ PROCEDURE 
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Note that the elements of P (S) may be considered as sorted lists of length n, i.e. of n 
positions, where 0 denotes the absence of the corresponding element of the set S at 
this position and 1 denotes the presence of the corresponding element of the set S at 
this position, i.e.: 
P(S) = { {0,0,0,0}, {1,0,0,0}, {0,1,0,0}, {0,0,1,0}, {0,0,0,1}, {1,1,0,0}, {1,0,1,0}, {1,0,0,1}, {0,1,1,0}, {0,1,0,1}, {0,0,1,1}, {1,1,1,0},  
               {1,1,0,1}, {1,0,1,1}, {0,1,1,1}, {1,1,1,1}  } 
Also, note that, the elements of P (S) may be seen as binary integers of length n, i.e.: 
P(S) = { {0000},{1000},{0100},{0010},{0001},{1100},{1010},{1001},{0110},{0101},{0011},{1110},{1101},{1011},{0111},{1111} } 
or as their decimal equivalents: 
P(S) = { 0, 8, 4, 2, 1, 12, 10, 9, 6, 5, 3, 14, 13, 11, 7, 15 } 
This analysis shows that when an agent attempts to compute all the 2k different 
arrangements of the k conditions of some initial norm, in order to decide whether to 
use them as knowledge or assumptions, it needs to compute the binary format of 
decimal integers from 0 up to 2k-1 (Algorithm 2, line 15). Next, it needs to match the 
0 indicator to denote knowledge and the 1 indicator to denote assumptions. It can then 
use this in order to populate the prerequisites (P) and justifications (J) parts of a 
default, as shown in Table 6.1 (Algorithm 2, lines 19 – 33). 
6.3.2 Inference on the basis of Assumptions 
Normative systems contain multiple norms, for each of which an agent constructs a 
KH structure. All the resulting single-norm KH structures are composed into a single 
polygon-like structure (Figure 6.2), which contains as many levels as the tallest of the 
constituent single-norm KH structures. Given an initial set of norms, the number of 
levels of the multi-norm KH structure is equal to the maximum ki, where 1 ≤ i ≤ r and r is 
the number of the initial norms of the form (1). To be precise, we should note that the 
multi-norm KH structure does not have a single top, since each constituent single-
norm KH structure may have its own top level. We are interested in the highest top 
level, since this denotes the point of termination of an agent’s inference process, 
when an agent moves upwards in the multi-norm KH structure and its mental state 
evolves over time. 
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no 
assumptions
1 assumption
all assumptions
ground 
level (0)
level 1
top level    
      max(ki)
 
Figure 6.2 Multi-norm KH structure of an agent’s mental states 
 
Therefore, the full DfT that is constructed by an agent is a pair of the form (W, D), 
where W contains all of the available (if any) historical information and D is the multi-
norm KH structure. Level 0 contains the r assumption-free defaults, level 1 contains 
the ∑
r
i=1 
ki one-assumption defaults, and so on, until the top max(ki) level, which contains 
some of the knowledge-free defaults. 
Note that, although the corresponding rule mapping is one-to-many, only one 
default for each initial norm may finally be employed for inference. Specifically, the 
inference process starts from the ground level, by applying as many defaults as 
possible given the agent’s current knowledge. Each time a default applies its 
consequent is included in the extension that is being computed currently. When there 
are no further defaults that can be applied in a level, this signals to the agent that 
assumptions are needed in order to proceed, and inference continues by examining 
defaults that lie in the next level upwards. Note that the case where reasoning is 
possible using only rules from the ground level is identical to inference in classical 
logic, but here we are also able to preserve consistency of entailment, by employing 
DfL or some of its variations such as Constrained Default Logic [225]. The inference 
is done according to Algorithm 3 (Table 6.2) and Algorithm 4 (Table 6.3). Algorithm 
3, first, calls for the construction of all single-norm KH structures, each of which is 
done as per Algorithm 2, and, second, calls for the computation of extensions, i.e. 
Algorithm 4, in a stepwise manner. Given the knowledge/hypothesis status of the 
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agent at any given point Algorithm 4 computes extensions by maintaining 
syntactically consistent sets of sentences. 
 
Table 6.2 Algorithm 3: Inference procedure 
 
This analysis indicates that during the reasoning process an agent infers all possible 
conclusions on the basis of its current knowledge. When no further inference is 
possible, the agent is able to reassess its mental state and establish its 
knowledge/hypothesis status, in order to continue. That is, the agent first attempts to 
draw conclusions using only assumption-free defaults, then by employing one 
assumption per default, then by employing two assumptions per default, and so on, 
until no further defaults apply. In other words, a general priority criterion among 
defaults is being established: This is the number of assumptions employed via the use 
Algorithm 3  
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PROCEDURE Hypotheser(W, RS) 
VARIABLES 
             LIST: W   // initial knowledge set 
                       RS   // list of lists representing the initial rule set 
                       R   // list representing the initial rule R, where the first element is the conclusion and  
                                the rest elements are the conditions 
                       In, Out, Π   // lists representing the current In, Out and Π sets 
                       DS   // list that contains defaults contained in a level  
                       Δ   // list that contains indicators for rules that have not fired yet 
              INTEGER: L //representing the current level          
 
START 
 
            // Compute all possible mappings for initial rules 
            FOR EACH R MEMBER OF RS DO { 
                            DefaultsForANorm(R) // Procedure that computes all possible mappings  
                                                                      for the initial rule R  
            }   // end of FOR 
 
            // Initialize the world 
            In  ← W 
            Out  ← ∅ 
            Π ← ∅ 
            Δ ← indicators for all rules contained in RS 
            L  ← 0 
 
           // Inference process 
            WHILE ( Δ ≠ ∅  and No Inconsistencies Exist) DO { 
                       DS ← GetDefautls(L, Δ)   // GetDefault(INTEGER  L, LIST Δ) queries the hierarchical  
                                                                        structures and returns  the defaults that are contained          
                                                                         in levels L  for rules that are members of the list Δ 
                       Reasoner(In, Out, Π, DS, Δ)   // procedure that computes extensions 
                       L  ← L + 1 // Move to next level 
            }   // end of WHILE 
 
END_ PROCEDURE 
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
09/12/2017 01:19:12 EET - 137.108.70.7
6. Assumption-based Reasoning in Open Normative Environments 
 
 100
of a default rule. Thus, such inference in a step-wise manner ensures that the agent 
employs the fewest possible hypotheses, always. This can be proved formally by 
mathematical induction. Here is a sketch of such a proof:  
 
Table 6.3 Algorithm 4: Computation of extensions 
 
Let Ji(L) be the total number of assumptions employed, when inference uses defaults 
from level L for initial norm i (1 ≤ i ≤ r) and Ĵ(n) be the total number of assumptions 
employed when inference uses defaults from level L, for all of the initial norms r, i.e.: 
Ĵ(L) = ∑
r
i=1
 Ji(L) 
Algorithm 4  
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PROCEDURE Reasoner(In, Out, Π, DS, Δ) 
VARIABLES 
          LIST: In, Out, Π   // lists representing the current In, Out and Π sets 
                    DS   // list that contains defaults contained in a level  
                    Δ   // list that contains indicators for rules that have not fired yet 
                    D   // list representing a default rule, where the first element is the conclusion and  
                              the rest elements are the prerequisites and justifications 
                    PS, JS, CS   // lists that contains the default prerequisites, justifications and consequents 
                    P, J, C   // lists that represent a prerequisite, justification and consequent 
 
START 
 
            FOR EACH D MEMBER OF DS DO { 
 
                        PS ← GetPrerequisites(D)   // GetPrerequisites(LIST D) returns a list that contains 
                                                                            the rule prerequisites 
                        JS ← GetJustificatios(D)   // GetJustifications(LIST D) returns a list that contains 
                                                                          the rule justifications 
 
                        // check the prerequisites 
                        FOR EACH P MEMBER OF PS DO { 
                                    Condition 1: Check whether all members of PS are contained in the In list 
                        }   // end of FOR 
 
                        // check the justifications 
                        FOR EACH J MEMBER OF JS DO { 
                                     Condition2: Check whether all members of JS are not contained in the Out list  
                        }   // end of FOR 
 
                        // the default rule fires 
                        IF ( both of the above conditions hold ) THEN { 
                                    add GetConsequent(D) in the In list as a new member            
                                     // GetConsequent(LIST D )returns a list that contains the rule consequent 
                                    add the negation of all member of JS in the Out list as new members 
                                     add D in the Π list as a new member 
                                     remove the indicator of D form the Δ list 
                      }   // end of IF 
 
            }   // end of FOR 
 
            RETURN  In, Out, Π, DS, Δ 
 
END_ PROCEDURE 
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For L=0, i.e. when inference is made on the ground level, Ĵ(L)=0. Assuming that for L=m, 
each rule at this level employs m assumptions, then Ĵ(m)=r*m satisfies the property (this is 
the worst case, i.e. all r defaults apply). Then for L=m+1 we must show that Ĵ(m+1) = Ĵ(m) + Δ, 
where Δ is the number of defaults that apply and 1 ≤ Δ ≤ r. Ĵ(m) is the fewest possible 
assumptions given our induction hypothesis, and Δ is the fewest possible assumptions 
(one assumption for each rule) for the next step of the inference process, that is step 
m+1. In the worst case where all defaults apply Δ = r.■ 
 
To illustrate the inference procedure, consider this next example: let us assume that 
a normative system comprises two rules of the form:  
R1 ≡ Y1 ←X1∧X2,  and R2 ≡ Y2 ← X3∧X4∧X5 
Thus, the corresponding single-norm and multi-norm KH structures are as follows 
(Dlevel,number denotes the level of the default and its identification number within its level, 
and it is used to facilitate reference):   
Single-norm KH structure for R1: 
Level 0: { D10,1 ≡ X1,X2 : true / Y1  } 
Level 1: { D11,1 ≡ X1 : X2 / Y1,      
                        D11,2 ≡ X2 : X1 / Y1         } 
Level 2: { D12,1 ≡ true : X2,X1 / Y1  } 
Single-norm KH structure for R2: 
Level 0: { D20,1 ≡ X3,X4,X5 : true / Y2     } 
Level 1: { D21,1 ≡ X3,X4 : X5 / Y2,      
                        D21,2 ≡ X3,X5 : X4 / Y2, 
                        D21,3 ≡ X4,X5 : X3 / Y2            } 
Level 2: { D22,1 ≡ X3 : X5, X4 / Y2, 
                        D22,2 ≡ X4 : X5, X3 / Y2, 
                        D22,3 ≡ X5 : X4, X3 / Y2            } 
Level 3: { D23,1 ≡ true : X5, X4, X3 / Y2    } 
Multi-norm KH structure for R1 and R2: 
Level 0: { D10,1 ≡ X1,X2 : true / Y1,   D20,1 ≡ X3,X4,X5 : true / Y2     } 
Level 1: { D11,1 ≡ X1 : X2 / Y1,           D21,1 ≡ X3,X4 : X5 / Y2,      
                       D11,2 ≡ X2 : X1 / Y1,           D21,2 ≡ X3,X5 : X4 / Y2, 
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                                                                D21,3 ≡ X4,X5 : X3 / Y2            } 
Level 2: { D12,1 ≡ true : X2,X1 / Y1,   D22,1 ≡ X3 : X5, X4 / Y2, 
                                                                D22,2 ≡ X4 : X5, X3 / Y2, 
                                                                D22,3 ≡ X5 : X4, X3 / Y2            } 
Level 3: {                                         D23,1 ≡ true : X5, X4, X3 / Y2    } 
Here are some possible scenaria, with different initial knowledge available each 
time, in the beginning of the reasoning process: 
• if W={X1, X2} then extension In(2)= W ∪ {Y1, Y2} is computed by making the assumption 
that X5, X4 and X3 hold (Out(2)={¬X5, ¬X4, ¬X3}) and by applying defaults D10,1 and D23,1 
respectively, i.e. Π(2)={ D10,1, D23,1}. Note that, the default D10,1 takes priority over the 
default D23,1, due to the fact that the first one does not employ any assumptions 
while the second one employs three assumptions in the inference process.   
• if W={X1, X2, X3} then extension In(2)= W ∪ {Y1, Y2} is computed by making the 
assumption that X5 and X4 hold (Out(2)={¬X5, ¬X4}) and by applying defaults D10,1 and 
D22,1 respectively, i.e. Π(2)={ D10,1, D22,1}. Also, note that, the default D10,1 takes priority 
over the default D22,1. 
• if W={X1, X3, X4, X5} then extension In(2)= W ∪ {Y2, Y1} is computed by making the 
assumption that only X2 holds (Out(2)={¬X2}) and by applying defaults D20,1 and D11,1 
respectively, i.e. Π(2)={ D20,1, D11,1}. The default D20,1 takes priority over the default 
D11,1, due to the fact that the first one does not employ any assumptions while 
the second one employs an assumption in the inference process.  
• if W={X1, X3, X4} then extension In(2)= W ∪ {Y1, Y2} is computed by making the 
assumptions that X2 and X5 hold (Out(2)={¬X2, ¬X5}) and by applying defaults D11,1 and 
D21,1 respectively, i.e. Π(2)={ D11,1, D21,1}. Now, note that, defaults D11,1 and D21,1, 
employ the same number of assumptions in the inferences process. Due to this 
fact and according to the priority criterion on the basis of the total number of 
assumptions employed by a rule, none of the rules takes priority over the 
other. Thus, both process Π(2)={ D11,1, D21,1} or Π(2)={ D21,1, D11,1} are feasible. It just 
happens in this case that, processes have identical final impacts to the 
environment, i.e. In(2)= W ∪ {Y1, Y2} and Out(2)={¬X2, ¬X5} or In(2)= W ∪ {Y2, Y1} and Out(2)={¬X5, 
¬X2}. 
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This last example indicates the need for additional priority criteria. For instance, 
we may use as a criterion the size of factual knowledge a rule employs, i.e. the 
number of prerequisites. In this case the default D21,1 takes priority over the default D11,1, 
due to the fact that the first one fires on a larger factual basis in contrast to the second 
one, although both of them employ the same number of assumptions in the inference 
process.    
Note that although a level may contain two or more defaults that correspond to the 
same initial contract rule (e.g. D21,1 or D21,2 or D21,3) there is no need for some kind of 
prioritization among those defaults. If two or more defaults of the same level, which 
are derived from the same initial rule (i.e. they belong to the same level within the 
same single-norm KH structure), were to apply simultaneously, then the more general 
default contained in the immediately lower level should have applied.  
We should note that it is important to consider the issue of consistency between 
assumptions employed during the reasoning process and new inferences derived as a 
result of the reasoning process. One of the reasons for which we revised our initial 
proposal for the construction of the DfT, which was described in section 6.2, is 
precisely because an agent would require a revision mechanism in order to 
reconstruct the default rules as new information becomes available, and the agent is 
able to prove literals from its updated knowledge, and hence treat them as 
prerequisites rather than justifications. The alternative way for the construction of the 
DfT does not require any revision of the defaults. This is because inference involves 
one level at a time in a stepwise manner, and the agent moves upwards to the next 
level of the multi-norm KH structure only when it has exhausted inference at a given 
level. This ensures that the agent employs the fewest possible hypotheses. 
6.3.3 Normal and Semi-Normal Default Theories 
So far, we have omitted normal defaults from the discussion about the way in 
which an agent may construct its DfT. Normal defaults have the form P:C/C, i.e., their 
justification coincides with their consequent. Two questions seem to arise naturally: 
• Should the agent include normal defaults in the KH structures that it 
constructs, and, if so,  
• In which level of the KH structure should normal defaults be placed? 
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Normal default theories always possess an extension. Thus, it is practical to require 
the use of such defaults in order to ensure that the agent can compute at least one 
extension of its currently available knowledge, by adding to it new information, 
provided that consistency is preserved. That is, the normal default may be viewed as 
behaving similarly to the justification-free default, in that all its prerequisites should 
be satisfied by the current knowledge base; the only additional assumption made in 
the case of the normal default concerns the consistency of its consequent with the 
current knowledge base. For this reason, although the normal default contains a single 
assumption, and should therefore belong to level 1 of the KH structure, 
‘operationally’ it belongs to level 0, since its assumption is not genuinely about 
something that holds in the world.   
Hence, it seems to us that ‘operationally’ an agent may either omit normal defaults 
totally from the KH structures that it constructs, or it may include them in level 0, 
instead of the assumption-free default shown above, when it is important to ensure 
that the agent will compute at least one extension, while preserving consistency. In 
this case, J0 = {Y}, and the defaults of the higher levels of the structures will be semi-
normal, i.e. of the form P:J∧C/C, i.e., all of the justifications imply the consequent. In 
this case, the agent will verify the consistency of a future world before it actually 
proceeds with inference, i.e. it will be more cautious. 
To illustrate this, recall the earlier example with the two rules of the form:  
R1 ≡ Y1 ← X1∧X2, and R2 ≡ Y2 ← X3∧X4∧X5 
where I is an additional set that contains pairs of formulae that render the knowledge 
base inconsistent when both members of the pairs hold simultaneously. The 
corresponding KH structures are as follows: 
Single-norm KH structure for R1: 
Level 0: { D10,1 ≡ X1,X2 : Y1 / Y1           } 
Level 1: { D11,1 ≡ X1 : Y1, X2 / Y1,      
                        D11,2 ≡ X2 : Y1, X1 / Y1          } 
Level 2: { D12,1 ≡ true : Y1, X2,X1 / Y1  } 
Single-norm KH structure for R2: 
Level 0: { D20,1 ≡ X3,X4,X5 : Y2 / Y2            } 
Level 1: { D21,1 ≡ X3,X4 : Y2, X5 / Y2,      
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                        D21,2 ≡ X3,X5 : Y2, X4 / Y2, 
                        D21,3 ≡ X4,X5 : Y2, X3 / Y2           } 
Level 2: { D22,1 ≡ X3 : Y2, X5, X4 / Y2, 
                        D22,2 ≡ X4 : Y2, X5, X3 / Y2, 
                        D22,3 ≡ X5 : Y2, X4, X3 / Y2          } 
Level 3: { D23,1 ≡ true : Y2, X5, X4, X3 / Y2  } 
Multi-norm KH structure for R1 and R2: 
Level 0: { D10,1 ≡ X1,X2 : Y1 / Y1,          D20,1 ≡ X3,X4,X5 : Y2 / Y2              } 
Level 1: { D11,1 ≡ X1 : Y1, X2 / Y1,          D21,1 ≡ X3,X4 : Y2, X5 / Y2,      
                        D11,2 ≡ X2 : Y1, X1 / Y1,           D21,2 ≡ X3,X5 : Y2, X4 / Y2, 
                                                                      D21,3 ≡ X4,X5 : Y2, X3 / Y2           } 
Level 2: { D12,1 ≡ true : Y1, X2,X1 / Y1,   D22,1 ≡ X3 : Y2, X5, X4 / Y2, 
                                                                      D22,2 ≡ X4 : Y2, X5, X3 / Y2, 
                                                                      D22,3 ≡ X5 : Y2, X4, X3 / Y2                 } 
Level 3: {                                               D23,1 ≡ true : Y2, X5, X4, X3 / Y2    } 
Here are some possible scenaria, for the cases discussed previously, but now with 
various sets of inconsistencies: 
• if W={X1, X2} and I={(Y1, Y2)} then the extension computed previously In(2)= W ∪ {Y1, Y2} is 
not feasible due to the inconsistency that holds between Y1 and Y2. Instead, a 
new extension is computed as follows: In(1)= W ∪ {Y1}, Out(1)={¬Y1} by applying only 
the default D10,1, i.e. Π(1)={ D10,1}. 
• if W={X1, X2, X3} and I={(Y1, Y2)} then the previously computed  extension In(2)= W ∪ {Y1, Y2} 
is not feasible due to the inconsistency that holds between Y1 and Y2. Instead, a 
new extension is computed as follows: In(1)= W ∪ {Y1}, Out(1)={¬Y1} by applying only 
the default D10,1, i.e. Π(1)={ D10,1}. 
• if W={X1, X3, X4, X5} and I={(Y1, Y2)} then the previously computed extension In(2)= W ∪ {Y2, 
Y1} is not feasible due to the inconsistency that holds between Y1 and Y2. Instead, 
a new extension is computed as follows: In(1)= W ∪ {Y2}, Out(1)={¬Y2} by applying only 
the default D20,1, i.e. Π(1)={ D20,1}. 
• if W={X1, X3, X4} and I={(Y1, Y2)} then the previously computed  extension In(2)= W ∪ {Y1, Y2} 
is not feasible due to the inconsistency that holds between Y1 and Y2. Instead, 
two new extensions are computed as follows: In(1)= W ∪ {Y1}, Out(1)={¬Y1,¬X2} by 
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applying only the default D11,1, i.e. Π(1)={ D11,1} and In(1)= W ∪ {Y2}, Out(1)={¬Y2,¬X5} by 
applying only the default D21,1, i.e. Π(1)={ D21,1}. 
6.4 Prototype Implementation 
We found it useful to implement a prototype as proof of concept for our technique 
and for experimentation. The prototype consists of three distinct components, shown 
in Figure 6.3: 
• the Rule Constructor, 
• the Rule Query, and 
• the Inference Engine. 
 
Inference
Query
Norms
Facts
Rule 
Database
Rule 
Constructor
XML Document
Rule 
Query 
Inference 
Engine
        Rule 
Instances
Data about 
the status of 
the inference 
process
Rules in 
appropriate 
format
Initial World 
Representation 
(Normative and 
Factual Knowledge)  
  Figure 6.3 Prototype architecture 
 
The Rule Constructor accepts a set of norms in the form of sequent calculus and 
constructs for each one the corresponding single-norm KH structure (Algorithm 2). It 
is implemented in Java. We choose to store these structures as XML documents for 
various reasons: First, because this offers the advantage of effortless storing and 
sharing of rules among the distinct components of the prototype. Moreover, it renders 
feasible the transport of rules to different platforms (e.g. different inference engines 
such as Prolog, Jess, Mandarax etc) or even to different applications (e.g. business 
applications, distributed systems applications, services composition applications etc).  
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To illustrate this idea consider the following rule, which involves three conditions 
(k=3):  
Y ← X1∧X2∧X3 
 
Table 6.4 XML document that represents the single-norm KH structure 
 
The corresponding XML document is shown in Table 6.4 (the total number of 
levels is 4, the total number of default rules is 8, the number of defaults at level 0 
XML Document  
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?> 
<defaults> 
     <default level=0 number=1> 
            <element index=0 type=consequent>Y</element> 
            <element index=1 type=prerequisite>X1</element> 
            <element index=2 type=prerequisite>X2</element> 
            <element index=3 type=prerequisite>X3</element> 
     </default> 
     <default level=1 number =1> 
            <element index=0 type=consequent>Y</element> 
            <element index=1 type=justification>X1</element> 
            <element index=2 type=prerequisite>X2</element> 
            <element index=3 type=prerequisite>X3</element> 
     </default> 
     <default level=1 number =2> 
            <element index=0 type=consequent>Y</element> 
            <element index=1 type=prerequisite>X1</element> 
            <element index=2 type=justification>X2</element> 
            <element index=3 type=prerequisite>X3</element> 
     </default> 
     <default level=1 number =3> 
            <element index=0 type=consequent>Y</element> 
            <element index=1 type=prerequisite>X1</element> 
            <element index=2 type=prerequisite>X2</element> 
            <element index=3 type=justification>X3</element> 
     </default> 
     <default level=2 number =1> 
            <element index=0 type=consequent>Y</element> 
            <element index=1 type=prerequisite>X1</element> 
            <element index=2 type=justification>X2</element> 
            <element index=3 type=justification>X3</element> 
     </default> 
     <default level=2 number =2> 
            <element index=0 type=consequent>Y</element> 
            <element index=1 type=justification>X1</element> 
            <element index=2 type=prerequisite>X2</element> 
            <element index=3 type=justification>X3</element> 
     </default> 
     <default level=2 number =3> 
            <element index=0 type=consequent>Y</element> 
            <element index=1 type=justification>X1</element> 
            <element index=2 type=justification>X2</element> 
            <element index=3 type=prerequisite>X3</element> 
     </default> 
     <default level=3 number =1> 
            <element index=0 type=consequent>Y</element> 
            <element index=1 type=justification>X1</element> 
            <element index=2 type=justification>X2</element> 
            <element index=3 type=justification>X3</element> 
     </default> 
</defaults> 
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(ground level) is 1, the number of defaults at level 1 is 3, the number of defaults at 
level 2 is 3, and finally, the number of defaults at level 3 (top level) is 1). All 
corresponding XML documents are stored as plain text files in the Rule Database 
whose role is identical to the role of the multi-norm KH structure.  
The Inference Engine is implemented in Prolog (Algorithms 3 and 4). During 
reasoning, the Inference Engine communicates with the Rule Query in order to obtain 
new rules and continue inference on a hypothetical basis. For the implementation of 
the Rule Query we used technologies such as DOM, XSLT and XQuery in order to 
extract data from the XML documents that are stored in the Rule Database, i.e. 
procedure GetDefaults (Algorithm 3, line 28).  
The prototype that we developed follows the specifications listed below: 
• Norms are initially represented in propositional logic as sequent calculus 
sentences of the form (1), and the tool constructs propositional DfTs. This is 
clearly an aspect that we wish to review for the next version of the prototype. 
• Extensions are computed in the manner presented in [14], i.e., by maintaining 
syntactically consistent sets of formulae whose conditions part (prerequisites 
and justifications) is interpreted conjunctively as in sequent calculus. The 
computation of extensions in Prolog is based on ideas presented in [12]. We 
extended these ideas in our implementation, in order to address more general 
cases, e.g. to support rule schemata with multiple prerequisites and 
justifications. 
• The agent constructs the KH structures before it starts its inference process, 
and it stores the KH structures that it produces as XML documents. 
• During the inference process, the agent processes the multi-norm KH structure 
that it produced earlier. It processes it starting from the ground level and 
moving upwards, towards the top of the structure. Within each level of the 
multi-norm KH structure, the agent encounters those defaults of single-norm 
KH structures that lie at the same level within the corresponding single-norm 
KH structures. That is, when the agent processes level k of the multi-norm 
structure, all defaults that lie at level k of the constituent single-norm KH 
structures are available to it. It examines defaults at this level, in the order it 
which it produced them, during the construction of the constituent single-
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norm KH structures. Of course this is amenable to change, if we so wish, by 
defining other criteria for prioritization among defaults, as we noted earlier in 
subsections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2. 
6.5 Example 
Consider a 3-party business transaction that takes place in an electronic 
marketplace populated by software agents. A buyer agent (BA) communicates with a 
seller agent (SA) and establishes an agreement for purchasing a certain product. 
Consequently, the seller agent communicates with a carrier agent (CA) and establishes 
a separate agreement for the safe and timely delivery of goods to the buyer agent. An 
extract of the initial set of contract norms for the agreement between the buyer agent 
and the seller agents is as follows: 
R={ R1 ≡   SAIsObligedToDeliverToBAWithinNext20days ← BAOrdersFromSA ∧ E-shopFunctionsWell, 
    R2 ≡   BAIsObligedToPayCAOnBehalfOfSA ← BAOrdersFromSA ∧ CADeliversToBA  
                                                      ∧ CAIsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromBAOnBehalfOfSA   } 
Note that these norms have the same number of conditions as the norms considered 
in the abstract example presented previously. Thus, the corresponding KH structures 
are as follows: 
Single-norm KH structure for R1: 
Level 0: {  
D10,1 ≡  
BAOrdersFromSA, E-shopFunctionsWell  
: true  
/ SAIsObligedToDeliverToBAWithinNext20days                                                                                       } 
Level 1: {  
D11,1 ≡  
BAOrdersFromSA  
: E-shopFunctionsWell  
/ SAIsObligedToDeliverToBAWithinNext20days,          
D11,2 ≡  
E-shopFunctionsWell  
: BAOrdersFromSA  
/ SAIsObligedToDeliverToBAWithinNext20days                                                                                     } 
Level 2: {  
D12,1 ≡  
true  
: E-shopFunctionsWell, BAOrdersFromSA  
/ SAIsObligedToDeliverToBAWithinNext20days                                                                                     } 
Single-norm KH structure for R2: 
Level 0: {  
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D20,1 ≡  
BAOrdersFromSA, CADeliversToBA, CAIsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromBAOnBehalfOfSA   
: true  
/ BAIsObligedToPayCAOnBehalfOfSA                                                                                                    } 
Level 1: {  
D21,1 ≡  
BAOrdersFromSA, CADeliversToBA  
: CAIsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromBAOnBehalfOfSA   
/ BAIsObligedToPayCAOnBehalfOfSA,      
D21,2 ≡  
BAOrdersFromSA, CAIsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromBAOnBehalfOfSA   
: CADeliversToBA  
/ BAIsObligedToPayCAOnBehalfOfSA, 
D21,3 ≡  
CADeliversToBA, CAIsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromBAOnBehalfOfSA   
: BAOrdersFromSA  
/ BAIsObligedToPayCAOnBehalfOfSA                                                                                                     } 
Level 2: {  
D22,1 ≡  
BAOrdersFromSA  
: CAIsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromBAOnBehalfOfSA, CADeliversToBA  
/ BAIsObligedToPayCAOnBehalfOfSA, 
D22,2 ≡  
CADeliversToBA  
: CAIsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromBAOnBehalfOfSA, BAOrdersFromSA  
/ BAIsObligedToPayCAOnBehalfOfSA, 
D22,3 ≡  
CAIsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromBAOnBehalfOfSA   
: CADeliversToBA, BAOrdersFromSA  
/ BAIsObligedToPayCAOnBehalfOfSA                                                                                                     } 
Level 3: {  
D23,1 ≡  
true  
: CAIsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromBAOnBehalfOfSA, CADeliversToBA, BAOrdersFromSA  
/ BAIsObligedToPayCAOnBehalfOfSA                                                                                                     } 
Multi-norm KH structure for R1 and R2: 
Level 0: {  
D10,1 ≡  
BAOrdersFromSA, E-shopFunctionsWell  
: true  
/ SAIsObligedToDeliverToBAWithinNext20days,      
D20,1 ≡  
BAOrdersFromSA, CADeliversToBA, CAIsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromBAOnBehalfOfSA   
: true  
/ BAIsObligedToPayCAOnBehalfOfSA                                                                                                     } 
Level 1: {  
D11,1 ≡  
BAOrdersFromSA  
: E-shopFunctionsWell  
/ SAIsObligedToDeliverToBAWithinNext20days,                    
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
09/12/2017 01:19:12 EET - 137.108.70.7
Symbolic Representations and Common-sense Reasoning in Open Multi-agent Systems
 
 111
 
D11,2 ≡  
E-shopFunctionsWell  
: BAOrdersFromSA  
/ SAIsObligedToDeliverToBAWithinNext20days         
D21,1 ≡  
BAOrdersFromSA, CADeliversToBA  
: CAIsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromBAOnBehalfOfSA   
/ BAIsObligedToPayCAOnBehalfOfSA,      
D21,2 ≡  
BAOrdersFromSA, CAIsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromBAOnBehalfOfSA   
: CADeliversToBA  
/ BAIsObligedToPayCAOnBehalfOfSA, 
D21,3 ≡  
CADeliversToBA, CAIsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromBAOnBehalfOfSA   
: BAOrdersFromSA  
/ BAIsObligedToPayCAOnBehalfOfSA                                                                                                     } 
Level 2: {  
D12,1 ≡  
true  
: E-shopFunctionsWell, BAOrdersFromSA  
/ SAIsObligedToDeliverToBAWithinNext20days,        
D22,1 ≡  
BAOrdersFromSA  
: CAIsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromBAOnBehalfOfSA, CADeliversToBA  
/ BAIsObligedToPayCAOnBehalfOfSA, 
D22,2 ≡  
CADeliversToBA  
: CAIsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromBAOnBehalfOfSA, BAOrdersFromSA  
/ BAIsObligedToPayCAOnBehalfOfSA, 
D22,3 ≡  
CAIsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromBAOnBehalfOfSA   
: CADeliversToBA, BAOrdersFromSA  
/ BAIsObligedToPayCAOnBehalfOfSA                                                                                                     } 
Level 3: {                                          
D23,1 ≡  
true  
: CAIsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromBAOnBehalfOfSA, CADeliversToBA, BAOrdersFromSA  
/ BAIsObligedToPayCAOnBehalfOfSA                                                                                                     } 
Suppose that the current explicit knowledge that the buyer agent possesses is that it 
has ordered goods from the seller agent, that the e-shop functions properly, and that 
the carrier agent that will actually deliver the goods is legally empowered to accept 
payment on behalf of the seller agent, i.e., the buyer agent’s current knowledge is: 
W={ BAOrdersFromSA, E-shopFunctionsWell, CAIsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromBAOnBehalfOfSA } 
On the basis of this knowledge alone, the buyer may only infer, that the seller is 
obliged to deliver products to it, within the next 20 days, i.e. the extension In(1)= W ∪ { 
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SAIsObligedToDeliverToBAWithinNext20days } is computed by making no assumptions (Out(1)={ }) and 
by applying default D10,1, i.e. Π(1)={ D10,1 }.  
But, apart from establishing what it must expect from its counterparty, the buyer 
agent may wish to explore potential future scenaria. For instance, the buyer may need 
to perform best-guess reasoning and plan its future activities on the assumption that 
certain events/actions will occur, and that its partners’ actions will be valid. Suppose 
that the buyer wants to infer the time by which it will have to pay for the goods, 
assuming that all goes well and it receives them in good time, because it wants to plan 
to have adequate funds available. To derive such an answer the buyer agent needs to 
identify and employ the assumption that delivery happens in due time (CADeliversToBA)16, 
i.e. the extension In(2)= W ∪ { SAIsObligedToDeliverToBAWithinNext20days, BAIsObligedToPayCAOnBehalfOfSA } is 
computed by making the assumption that CADeliversToBA holds (Out(2)={ ¬CADeliversToBA }) and 
by applying defaults D10,1 and D21,2 (Π(2)={ D10,1, D21,2 }), respectively. 
Now suppose that the buyer agent does not possess complete historical 
information, i.e. it does not know everything that may have happened so far. Let its 
current knowledge be such that it only knows that it ordered goods from the seller 
agent, that the e-shop functions well, and that the carrier agent delivered goods to it:  
W={ BAOrdersFromSA, E-shopFunctionsWell, CADeliversToBA } 
The buyer may need to perform no-risk reasoning, in order to derive a conclusion 
based on assumptions, because alternatively it might find itself in an undesirable 
situation. For instance, it may want to infer that it has an obligation to pay for the 
goods that it received, yet this inference is not possible, unless it assumes that the 
carrier agent is legally empowered to accept payment on behalf of the seller agent 
(CAIsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromBAOnBehalfOfSA), i.e. the extension In(2)= W ∪ { 
SAIsObligedToDeliverToBAWithinNext20days, BAIsObligedToPayCAOnBehalfOfSA } is computed by making the 
assumption that CAIsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromBAOnBehalfOfSA holds (Out(2)={ 
¬CAIsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymenFromBAOnBehalfOfS }) and by applying defaults D10,1 and D21,1 (Π(2)={ D10,1, 
D21,1 }), respectively. In this scenario, the buyer agent does not possess knowledge 
about the carrier agent’s legal power to accept payment on behalf of the seller agent. 
It may be the case that when such information was communicated to it by the seller 
                                                 
16 In the full representation of the example, using some temporal logic, the temporal conditions 
involved in norms, are treated as all other conditions, when the agent constructs single-norm KH 
structures, i.e. the agent can make assumptions about them as well.  
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agent, it got lost or distorted, or it may be the case that the seller agent simply ‘forgot’ 
to communicate such information to it. If the buyer agent does not perform no-risk 
reasoning, it risks finding itself in a situation where it will have violated its obligation 
to pay for the goods that it received, inadvertently, and it will have to face the legal 
consequences, e.g. to pay extra charges. 
6.6 Summary 
The work presented in this chapter is motivated by the need for assumption-based 
reasoning in open normative multi-agent environments. The behaviour of agents in 
multi-agent environments is restricted by the norms that regulate the particular 
environment in which they participate. In the most general case, regardless of any 
particular application domain, some agreements govern the society of agents.  
Unavoidably in open environments agents have incomplete knowledge about their 
world, and about other agents, yet they must somehow plan their activities. The 
question we seek to address is whether it is possible for agents to identify appropriate 
assumptions dynamically. We argued that e-contracts could be represented as DfT 
and proposed a theoretical way in which such theories could be constructed 
automatically from initial representations. That proposal relied on determining what 
information could be proved from the agent’s knowledge base, in order to decide 
whether it would serve as an assumption or not. Later, we proposed an incremental 
technique that can be used for this construction which enables the dynamic and ad 
hoc identification of candidate assumptions without resorting to proof. We have 
developed a prototype implementation based on this idea, which translates initial 
propositional representations into propositional DfT. Norms are represented as 
sentences of the form (1) and extensions are computed in the manner discussed in 
chapter 5. 
Research discussed in this chapter has been published or is under review in [92, 95, 
97, 85, 89]. 
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7 Autonomous Hypothetical Non-
monotonic Reasoning 
7.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we proposed two different approaches to assumption-based 
reasoning that enable agents to reformulate an initial set of norms by identifying and 
employing appropriate candidate assumptions dynamically. The first approach fall 
short due to the agent need to attempt to prove formulae (and fail in doing so) in order 
to decide which of these are candidate assumptions. This is obviously a strong 
limitation towards a computational implementation. Concerning the second approach, 
although the implementation is feasible, and indeed we presented a prototype tool, we 
see, now, that additional requirements are essential towards rational autonomous 
CSR and specifically, autonomous hypothetical non-monotonic reasoning.  
In this chapter, furthermore, we address the issue of agent autonomy. We take the 
most recent perspective on autonomy that is relevant to an agent’s reasoning process. 
Our agent is expected to make inferences about which beliefs to adopt about its 
environment, other agents and norms in force, which goals to commit to, and which 
actions to perform, in the presence of incomplete or inconsistent information, and it is 
expected to be independent from external intervention in this reasoning process. We 
see that the degree to which an agent's reasoning is autonomous is affected by the 
degree to which it is able to choose its assumptions autonomously. We claim that an 
agent that answers the reasoning problem 1H - 3H, addresses also the autonomy 
problem: 
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1A. What is the appropriate behaviour, i.e. physical and/or mental actions, in 
order to be autonomous? 
2A. How does my independence at some time point explain my current state and 
how does it affects my inferences in the future? and  
3A. What happens when I need to adapt my independence (reduce or increase it) 
because of changes in the environment? 
We re-introduce the incremental technique discussed in the previous chapter in a 
manner that enables agents to ‘develop for themselves the laws and strategies 
according to which they regulate their behaviour (in the spirit of [234]) and to ‘make 
their own inferences and reasoning and to rely on their own conclusions’ (in the spirit 
of [40]). It turns out that the KH structure is, in fact, a lattice. The lattice represents 
what we may call the KH space of the agent and each lattice node, i.e. a default rule, 
is characterized by what is known and what is not known to the agent, i.e. it 
represents what we called the KH status of the agent. At any particular time point the 
agent may position itself on it, given the explicit knowledge that it currently 
possesses, i.e. without resorting to proof. Once the agent has positioned itself on this 
lattice, it finds out what assumptions are related to the node it occupies and may 
employ them in its reasoning. As the agent’s knowledge changes over time, and 
consequently as its assumption needs change, the agent re-positions itself on the 
lattice by moving on it from node to node. The lattice structure that we use in order to 
represent KH spaces, first, suggests that an implementation is also feasible, relying 
only on set manipulation rather than proof, and, second, facilitates hypothetical 
nonmonotonic reasoning. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: sections 7.2 to 7.4 re-introduce the 
incremental technique discussed in the previous chapter, specifically, section 7.2 
concerns with the dynamic identification of assumptions, section 7.3 concerns with 
theory construction, and section 7.4 concerns with the inference proccess; section 7.5 
presents ways to manage the space of knowledge/hypothesis towards autonomous and 
rational reasoning; section 7.6 illustrates these proposals by discussing hypothetical 
nonmonotonic reasoning in various examples; and, finally, section 7.7 provides a 
summary. 
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7.2 Assumption Identification 
Recall, that a norm of the form (1) may be mapped to any one of the following 
defaults: 
X1∧X2∧…∧Xk : true / Y                                       (assumption-free default rule) 
X1∧X2∧…∧Xk-1 : Xk / Y 
X1∧X2∧…∧Xk : Xk-1 / Y 
... 
X2∧…∧Xk : X1 / Y 
X1∧X2∧…∧Xk-2 : Xk-1, Xk / Y 
X1∧X2∧…∧Xk-1 : Xk-2, Xk / Y 
… 
X2∧…∧Xk-1 : X1, Xk / Y 
… 
true : X1,X2,…,Xk-2, Xk-1, Xk / Y                        (knowledge-free default rule) 
Each one of the 2k possible states is characterized by what is known and what is 
not known to the agent, i.e. it represents what we called the single-norm KH status of 
the agent. These possible KH states may be organized in a multi-level hierarchy as 
proposed in the previous chapter. But, now, it turns out that this structure is, in fact, a 
lattice structure of height k+1, where the binary relation that causes them to be partially 
ordered is the number of assumptions employed. That is, the formulation of a norm at 
level 0 is the single assumption-free default; level 1 contains the k one-assumption 
defaults, and so on, until the top level which contains the single, knowledge-free 
default.  
This structure, in constrast to what we proposed in the previous chapter, may be 
traversed either bottom-up or top-down causing the P and J sets to contract or expand 
accordingly. An agent trying to choose the appropriate formulation for a norm, given 
its current knowledge, traverses the structure upwards starting from level 0, and in 
this case, at each level l computes that Pl = Pl -1 – {Xj | Xj is not known explicitly} and Jl = Jl -1 ⋃ { Xj | Xj is not 
known explicitly}, where 1 ≤ j ≤ k and 0 ≤ l ≤ k. If l=0, then P0 = P and J0 = ∅. An agent that receives new 
information, which necessitates the retraction of previously drawn conclusions, 
traverses the structure downwards, starting from some level m (this is the level of the 
norm formulation that it employed in its reasoning before it received the new 
information) and in this case computes at each level (l-1) that Pl -1=Pl ⋃ {Xj | Xj is retracted} and Jl-1 
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= Jl – {Xj | Xj is retracted}, where 1 ≤ j ≤ k and 0 < l ≤ m. If m=k, then Pk = ∅ and Jk = J. Of course, defaults 
contained in the same level have the same number of assumptions. 
To illustrate this idea, schematically, consider the following norm, which involves 
three conditions: 
Y←X1∧X2∧X3 
The corresponding lattice structure of height 4 is shown in Figure 7.1 where each 
level contains the following defaults: 
Level 0: { D0,1 ≡ X1∧X2∧X3 : true / Y                                                                      } 
Level 1: { D1,1 ≡ X1∧X2 : X3 / Y,     D1,2 ≡ X1∧X3 : X2 / Y,     D1,3 ≡ X2∧X3 : X1 / Y   } 
Level 2: { D2,1 ≡ X1 : X2, X3 / Y,     D2,2 ≡ X2 : X1, X3 / Y,     D2,3 ≡ X3 : X1, X2/ Y    } 
Level 3: { D3,1 ≡ true : X1,X2,X3 / Y                                                                         } 
Dlevel,number denotes the level of the default and its identification number within its level, 
and it is used to facilitate reference. 
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all 
assumptions
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level (0)
level 1
top level (k)
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Figure 7.1 Expansion/contraction of KH status 
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In Figure 7.1, the assumption space expands, and the corresponding knowledge 
base contracts, when the agent moves upwards in the lattice structure. Conversely, the 
assumption space contracts and the corresponding knowledge base expands, when the 
agent moves downwards. 
Mathematical Properties of Lattices 
Note that, although, the proposed mapping of a norm of the form (1) into defaults 
results in an exponential number of defaults, this is manageable assuming a 
deterministic number of conditions in the initial norms. In fact, let | L | denote the total 
number of defaults contained at level L, where 0 ≤ L ≤ k, and k is the total number of 
conditions in an initial rule of the form (1). Then, it is easy to verify that the 
following properties hold: 
• | L | = 1  if  L = 0 
• | L | = ( k – L + 1)  *  | L-1|  /  L  if L ≠ 0 
Also, note that, an agent that places itself on a specific node in a level, on the basis 
of its current knowledge, either attempts to move upwards by expanding its 
assumption space or attempts to move downwards by expanding its knowledge. In 
both cases the agent does not need to examine all the defaults that are contained in the 
next level upwards or the previous level downwards. This is because of the binary 
relation that holds among the defaults and causes them to be partially ordered on the 
basis of the number of assumptions employed at each level. Specifically, consider that 
an agent finds itself at some state al level L. Then, in the case the agent reasons on the 
basis of new assumptions, i.e. moving upwards, the possible new defaults that the 
agent should examine are restricted to k – L, i.e. all the possible children defaults that 
may be computed form its current status (the parent node); in the case the agents 
reasons nonmonotonically, i.e. moving downwards, the possible defaults that the 
agent should examine are L, i.e. all the possible parent defaults that may be computed 
form its current status (the child node). Therefore, the lattice structure, first, enables 
an agent to position itself among all its possible KH states, and second, enables an 
agent to move upwards or downwards, i.e. reason hypothetical or nonmonotonically, 
via the parent/child relation that hold among the lattice nodes. 
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Recall that, an agent in order to populate the lattice levels needs to compute the 
power set P(S) of a given set S. For instance, given a set S = {a, b, c, d} of n=4 elements, the 
corresponding power set is the set P (S) that contains 2n elements as follows: 
P(S) = { {}, {a}, {b}, {c}, {d}, {a,b}, {a,c}, {a,d}, {b,c}, {b,d}, {c,d}, {a,b,c}, {a,b,d}, {a,c,d}, {b,c,d}, {a,b,c,d} } 
As shown in the previous section 6.3, the elements of P (S) may be seen as binary 
integers of length n, i.e.: 
P(S) = { {0000},{1000},{0100},{0010},{0001},{1100},{1010},{1001},{0110},{0101},{0011},{1110},{1101},{1011},{0111},{1111} } 
or as their decimal equivalents: 
P(S) = { 0, 8, 4, 2, 1, 12, 10, 9, 6, 5, 3, 14, 13, 11, 7, 15 } 
This particular view, also, helps us towards the computation of the relations that 
hold among the lattice nodes. Let us call the binary integers and their decimal 
equivalents of level 1 as base nodes, and the set that contains them as the base set. 
For instance, given the above set S = {a, b, c, d} of n=4 elements, the base elements are those 
contained in the base set S = {{0001}, {0010}, {0100}, {1000}} or their decimal equivalents S = {1, 2, 4, 
8}. These nodes are nodes that employ only one assumption. We see that whenever an 
agent find itself in a node N it either needs to move upwards or needs to move 
downwards. For both of the above cases the agent seeks to find all possible neighbour 
nodes to move to, i.e. child nodes that are at the next level upwards when reasoning 
hypothetically, or parent nodes that are at the previous level downwards when 
reasoning non-monotonically. It is clear that these neighbours are being computed via 
the manipulation of lists, binary decimal integers, as shown in Algorithm 5 (Table 
7.1). 
This algorithm is based on the Algorithm 2 (Table 6.1), as shown in the previous 
chapter, for the construction of the single-norm KH structure. Given a node N and the 
set of base elements that correspond to this node, we may calculate the neighbours of 
N by adding and abstracting the decimal integers of the base elements to the decimal 
integer that correspond to the element N. We use an auxiliary prodedure named 
NumberOfAssumptions which calculates the total number of aces in the binary format 
that correspond to an element, i.e. either element N or their potential children/parents. 
Whenever, a potential child or parent node employs more or less assumptions, 
correspondingly, and belongs within the lattice limits (0 ≤ decimal integer ≤ 2k-1), then we may 
characterize the node explicitly, either as a child or as a parent node.  
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Table 7.1 Algorithm 5: Computation of the neighbour nodes 
 
Up to now we enabled an agent to seek for useful assumptions and indicate a set of 
appropriate formulations of defaults to place in the D set of the DfT representing the 
norms that it will use during its reasoning. The second question that arises towards 
assumption identification is “which substitution instance of initial norm conditions 
that were marked as assumptions should be chosen and employed in the inference 
procedure”, i.e., tantamount to the question “which is the appropriate ground instance 
of a default to use during the reasoning”, for each of the norms in the initial set of 
norms. To this end, we adopt Herbrand semantics for the FOL language. The 
Herbrand universe of a FOL language is the set of all ground terms. The Herbrand 
Algorithm 5  
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
 PROCEDURE NeighbourhoodForANode(N, L, BL) 
  
 VARIABLES 
     INTEGER: i, j, b, max, min,  TempP, TempN  
                            N // node represented as an decimal integer 
                            L // integer representing the level where N is contained 
     LIST: BL   // list that contains the base elements represented as decimal integers 
   
 START 
  
    b=Size(BL);   // Size(LIST BL) returns the number of elements in the list BL,  
                                     i.e. b is the total number of the base elements 
 
    max ← 2b -1 // maximum decimal integer, i.e. element at the top level 
    min ← 0      // minimum decimal integer, i.e. element at the ground level 
 
    FOR i=1 TO i=k STEP 1 DO {  
 
       FOR j=0 TO j=b-1 STEP 1 DO { 
  
           TempP  ← N + BL[j] 
           TempN  ← N - BL[j] 
 
           // NumberOfAssumptions(INTEGER N) coverts the decimal integer N to its equivalent  
           //       binary and, counts the number of aces (1), i.e. the umber of assumptions employed 
                              
          IF ( (NumberOfAssumptions(TempP) >  NumberOfAssumptions(N)) AND TempP < max +1 ) THEN {       
                      TempP  is a child node              
          ELSE IF ( (NumberOfAssumptions(TempN) <  NumberOfAssumptions(N)) AND TempN > min - 1 )  
THEN { 
                      TempN  is a parent node 
          }   // end of IF                                     
 
      }   // end of FOR 
  
   }   //end of FOR 
 
 END_ PROCEDURE 
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base of a FOL language is the set of all ground atoms formed using elements of the 
Herbrand universe as arguments. Thus, an agent may identify possible grounded 
assumptions searching among grounded formulae computed on the basis of the 
Herbrand semantics. 
7.3 Theory Construction 
Of course, systems are typically subjects to multiple norms, each of which may be 
formulated as a default, and candidate default formulations are organized in a lattice, 
such as the one described above. Hence, the DfT representation of a set of norms is a 
pair of the form (W, D), where W is a set of logic formulae that represent currently 
available knowledge, and D is a set of lattices, each containing the possible 
formulations of a norm as a default. Note that each initial norm may be mapped to 
one of many candidate defaults, and during its reasoning the agent will employ only 
one default formulation for each initial norm.  
To illustrate this, let us assume that a normative system comprises two norms of 
the form:  
R1≡Y1←X1∧X2 and R2≡Y2←X3∧X4∧X5 
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Figure 7.2 Expansion/contraction of KH status for rule R1 
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Figure 7.3 Expansion/contraction of KH status for rule R2 
 
Single-norm Lattice Structure for R1: 
Level 0R1: { D10,1 ≡ X1∧X2 : true / Y1                          }                
Level 1R1: { D11,1 ≡ X1 : X2 / Y1, D11,2 = X2 : X1 / Y1  }                                        
Level 2R1: { D12,1 ≡ true : X1,X2/ Y1                           }                
 Single-norm Lattice Structure for R2: 
Level 0R2: { D20,1 ≡ X3∧X4∧X5 : true / Y2                                                                          } 
Level 1R2: { D21,1 ≡ X3∧X4 : X5 / Y2,   D21,2 = X3∧X5 : X4 / Y2, D21,3 = X4∧X5 : X3 / Y2         } 
Level 2R2: {  D22,1 ≡ X3 : X4, X5 / Y2,   D22,2 = X4 : X3, X5 / Y2,  D22,3 = X5 : X3, X4 / Y2       } 
Level 3R2: { D23,1 ≡ true : X3, X4, X5/ Y2                                                                            } 
7.4 Inference Procedure 
Reasoning starts with the agent to attempt to position itself on specific nodes for 
each lattice contained in the D set of its theory. The initialization is useful for two 
reasons: first, the agent determines what is known and what is not, and, second, it sets 
a starting point for its inference by determining exactly what are the available options 
whenever the agent needs to reason hypothetically or non-monotonically by using the 
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parent-child (moving upwards) or child-parent (moving downwards) relationships for 
its current state (node). Next the agent starts to apply defaults in order to derive 
conclusions. For now, consider a quantitative criterion that helps the agent to decide 
which default to apply, in the case where two or more defaults apply, that correspond 
to two or more initial rules, at the same time. This criterion depends on the number of 
knowledge/assumptions employed for each default, i.e., minimality of assumptions is 
considered as the criterion. Later, we discuss why this criterion is inadequate for 
rational agents and we propose alternatives. Each time a default applies its 
conclusions are included in the current extension that is being computed. In our 
previous approach to assumption-based reasoning, as explained in chapter 6, we 
noted that, whenever, there are no further defaults that can be applied in a level this 
signals to the agent that it needs to employ further assumptions in order to proceed, 
and inference continues by examining defaults that lie in the next level upwards. The 
case where reasoning is possible using only defaults from the ground levels is 
identical to inference in classical logic, but here we are also able to preserve 
consistency of entailment, if we want to employ appropriate variations of DfL such as 
Constrained Default Logic [225] as we discuss later. 
Now, we see that, during inference, the agent needs to update its KH status, for two 
reasons: first each time a default applies the derived conclusions may influence the 
current state of the agent in the lattices; second, we have considered an environment 
that is open and thus information and agents come and leave in a vaguely manner. 
Therefore, an agent needs to update its internal state, i.e. its position on lattices. 
The inference is done according to the Algorithm 6 (Figure 7.4). The Listener is a 
procedure that detects any changes of the world and refers these to the agent in order 
to update its world. Thus, the agent’s world is affected (updated) first by endogenous 
factors, e.g. its inference process, and second, by exogenous factors, e.g. changes in 
the environment or other agent’s valid actions. 
To illustrate the reasoning process, consider the previous example with the two 
norms R1, R2 and the corresponding lattices shown in Figures 7.2 and 7.3. Here are 
some possible scenaria, with different initial knowledge available each time, in the 
beginning of the reasoning process: 
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• if W=In(0)={X1, X2} and Out(0)=∅ then the agent initially places itself to the nodes D10,1 
and D23,1 for R1 and R2 respectively. First, the extension In(1)={X1, X2, Y1} (Out(1)={ }) is 
computed on a factual basis by applying default D10,1. Now the agent is able to 
update its world and reposition itself into the KH lattices for the defaults that 
have not fired yet. No other changes are detected so the extension In(2)={X1, X2, Y1, 
Y2} is computed by making the assumption that X3, X4 and X5 hold (Out(2)={¬X3, ¬X4, 
¬X5}) and by applying default D23,1. 
 
YES
END
START
INFERENCE
(Hypothetical / Non-monotonic)LISTENER
INITIALIZATION-
POSITION / REPOSITION
NEW WORLD
INITIAL 
WORLD
DECISION
NO
 
Figure 7.4 Algorithm 6: Life-cycle of reasoning in open environments 
 
• if W=In(0)={X1, X2, X3} and Out(0)=∅ then the agent initially places itself to the nodes D10,1 
and D22,1 for R1 and R2 respectively. First, the extension In(1)={X1, X2, X3, Y1} (Out(1)={ }) is 
computed on a factual basis by applying defaults D10,1. Now the agent is able to 
update its world and reposition itself into the KH lattices for the defaults that 
have not fired yet. No other changes are detected so the extension In(2)={ X1, X2, X3, 
Y1, Y2} is computed by making the assumption that X4 and X5 hold (Out(2)={¬X4, ¬X5}) 
and by applying default D22,1. 
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• if W=In(0)={X1, X3, X4, X5} and Out(0)=∅ then the agent initially places itself to the nodes 
D11,1 and D20,1 for R1 and R2 respectively. First, the extension In(1)={ X1, X3, X4, X5, Y2} 
(Out(1)={ }) is computed on a factual basis by applying defaults D20,1. Now the 
agent is able to update its world and reposition itself to the KH lattices for the 
defaults that have not fired yet. No other changes are detected so the extension 
In(2)={ X1, X3, X4, X5, Y2, Y1} is computed by making the assumption that only X2 holds 
(Out(2)={¬X2}) and by applying default D11,1. 
Note that although a level may contain two or more defaults that correspond to the 
same initial norm (e.g. D21,1 or D21,2 or D21,3) there is no need for some kind of 
prioritization amongst them. If two or more defaults of the same level, which are 
derived from the same initial norm, were to apply simultaneously, then the more 
general default contained in the immediately lower level should have applied. 
Moreover, because inference involves one lattice level at a time in a step-wise 
manner, the agent employs the fewest possible hypotheses. 
During its reasoning, the agent will need to remember which default formulation it 
chose for each of the norms that it reasons with, i.e., it needs to remember which node 
it chose for each of the lattices, in order to be able to answer question 2H. Moreover, 
as its reasoning progresses and new information becomes available, either merely 
augmenting its knowledge base, or updating some part of it, the agent will need to 
update its choice of default formulations, moving upwards or downwards within each 
lattice structure. Upward moves correspond to the agent trying to answer question 1H, 
while downward moves correspond to the agent trying to answer question 3H. 
In order to illustrate all three issues of interest (1H - 3H) at the same time, let us 
assume that a normative system comprises two norms of the form:  
R1≡X3←X1∧X2 and R2≡Y2←X3∧X4∧X5 
Thus, the corresponding lattices' levels contain the defaults (lattices are identical in 
structure to the lattices shown in Figures 7.2 and 7.3):   
Single-norm Lattice Structure for R1: 
Level 0R1: { D10,1 ≡ X1∧X2 : true / X3                          }                
Level 1R1: { D11,1 ≡ X1 : X2 / Y1, D11,2 = X2 : X1 / X3  }                                        
Level 2R1: { D12,1 ≡ true : X1,X2/ X3                           }                
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 Single-norm Lattice Structure for R2: 
Level 0R2: { D20,1 ≡ X3∧X4∧X5 : true / Y2                                                                          } 
Level 1R2: { D21,1 ≡ X3∧X4 : X5 / Y2,   D21,2 = X3∧X5 : X4 / Y2, D21,3 = X4∧X5 : X3 / Y2         } 
Level 2R2: {  D22,1 ≡ X3 : X4, X5 / Y2,   D22,2 = X4 : X3, X5 / Y2,  D22,3 = X5 : X3, X4 / Y2       } 
Level 3R2: { D23,1 ≡ true : X3, X4, X5/ Y2                                                                            } 
Here is a possible scenario: 
• if W=In(0)={X1, X4} and Out(0)=∅ then the agent initially places itself to the nodes D11,1 
and D22,2 for R1 and R2 respectively (Figure 7.5). First, the extension In(1)={X1, X4, X3} 
(Out(1)={ ¬X2 }) is computed by applying default D11,1.  
 
X3X5
X4
X3 X3X5
X3 X4
X5X4 X4
X5
X1
X1 X2
X2
Lattice Structure for norm R1 Lattice Structure for norm R2
State if reason hypothetically
Current State
State if reason non-monotonically
 
Figure 7.5 Initialization 
 
Now the agent is able to update its world and reposition itself into the KH 
lattices for the defaults that haven’t fired, yet. Specifically, the agent now 
possesses the knowledge that X3 holds, and consequently, it is able to change 
its position into the KH lattice for norm R2, and move to the node D21,1  (Figure 
7.6). Note that, although, the agent moves downwards to the lower level that 
contains three nodes (D21,1, D21,2, D21,3), only the two of them (D21,1, D21,3) are 
acceptable nodes due to their connection with the child node (D22,2). Moreover, 
this connection indicates exactly which one of the nodes should the agent 
choose when moving downwards. As a result, the extension In(2)={X1, X4, X3, Y2} is 
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computed by making the additional assumption that X5 holds (Out(2)={ ¬X2, ¬X5}) and 
by applying default D21,1. This extension is computed on the initial commitment 
that X2 holds. This commitment implies that X3 holds and this is considered as 
factual knowledge on the next norm that fires. It is clear, that the agent is able 
to reason hypothetically (1H) and rely on its commitments (2H) in an 
argumentation-like manner.  
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Figure 7.6 Reposition 
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Figure 7.7 Reposition 
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This is the same fact that enables the agent to reason non-monotonically (3H). 
Consider that, at a later time point, the agent possesses the knowledge that ¬X2 
and X5 hold. Now, the agent, first, should retract the employed assumption 
about X2 and any conclusions derived on its basis, and second, needs to 
reposition itself again, into the KH lattices. Note that, in this case, the agent 
repositions itself to a different nodes from its initial states due to the 
augmented knowledge base, i.e. for R1 it still positions itself to the state D11,1, 
and for R2 it repositions itself to the state D21,3  (Figure 7.7). As a result, now, 
the extension In(1)={X1, X4, ¬X2, X5, Y2} is computed by making the single assumption 
that X3 holds (Out(1)={ ¬X3}) and by applying default D21,3, only (D11,1 can not fire). 
7.5 Managing the Space of Knowledge/Hypothesis 
So far, we have argued that agents must resort to assumptions in order to reason in 
the presence of incomplete knowledge, and we have shown a way in which they may 
be able to identify candidate assumptions and employ them dynamically. We have 
shown that the space of possible hypotheses available to an agent is essentially 
infinite, since it treats any literal that it does not know about explicitly as a candidate 
assumption. As a result, it affords an agent the ability to use all available notions that 
the representation language supports, e.g. information about actions and time, deontic 
notions, physical and legal ability, roles, beliefs, etc. Such information may be 
relative to the agent itself, other agents or the environment. This suggests that our 
proposal is distinct from other approaches to assumption-based reasoning. 
Other approaches to dynamic assumption-based reasoning (e.g. [52, 158, 51, 205, 
206, 2, 192, 193, 185, 131, 233]) rely on a finite hypotheses space, which is either 
pre-specified (usually in this case it is referred to as assumption pool) and is explored 
dynamically, or is identified dynamically by goal-driven generation, i.e. the agent has 
specific conclusions that it wants to derive and identifies what assumptions are 
required in order to perform its derivations. Although the goal-oriented view on 
hypothetical reasoning facilitates the implementation of a tool, e.g. an agent, we think 
that it is something more than this, perhaps related to the agent’s personality and 
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distinct approach to reasoning (e.g. cautious vs. risky). Our approach enables agents 
to be more independent and open-minded (one might say more like humans) and is 
distinct with respect to other approaches to hypothetical reasoning, due to the fact that 
we prefer to use appropriate mechanisms in order to manage the full assumption 
space.  
There are three aspects to managing the space of hypotheses: 
• How do we ensure that the set of hypotheses that an agent uses to draw a 
conclusion is consistent, and that the possible world models that the agent 
infers are rational? 
• How do we restrict the space of hypotheses, when this is imperative, due to 
constraints that arise from a particular application domain? 
• Is the order in which an agent identifies and employs hypotheses important, 
i.e. does it affect what conclusions it may draw, whether these are rational, 
and the extent to which the agent bases its reasoning on reality rather than 
wishful thinking? 
Next, we discuss each of these issues in turn and propose qualitative criteria to 
manage the space of assumptions and possible defaults to apply. 
7.5.1 Hypotheses Rationality and Consistency 
One may argue that following Reiter’s original computation of extensions within 
DfT we may compute possible world models that are counter-intuitive.  
For instance, according to the knowledge base: 
{ Has(Fledgling,Feathers),  ∀x (Has(x,Feathers) ∧ Flies(x))→ Is(x,Eagle),  ∀x (Has(x,Feathers) ∧ ⌐Flies(x))→ Is(x,Pengiun) }  
an agent may compute an extension where the fledgling bird is an eagle and a 
penguin on the basis of the simultaneous assumptions that it can and cannot fly, i.e.: 
In(2) = { Has(Fledgling,Feathers), Is(Fledgling,Eagle), Is(Fledgling,Pengiun)} and Out(2) = { ⌐Flies(Fledgling), Flies(Fledgling)}.  
Moreover, for instance, in a business realistic example, a buyer agent would infer 
an extension which suggests that it infers a possible version of the world, in which it 
bears an obligation to pay the seller agent, although no delivery from the seller agent 
is explicitly recorded in this world, and similarly that the seller agent bears an 
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obligation to deliver, although this world does not explicitly record that the buyer’s 
agent order is valid (best-guess reasoning).  
This view of extensions, separated from assumptions, as possible world models, is 
clearly undesirable. To overcome this problem we may employ Constrained Default 
Logic [225] and require joint consistency of default assumptions. The possible world 
model that the agent infers incrementally, for a CDfT, is the consistent set In(i)∪¬Out(i). 
This is tantamount to saying that the possible world models inferred by the agent 
contain, besides previous knowledge, both the consequents and the assumptions of 
the applied defaults. 
Moreover, note that it is important to consider the issue of consistency between 
assumptions employed during the reasoning process and new inferences derived as a 
result of the reasoning process. One of the reasons for which it is impossible to resort 
to proof for the construction of the DfT, is precisely because we need a revision 
mechanism in order to reconstruct the default rules as new information becomes 
available, so that the agent could prove literals from its updated knowledge, and 
hence identify them correctly as prerequisites or justifications, i.e. candidate 
assumptions. By constructing lattice structures we facilitate the requirement to revise 
the defaults. This is because inference on the lattice structure involves one level at a 
time, and should new information become available, the agent can move upwards or 
downwards to the required level of the lattice. Incidentally, in this way it is also 
guaranteed that during its inference, the agent will employ the fewest possible 
hypotheses, i.e. the conclusions it derives at any given time are committed to its 
current knowledge to the largest possible extent, and it only makes assumptions when 
it really has to. 
Towards commitment to previous worlds, an agent may use special default rules 
such as normal and semi-normal defaults as already discussed in the subsection 6.3.3. 
7.5.2 Hypotheses Restriction 
It may be risky for an agent to employ assumptions in full freedom. Full autonomy 
in assumption identification may be unsafe and lead to undesirable situations such as 
lack of control, unpredictable effects and counter-intuitive worlds. Thus, a 
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
09/12/2017 01:19:12 EET - 137.108.70.7
7. Autonomous Hypothetical Non-monotonic Reasoning 
 
 132
mechanism capable of motivating and adjusting the agents’ hypothetical reasoning is 
really essential. 
For this purpose, we see that DfL’s syntax and semantics can be really helpful. 
Recall that during its reasoning, the agent computes the extension of its theory 
incrementally and at each step i of the reasoning process constructs the set In(i), which 
contains all previously available knowledge together with any new derived 
knowledge. The Out(i) set computed at each step of this reasoning process contains 
formulae that should not turn out to be true i.e., the negation of formulae that are 
employed as assumptions. By initializing the Out set appropriately, we may control the 
agent in its identification and deployment of assumptions, and hence we may control 
its autonomy.  
Here are some possible scenaria, for the examples discussed above but now with 
different initializations of the Out set: 
R1≡Y1←X1∧X2 and R2≡Y2←X3∧X4∧X5 
The corresponding lattices' levels contain the defaults (Figures 7.2 and 7.3):   
Single-norm Lattice Structure for R1: 
Level 0R1: { D10,1 ≡ X1∧X2 : true / Y1                          }                
Level 1R1: { D11,1 ≡ X1 : X2 / Y1, D11,2 = X2 : X1 / Y1  }                                        
Level 2R1: { D12,1 ≡ true : X1,X2/ Y1                           }                
 Single-norm Lattice Structure for R2: 
Level 0R2: { D20,1 ≡ X3∧X4∧X5 : true / Y2                                                                          } 
Level 1R2: { D21,1 ≡ X3∧X4 : X5 / Y2,   D21,2 = X3∧X5 : X4 / Y2, D21,3 = X4∧X5 : X3 / Y2         } 
Level 2R2: {  D22,1 ≡ X3 : X4, X5 / Y2,   D22,2 = X4 : X3, X5 / Y2,  D22,3 = X5 : X3, X4 / Y2       } 
Level 3R2: { D23,1 ≡ true : X3, X4, X5/ Y2                                                                            } 
• if W = In(0) = {X1, X2} and Out(0) = {Y2} then extension In(1) = {X1, X2, Y1} is computed by 
applying only D10,1 default (Out(1) = {Y2}). No assumptions are possible due to the 
initial restriction on what can be inferred. 
• if W = {X1, X2, X3} and Out(0) = {X4, X5} then extension In(1) = { X1, X2, X3, Y1} is computed by 
applying only D10,1 default (Out(1) = {X4, X5}). Again no assumptions are possible due 
to the initial restriction on what can be assumed. 
• if W = {X1, X3, X4, X5} and Out(0) = {X2, Y2} then no extension is computed due to the initial 
restriction on what can be inferred and assumed. 
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A question that arises naturally is ‘What kind of information can be used to restrict 
the assumption space?’. The answer is simple: ‘Any kind of information!’. And this 
answer is what is really important in our proposal. It means that we are able to use all 
available notions that our representation language supports. For instance, we may 
include information about actions and time, deontic notions, physical and legal 
ability, roles, beliefs, etc. Such information may relate to the agent itself, other agents 
or the environment.  
The next question that arises is “How must we initialize the Out(i) set?”. We may use 
a Pre-constrained Default Theory. A PcDfT is a triple of the form (W, D, PC), where (W, D) 
is a CDfT and PC is set of formulae that are considered as the constraints of the theory 
[226]. For the first step of the process, i.e., for i=1, In(0)=W and Out(0) = PC. It is clear that, 
the role of pre-constraints is identical to the role of the Out(i) set in initializing and 
adjusting agents’ hypotheses. By initializing the PC set appropriately, an agent may 
specify and apply a certain strategy in its reasoning. Note that the formulae contained 
in PC define what the agent concedes or expects, and not factual knowledge. For this 
reason it is separated from W. 
For example, in case of incomplete knowledge about the carrier’s agent validity to 
perform delivery and to accept payment on delivery, the buyer agent should make 
some assumptions in order to proceed with inference. A risky agent may accept that 
the carrier agent is legally (and practically, obviously) empowered to perform 
delivery and accept payment, thus the validity of the corresponding actions could be 
assumed. On the other hand, a cautious agent may accept the assumptions regarding 
the action of delivery but not regarding the action of accepting payment. To model 
this cautious strategy the agent may insert into PC that legal power or validity of the 
carrier agent to receive payment holds. 
7.5.3 Hypotheses Sequence 
So far, an agent is able to deal with the problem of incomplete knowledge by 
reconstructing the initial domain representation into a DfT. A question that arises 
during assumption-based reasoning is what is the reasonable sequence for employing 
assumptions? We believe that this question and its answer are strongly related to 
causality. 
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We may use stratification for a DfT [45, 46] or for its two variants (CDfT and 
PcDfT) [13]. Recall that, a DfT is called stratified iff there exists a stratification 
function s that assigns a natural number to each default. As a result of the application 
of a stratification function the set of default rules is ordered into strata.  
Note that the way in which agents construct lattice structures, as per our proposal, 
resembles, in a way, stratification of a DfT. The possible default formulations of each 
initial norm are assigned to the various lattice levels, depending on the number of 
assumptions that each default formulation employs. That is, the number of 
assumptions may be regarded as somewhat similar to a stratification criterion applied 
to the set of possible default formulations for each initial norm.  
The question that arises naturally, now, is how these two distinct ordering methods 
(one due to stratification and one due to the number of assumptions) relate to each 
other. Stratification aims at preserving causal relations between defaults, while the 
organization of defaults into lattice structures aims at ensuring that agents employ the 
fewest possible hypotheses at each step of their reasoning process, and thus base their 
conclusions on facts as much as possible, rather than on assumptions. The set of 
lattices that the agent possesses may be subjected to stratification, so that the agent 
chooses a reasonable order in which to apply default rules, and preserve any causal 
relations between defaults. Once a particular lattice, belonging to a particular stratum, 
is chosen, the agent establishes which node of the lattice corresponds to its current 
knowledge base (and therefore assumption requirements). Note that the agent may 
use different levels of different lattices. The precise level to be used in each lattice is 
determined by its current knowledge. The precise lattice to use at each point is 
determined by the stratification function. In this way an agent infers some knowledge, 
even on a (partially or totally) hypothetical basis, which causes the entailment of 
other knowledge in an argumentation-like manner (cf [198]) and we may characterize 
its conclusions in the same way that is used to characterize arguments (e.g. 
defeasible).  
To illustrate this, let us assume the previous normative system containing the 
norms R1 and R2 enhanced with two additional norms R3 and R4 of the form:  
R3=X2←X6 and R4=X5←X7∧X8 
The corresponding lattices’ levels for norms R3 and R4 contain the defaults:   
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Single-norm Lattice Structure for R3: 
Level 0R3: { D30,1 = X6 : true / X2  } 
Level 1R3: { D31,1 = true : X6/ X2  }                   
Single-norm Lattice Structure for R4:: 
Level 0R4: { D40,1 = X7,X8 : true / X5                                          } 
Level 1R4: { D41,1 = X7 : X8 / X5,  D41,2 = X8 : X7 / X5  }  
Level 2R4: { D42,1 = true : X7,X8/ X5                             } 
Under a stratified theory it is clear that R3 and R1 as well as R4 and R2, are mapped 
into different strata because R1 and R2 use the consequents of norms R3 and R4, 
respectively, either in the prerequisites or the justifications sets. Here are some 
possible scenaria, with different initial knowledge available each time, in the 
beginning of the reasoning process: 
• if W=In(0)={X1, X6 , X3} and Out(0)=∅ then extension In(4)={X1, X6, X3, X2, Y1, X5, Y2} is computed by 
making the assumption that X7, X8 and X4 hold (Out(4)={¬X7, ¬X8, ¬X4) and by applying 
defaults D30,1, D10,1, D42,1 and D21,2 respectively. Note that, in this case, the agent 
first infers X5 on the assumption of X7, X8 and later infers Y2 only on the 
assumption of X4, while it uses its previous decisions towards this scope.   
• if W=In(0)={X1, X2, X3, X7, X8} and Out(0)=∅ then extension In(3)={ X1, X2, X3, X7, X8, Y1, X5, Y2} is 
computed by making the assumption that X4 hold (Out(3)={¬X4}) and by applying 
defaults D10,1, D40,1 and D21,2 respectively. Note that, in this case, there is no reason 
for an agent to use any of the two possible default formulations for the initial 
norm R3, because this norm adds no useful information to its knowledge base. 
To sum up, we see that, an agent, when uses stratification on the set of available 
lattice structures and then performs its reasoning within the lattices, does not miss any 
causal knowledge and avoids employing unhelpful assumptions. 
7.6 Examples 
So far in our discussion, we have used abstract examples, in order to facilitate 
focusing on concepts rather than the particulars of a specific domain of an 
application. Here we illustrate the points raised in the preceding discussion, with 
reference to one general example and one e-commerce example. Of course, the 
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technique proposed in this thesis, is more generally applicable to other open multi-
agent scenaria, where agents have to reason with incomplete or inconsistent 
knowledge and their behaviour is regulated by some norms (e.g. cooperative 
distributed problem solving, task allocation etc). 
7.6.1 General Example 
Consider the following normative system:    
 Specie(x,Mammal) ← Has(x,Hair) ∧ Produce(x,Milk), 
 Specie(x,Bird) ← Has(x,Feathers) ∧ Lays(x,Eggs), 
 Is(x,Tigger) ← Specie(x,Mammal) ∧ Color(x,Brown-Orange) ∧ Has(x,Stripes), 
 Is(x,Pengiun) ← Specie(x,Bird) ∧ ¬Flies(x) ∧ Swims(x), 
 Is(x,Platypus) ← Produce(x,Milk) ∧ Lays(x,Eggs) ∧ Swims(x), 
 Is(x,Echidna) ← Produce(x,Milk) ∧ Lays(x,Eggs) ∧ Has(x,Spines), 
Note that these norms are syntactically identical to the norms considered in the 
abstract examples presented above. Thus, the corresponding lattices of candidate 
default formulations for each one coincide with the lattices shown previously.  
Now imagine that the initial knowledge is: 
W=In(0)={ Has(Animal,Hair) ∨ Has(Animal,Feathers),  Is(x, x’) ∨ Is(x, x’’) }, 
that is, we know that Animal either has hair or feathers. On the basis of this knowledge 
and without resorting to any assumptions inference is not possible. In contrast, on the 
basis of assumptions an agent is able to compute possible future worlds. Consider that 
we use a stratified and constrained DDfL. In this case, two extensions, i.e. possible 
worlds, are computed: 
• 1st possible world: 
In’(2)=In(0) ∪ { Has(Animal,Hair), Specie(Animal,Mammal), Is(Animal,Tigger) } on the basis of the 
assumptions that Animal produces milk, its color is brown-orange and has 
stripes, i.e., Out’(2)={ ¬Produce(Animal,Milk), ¬ Color(Animal,Brown-Orange), ¬ Has(Animal,Stripes) } 
• 2nd possible world:  
In’’(2)= =In(0) ∪ { Has(Animal, Feathers), Specie(Animal,Bird), Is(Animal,Penguine) } on the basis of the 
assumptions that Animal lays eggs, can not fly but swims, i.e., Out’’(2)={ 
¬Lays(Animal,Eggs), Flies(Animal), ¬Swims(Animal) } 
Note that, under the ODA, in each extension only two of the four initial norms and 
their corresponding defaults are used. That is, not due to the initial disjunction of 
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factual knowledge that animal has either hair or feathers (as a matter of fact we are 
free to employ any assumption and infer a conclusion on a totally hypothetical basis), 
but due to the restriction of joint-consistency of the constrained variation of the 
theory that we use, i.e., assumptions employed and conclusions entailed must be 
consistent with the current knowledge. Moreover, due to stratification we employ 
assumptions and infer new knowledge in an argumentation-like manner, e.g. Animal is 
considered to be a mammal on basis of the assumption that it produces milk, and 
correspondingly, Animal is considered to be a tiger on the inference that it is a mammal 
and the assumptions regarding its brown-orange color and its stripes. 
Until now, we have illustrated the way the proposed technique is used to address 
issues of interest 1H and 2H, which are dynamic assumption identification and the 
commitment to them. Now, consider the following scenario that illustrates the way 
our technique address issue of interest 3H, i.e., non-monotonicity. Imagine that the 
agent followed the second of the above two extensions and inferred that Animal is a 
Penguin. At a later time point it is informed that Has(Animal,Hair), Produce(Animal,Milk) and 
Lays(Animal,Eggs). This new information affects its previously drawn conclusions on the 
basis of the assumptions employed. Now, the agent needs to traverse the lattices 
downwards in order to choose an alternative formulation for the norms compatible 
with its current knowledge. Thus, the agent retracts its previously drawn conclusions 
and follows one of the alternative extensions that are computed: 
• 1st possible world: 
In’(2)= In(0) ∪ { Has(Animal,Hair),  Produce(Animal,Milk), Lays(Animal,Eggs } ∪ { Specie(Animal,Mammal), 
Is(Animal,Platypus) } on the basis of the assumption that Animal swims, i.e., Out’(2)={ 
¬Swims(Animal) } 
• 2nd possible world: 
In’’(2)= In(0) ∪ { Has(Animal,Hair),  Produce(Animal,Milk), Lays(Animal,Eggs) } ∪ { Specie(Animal,Mammal), 
Is(Animal,Echidna) } on the basis of the assumption that Animal has spines, i.e., Out’’(2)={ 
¬Has(Animal,Spines) } 
• 3rd possible world: 
In’’’(2)= In(0) ∪ { Has(Animal,Hair),  Produce(Animal,Milk), Lays(Animal,Eggs)} ∪ {Specie(Animal,Mammal), 
Is(Animal,Tigger) } on the basis of the assumptions that Animal produces milk, its color 
is brown-orange and has stripes, i.e., Out’’’(2)={ ¬Produce(Animal,Milk), ¬Color(Animal,Brown-
Orange), ¬Has(Animal,Stripes) } 
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7.6.2 Business Example 
Consider a 3-party business transaction that takes place in an electronic 
marketplace populated by software agents, as already discussed in chapters 4 and 6. 
Let the set {BA, SA, CA, …} denote agents in the e-market (where BA, SA, CA denote buyer, 
seller and carrier respectively). A buyer agent (BA) communicates with a seller agent 
(SA) and establishes an agreement for purchasing a certain product. Consequently, the 
seller agent communicates with a carrier agent (CA) and establishes a separate 
agreement for the safe and timely delivery of goods to the buyer agent.  
7.6.2.1 Dealing with information gaps (1H) 
Single-agent Autonomous Reasoning 
Assume that the initial set of contract norms for the agreement between BA and SA 
may contain two rules, R1 and R2, among others. R1 states that agent2 is obliged to deliver 
to agent1 if agent1 orders from agent2 and the transaction is successfully compiled. R2 states 
that agent1 is obliged to pay agent3 who acts on behalf of agent2 if agent1 orders from agent2, 
agent3 delivers the products to agent1 and agent3 is empowered to accept payment from 
agent1 on behalf of agent2. 
R={ R1≡ IsObligedToDeliver(agent2,agent1) ← OrdersFrom(agent1,agent2) ∧ E-shopFunctionsWell, 
       R2 ≡ IsObligedToPayOnBehalfOf(agent1,agent3,agent2) ← OrdersFrom(agent1,agent2) ∧ DeliversTo(agent3,agent1)  
   ∧ IsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agent3,agent1,agent2) } 
Note that these norms are syntactically similar to the norms considered in the 
examples above. Thus, the corresponding lattices of candidate default formulations 
for each one coincide with the lattices shown in Figures 7.2 and 7.3, i.e. they are as 
follows: 
Single-norm Lattice Structure for R1: 
Level 0: {  
D10,1 ≡  
OrdersFrom(agent1,agent2), E-shopFunctionsWell  
: true  
/ IsObligedToDeliver(agent2,agent1)                                 } 
Level 1: {  
D11,1 ≡  
OrdersFrom(agent1,agent2)  
: E-shopFunctionsWell  
/ IsObligedToDeliver(agent2,agent1),       
D11,2 ≡  
E-shopFunctionsWell  
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: OrdersFrom(agent1,agent2)  
/ IsObligedToDeliver(agent2,agent1)                                } 
Level 2: {  
D12,1 ≡ 
 true  
: OrdersFrom(agent1,agent2), E-shopFunctionsWell  
/ IsObligedToDeliver(agent2,agent1)                                  } 
Single-norm Lattice Structure for R2: 
Level 0: {  
D20,1 ≡  
OrdersFrom(agent1,agent2), DeliversTo(agent3,agent1),   
  IsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agent3,agent1,agent2)  
: true  
/ IsObligedToPayOnBehalfOf(agent1,agent3,agent2)                                                                                         } 
Level 1: {  
D21,1 ≡  
OrdersFrom(agent1,agent2), DeliversTo(agent3,agent1)  
: IsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agent3,agent1,agent2)  
/ IsObligedToPayOnBehalfOf(agent1,agent3,agent2),            
D21,2 ≡  
OrdersFrom(agent1,agent2), IsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agent3,agent1,agent2)  
: DeliversTo(agent3,agent1)  
/ IsObligedToPayOnBehalfOf(agent1,agent3,agent2),            
D21,3 ≡  
DeliversTo(agent3,agent1), IsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agent3,agent1,agent2)  
: OrdersFrom(agent1,agent2)  
/ IsObligedToPayOnBehalfOf(agent1,agent3,agent2)                                                                                           } 
Level 2: {  
D22,1 ≡  
OrdersFrom(agent1,agent2)  
: DeliversTo(agent3,agent1), IsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agent3,agent1,agent2)  
/ IsObligedToPayOnBehalfOf(agent1,agent3,agent2),             
D22,2 ≡  
DeliversTo(agent3,agent1)  
: OrdersFrom(agent1,agent2), IsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agent3,agent1,agent2)  
/ IsObligedToPayOnBehalfOf(agent1,agent3,agent2), 
D22,3 ≡  
IsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agent3,agent1,agent2)  
: OrdersFrom(agent1,agent2), DeliversTo(agent3,agent1)  
/ IsObligedToPayOnBehalfOf(agent1,agent3,agent2)                                                                                      } 
Level 3: {  
D23,1 ≡  
true  
: OrdersFrom(agent1,agent2), DeliversTo(agent3,agent1),   
   IsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agent3,agent1,agent2)  
/ IsObligedToPayOnBehalfOf(agent1,agent3,agent2)                                                                                       } 
Suppose that the initial knowledge for agent BA is W={ OrdersFrom(BA,SA), E-shopFunctionsWell}, 
that is, BA knows that it placed an order, and that the electronic transaction compiled 
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successfully. BA employs the default formulation D10,1 for norm R1 and it may only infer 
that SA is obliged to deliver products, on the basis of this knowledge, without resorting 
to any assumptions. But there are cases where BA needs to perform:  
• best-guess reasoning i.e., the agent needs to plan its future activities on the 
assumption that certain events/actions will occur, and that its partners’ actions 
will be valid. For instance, consider that BA has just ordered successfully from 
SA and also knows that CA is empowered to accept payment on behalf of SA, i.e., 
its current knowledge is: 
W = In(0) = { OrdersFrom(BA,SA), E-shopFunctionsWell, IsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(CA,BA,SA)  } 
In order to infer that it might find itself bearing an obligation to pay at some 
future time (and plan to have adequate funds available), it needs to assume 
that CA will deliver on time, i.e., that DeliversTo(CA,BA). In this case the agent uses 
the formulation D10,1 for norm R1 and the formulation D21,2 for norm R2 (Figure 
7.8): 
Π(2) = { D10,1, D21,2} 
In(2) = W ∪ { IsObligedToDeliver(SA,BA), IsObligedToPayOnBehalfOf(BA,CA,SA) } 
Out(2) = { ¬ DeliversTo(CA,BA)  } 
 
Lattice Structure for norm R1 Lattice Structure for norm R2
State if reason hypothetically
Current State
State if reason non-monotonically
 
Figure 7.8 BA’s position for norms R1 and R2 
 
• no-risk reasoning, i.e., even though the agent may not know everything about 
the past and present, it may need to infer information, in order to protect itself 
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from an undesirable situation in the future. For instance, consider that BA 
knows that it has just ordered successfully from SA and that CA delivered the 
goods to it, but it does not know explicitly whether CA is legally empowered to 
accept payment on behalf of SA, i.e., its current knowledge is: 
W = In(0) = { OrdersFrom(BA,SA), E-shopFunctionsWell, DeliversTo(CA,BA)  }  
In order to proceed and pay CA (and avoid finding itself in a situation where its 
payment is overdue) BA must be able to infer its obligation to pay CA, and this 
is possible only by resorting to the assumption that CA is legally empowered to 
accept payment on behalf of SA., i.e. that IsEmpoweredToAccept 
PaymentFromOnBehalfOf(CA,BA,SA). In this case the agent uses the default formulation 
D10,1 for norm R1 and the formulation D21,1 for norm R2 (Figure 7.9): 
Π(2) = { D10,1, D21,1} 
In(2) = W ∪ { IsObligedToDeliver(SA,BA), IsObligedToPayOnBehalfOf(BA,CA,SA) } 
Out(2) = { ¬ IsEmpoweredToAccept PaymentFromOnBehalfOf(CA,BA,SA) } 
 
Lattice Structure for norm R1 Lattice Structure for norm R2
State if reason hypothetically
Current State
State if reason non-monotonically
 
Figure 7.9 BA’s position for norms R1 and R2 
 
Now, let us see an example where it is desirable, for some reason, to restrict the 
assumption space. What if we wanted our agent BA to avoid assuming that some agent 
is legally empowered to act as a representative for another agent in matters of 
payment? Then the Out(0) set (this is the set of pre-specified constraints, PC,  that was 
mentioned earlier) must be initialized to contain the forbidden assumption:  
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PC=Out(0) = { IsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agent3,agent1,agent2) }  
Now, it is impossible for BA to employ the above assumption, that is, it will only 
use the formulation D10,1 of norm R1, i.e.: 
Π(1) = { D10,1} 
In(1) = W ∪ { IsObligedToDeliver(SA,BA)} 
Out(1) = { IsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agent3,agent1,agent2) } 
The Out set may, also, be initialized to contain rules in order to restrict the 
assumption space. For example, CA must not be assumed to be empowered to accept 
payment on behalf of SA, if either SA or CA is a debtor. Then the Out(0) set must be 
initialized to contain the forbidden assumption, which in this case takes the form of a 
rule: 
PC=Out(0) = { IsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agent3,agent1,agent2) ← Debtor(agent2),  
                       IsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agent3,agent1,agent2) ←  Debtor(agent3)   }  
Recall that when the Out set contains a literal, the intended semantics is that it 
should not be assumed. When the Out set contains a rule, the intended semantics is 
that, if the rule conditions hold, then the rule conclusion should neither be assumed 
nor concluded during inference, i.e., rules in the Out set act as constraints. Each 
condition in such a constraint may be known to the agent, i.e. it may be the case that 
it is explicitly contained in its initial knowledge, or it may be inferred during the 
reasoning process, or it may be assumed during the reasoning process.  
Multi-agent Autonomous Reasoning 
Consider now that the initial set of norms for the agreement between BA and SA 
contains, in addition to R1 and R2, norm R3, which states that agent2 is obliged to accept 
payment from agent3 on behalf of agent1 if agent3 delivers the products to agent1, agent1 pays 
for the products to agent3 and agent3 is empowered to accept payment from agent1 on 
behalf of agent2. 
R = { R1 ≡ IsObligedToDeliverTo (agent2,agent1) ← OrdersFrom(agent1,agent2) ∧ E-shopFunctionsWell, 
         R2 ≡ IsObligedToPayOnBehalfOf(agent1,agent3,agent2) ← OrdersFrom(agent1,agent2) ∧  DeliversTo(agent3,agent1)  
∧ IsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agent3,agent1,agent2),  
        R3 ≡ IsObligedToAcceptPaymenFromOnBehalfOf(agent2, agent3,agent1) ← DeliversTo(agent3,agent1) ∧ Pays(agent1,agent3)  
∧ IsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agent3,agent1,agent2) } 
The corresponding lattices are as follows: 
Single-norm Lattice Structure for R1: 
Level 0: {  
D10,1 ≡  
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OrdersFrom(agent1,agent2), E-shopFunctionsWell  
: true  
/ IsObligedToDeliver(agent2,agent1)                                 } 
Level 1: {  
D11,1 ≡  
OrdersFrom(agent1,agent2)  
: E-shopFunctionsWell  
/ IsObligedToDeliver(agent2,agent1),       
D11,2 ≡  
E-shopFunctionsWell  
: OrdersFrom(agent1,agent2)  
/ IsObligedToDeliver(agent2,agent1)                                } 
Level 2: {  
D12,1 ≡ 
 true  
: OrdersFrom(agent1,agent2), E-shopFunctionsWell  
/ IsObligedToDeliver(agent2,agent1)                                   } 
Single-norm Lattice Structure for R2: 
Level 0: {  
D20,1 ≡  
OrdersFrom(agent1,agent2), DeliversTo(agent3,agent1),   
  IsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agent3,agent1,agent2)  
: true  
/ IsObligedToPayOnBehalfOf(agent1,agent3,agent2)                                                                                        } 
Level 1: {  
D21,1 ≡  
OrdersFrom(agent1,agent2), DeliversTo(agent3,agent1)  
: IsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agent3,agent1,agent2)  
/ IsObligedToPayOnBehalfOf(agent1,agent3,agent2),            
D21,2 ≡  
OrdersFrom(agent1,agent2), IsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agent3,agent1,agent2)  
: DeliversTo(agent3,agent1)  
/ IsObligedToPayOnBehalfOf(agent1,agent3,agent2),            
D21,3 ≡  
DeliversTo(agent3,agent1), IsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agent3,agent1,agent2)  
: OrdersFrom(agent1,agent2)  
/ IsObligedToPayOnBehalfOf(agent1,agent3,agent2)                                                                                           } 
Level 2: {  
D22,1 ≡  
OrdersFrom(agent1,agent2)  
: DeliversTo(agent3,agent1), IsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agent3,agent1,agent2)  
/ IsObligedToPayOnBehalfOf(agent1,agent3,agent2),             
D22,2 ≡  
DeliversTo(agent3,agent1)  
: OrdersFrom(agent1,agent2), IsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agent3,agent1,agent2)  
/ IsObligedToPayOnBehalfOf(agent1,agent3,agent2), 
D22,3 ≡  
IsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agent3,agent1,agent2)  
: OrdersFrom(agent1,agent2), DeliversTo(agent3,agent1)  
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/ IsObligedToPayOnBehalfOf(agent1,agent3,agent2)                                                                                      } 
Level 3: {  
D23,1 ≡  
true  
: OrdersFrom(agent1,agent2), DeliversTo(agent3,agent1),  
   IsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agent3,agent1,agent2)  
/ IsObligedToPayOnBehalfOf(agent1,agent3,agent2)                                                                                      } 
Single-norm Lattice Structure for R3: 
Level 0: {  
D30,1 ≡  
DeliversTo(agent3,agent1), Pays(agent1,agent3))  
 ∧ IsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agent3,agent1,agent2)  
: true  
/ IsObligedToAcceptPaymenFromOnBehalfOf(agent2, agent3,agent1)                                                         } 
Level 1: {  
D31,1 ≡  
DeliversTo(agent3,agent1), Pays(agent1,agent3)  
: IsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agent3,agent1,agent2) 
/ IsObligedToAcceptPaymenFromOnBehalfOf(agent2, agent3,agent1),          
D31,2 ≡  
DeliversTo(agent3,agent1), IsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agent3,agent1,agent2)  
: Pays(agent1,agent3)  
/ IsObligedToAcceptPaymenFromOnBehalfOf(agent2, agent3,agent1),            
D31,3 ≡  
Pays(agent1,agent3), IsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agent3,agent1,agent2)  
: DeliversTo(agent3,agent1)  
/ IsObligedToAcceptPaymenFromOnBehalfOf(agent2, agent3,agent1)                                                        } 
Level 2: {  
D32,1 ≡  
DeliversTo(agent3,agent1)  
: Pays(agent1,agent3), IsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agent3,agent1,agent2)  
/ IsObligedToAcceptPaymenFromOnBehalfOf(agent2, agent3,agent1),             
D32,2 ≡  
Pays(agent1,agent3)  
: DeliversTo(agent3,agent1), IsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agent3,agent1,agent2)  
/ IsObligedToAcceptPaymenFromOnBehalfOf(agent2, agent3,agent1), 
D32,3 ≡  
IsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agent3,agent1,agent2) 
: DeliversTo(agent3,agent1), Pays(agent1,agent3)  
/ IsObligedToAcceptPaymenFromOnBehalfOf(agent2, agent3,agent1)                                                      } 
Level 3: {  
D33,1 ≡  
true  
: DeliversTo(agent3,agent1), Pays(agent1,agent3),   
  IsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agent3,agent1,agent2))  
/ IsObligedToAcceptPaymenFromOnBehalfOf(agent2, agent3,agent1)                                                     } 
In this case, agents BA and SA are subject to the same set of norms (the R set), and 
suppose that they possess different individual knowledge. Each of them needs to 
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reason autonomously based on individual hypotheses, although they may share the 
same overall goal (e.g. to comply with the agreement). 
We showed above (cf. the non-risk reasoning case) that if: 
WBA = In(0)BA = { OrdersFrom(BA,SA), E-shopFunctionsWell, DeliversTo(CA,BA) },  
BA needs to assume that CA is empowered to accept payment on behalf of SA in order to 
infer its obligation to pay. 
On the other hand, SA may possess this kind of knowledge due to its separate 
agreement with CA, so it does not need to make such an assumption. However, it may 
need to employ other assumptions. For instance, let SA know that BA ordered from it 
successfully, that CA delivered goods to BA, and that CA is legally empowered to accept 
payment from BA on its behalf, i.e. 
WSA = In(0)SA = { OrdersFrom(BA,SA),  DeliversTo(CA,BA), E-shopFunctionsWell, 
                           IsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(CA,BA,SA)      } 
Then in order to recognize whether its partner (BA) complies with the agreement (and 
consider this business transaction completed) SA needs to assume that BA performs 
payment (Pays(BA, CA)), and this is possible with formulation D31,2 of norm R3 (Figure 
7.10), i.e.: 
Π(3)SA = { D10,1, D20,1, D31,2} 
In(3)SA = W ∪ { IsObligedToDeliver(SA,BA), IsObligedToPayOnBehalfOf(BA,CA,SA), 
                         IsObligedToAcceptPaymenFromOnBehalfOf(SA, CA,BA)                       } 
Out(3)SA = { ¬ Pays(BA, CA) } 
 
Lattice Structure for norm R1 Lattice Structure for norm R2 Lattice Structure for norm R3
State if reason hypothetically
Current State
State if reason non-monotonically
 
Figure 7.10 SA’s position for norms R1, R2 and R3 
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In the same way that we may have multiple agents reasoning with the same current 
knowledge, using different assumptions, we may impose the same or different 
restrictions on their assumption spaces, by appropriate initializations of their 
respective Out sets. 
7.6.2.2 Commitment to Assumptions (2H) 
Consider, again, the same set of norms for the agreement between BA and SA which 
contains R1, R2 and R3. We showed above (cf. the non-risk reasoning case) that if: 
WBA = In(0)BA = { OrdersFrom(BA,SA), E-shopFunctionsWell, DeliversTo(CA,BA) }  
initially the BA positions itself as shown in Figure 7.11, i.e. in order to infer its 
obligation to pay, BA needs to assume that CA is empowered to accept payment on 
behalf of SA, i.e. IsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(CA,BA,SA).  
Π(2)BA = { D10,1, D21,1} 
In(2)BA = W ∪ { IsObligedToDeliver(SA,BA), IsObligedToPayOnBehalfOf(BA,CA,SA) } 
Out(2)BA = { ¬ IsEmpoweredToAccept PaymentFromOnBehalfOf(CA,BA,SA) } 
 
Lattice Structure for norm R1 Lattice Structure for norm R2 Lattice Structure for norm R3
State if reason hypothetically
Current State
State if reason non-monotonically
 
Figure 7.11 BA’s initial position for norms R1, R2 and R3 
 
This assumption, if employed at some time point, affects BA’s subsequent inferences, 
and BA needs to reposition itself into the lattice structures of norms that haven’t fired 
yet as shown in Figure 7.11. For example, in order to infer SA’s obligation to accept its 
payment via its representative (CA) as norm R3 states, BA only needs either to assume 
payment (Pays(BA, CA) will be rendered true in its knowledge base ), because it is still 
committed to its previous assumption about CA’s legal power, or to actually perform 
it. In other words, BA either needs to use the default formulation D31,2 or the default 
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formulation D30,1, from the lattice corresponding to norm R3. For instance, the 
following world is computed (Figure 7.12):  
 
Lattice Structure for norm R1 Lattice Structure for norm R2 Lattice Structure for norm R3
State if reason hypothetically
Current State
State if reason non-monotonically
 
Figure 7.12 BA’s reposition for norms R1, R2 and R3 
 
Π(3)BA = { D10,1, D20,1, D31,2} 
In(3)BA = W ∪ { IsObligedToDeliver(SA,BA), IsObligedToPayOnBehalfOf(BA,CA,SA) , 
                         IsObligedToAcceptPaymenFromOnBehalfOf(SA,CA,BA)                       } 
Out(3)BA = {¬ IsEmpoweredToAccept PaymentFromOnBehalfOf(CA,BA,SA), ¬ Pays(BA, CA) } 
The child-parent relations that hold between the lattice nodes indicate the path that 
the agent could follow. 
7.6.2.3 Non-monotonic Reasoning (3H) 
Consider, again the same set of norms R1, R2 and R3, for the agreement between BA 
and SA, but now the Out(0) set contains the following rules that restrict the assumption 
space: 
PC=Out(0)BA = { IsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agent3,agent1,agent2) ← Debtor(agent2),  
                          IsEmpoweredToAcceptPaymentFromOnBehalfOf(agent3,agent1,agent2) ←  Debtor(agent3)  }  
If the initial knowledge for agent BA is: 
WBA  = In(0)BA = { OrdersFrom(BA,SA), E-shopFunctionsWell, DeliversTo(CA,BA) }  
Then, as discussed above and shown in Figure 7.12, BA may infer its obligation to pay 
(default formulation D21,1) and SA’s obligation to accept its payment (default 
formulation D31,2), sequentially, on the basis of the assumptions, first, that CA is 
empowered to accept payment on behalf of SA (the conditions of the constraints 
contained in the Out set are not satisfied), and second, that payment happens (again, 
the conditions of the constraints contained in the Out set are not satisfied ).  
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Now imagine that at a later time point BA is informed that SA is indeed a debtor, i.e. 
Debtor(SA) is added to its current knowledge base. This new information affects its 
previously drawn conclusion. Now, BA needs to traverse the lattices downwards in 
order to choose an alternative formulation for the norms compatible with its current 
knowledge and any restrictions imposed on the assumption space. For example, BA 
had previously used the formulation D21,1 for norm R2 and the formulation D31,2 for norm 
R3 (Figure 7.12). Now that its knowledge base has expanded and contains new 
information, it traverses the corresponding lattices downwards from these nodes and 
reaches the formulations that lie at level 0 in each lattice, i.e. it retracts previously 
employed assumptions, along with any conclusions drawn on their basis (Figure 
7.13). At this state, BA is not able to continue the incremental computation of 
extensions because neither norm R2 nor norm R3 apply, due to the restrictions applied, 
and, therefore, BA returns to the following extension:  
Π(1)BA = { D10,1} 
In(1)BA = W ∪ { IsObligedToDeliver(SA,BA) } 
Out(1)BA = { } 
 
Lattice Structure for norm R1 Lattice Structure for norm R2 Lattice Structure for norm R3
State if reason hypothetically
Current State
State if reason non-monotonically
 
Figure 7.13 BA’s reposition for norms R1, R2 and R3 
7.7 Summary 
The work presented in this chapter is motivated by the need for both hypothetical 
and non-monotonic reasoning in open normative multi-agent environments. We 
presented a technique that enables an agent, at any particular time point, to determine 
what is know and is not known and to position itself in the world, based on the 
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explicit knowledge that it currently possesses and without resorting to proof. It turned 
out that the agent’s knowledge/hypothesis space is, in fact, a lattice. Once the agent 
possesses self-knowledge, it finds out what assumptions are related to the node it 
occupies and may employ them in its reasoning. As the agent’s knowledge changes 
over time, and consequently as its assumptions and conclusions need change, the 
agent re-positions itself on the lattice by moving on it from node to node. Moreover, 
we claimed that the degree of agent autonomy is related to the extent to which an 
agent is ‘free’ to make assumptions about anything it does not know about, and 
supported assumption identification and usage, without a priori restrictions on the 
agent, and without resorting to proof, which is prohibitive computationally. Instead, 
we showed how the variations of DfL enable agents to be more ‘independent’ and 
‘open-minded’ (one might say more like humans) by self-managing their reasoning. 
Research discussed in this chapter has been published or is under review in [100, 
98, 86]. 
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8 Related Work 
8.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters concerned with the introduction of symbolic knowledge 
representations and reasoning techniques for CSR of intelligent autonomous software 
agents that populate open computational environments. First, we were interested in 
identifying research questions that arise in these settings towards the need for CRS. 
Later, we proposed two initial approaches for assumption-based reasoning in open 
norm-governed environments, discussed their limitations, and, correspondingly, 
proposed a third approach to autonomous hypothetical non-monotonic reasoning that 
enable agents to manage their available knowledge, identify rational assumptions and 
consequently, to self-regulate their reasoning. During the last twenty years, various 
approaches were introduced towards these scopes. In this chapter, we organize the 
related work, which we found in the literature, in distinct thematic areas, discuss the 
motivation and special features of these approaches and provide a critical review that 
explains our decisions towards the adoption, adaptation or differentiation. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: section 8.2 discusses research 
approaches towards the dynamics of domains and especially the dynamics of Default 
Theories; section 8.3, first, reviews approaches towards assumption-based reasoning 
and, second, reviews approaches towards non-monotonic reasoning; section 8.4 
discusses research approaches towards autonomy-oriented reasoning; and, finally, 
section 8.5 provides a summary. 
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8.2 Research on the Dynamics of Default Theories 
There are many variations of Reiter’s Default Logic in the AI literature, such as the 
Justified DfL [163], the Constrained DfL [225], the Rational DfL [178], the 
Cumulative DfL [28], the Pre-constrained DfL [13, 226], the Stratified DfL [45, 46] 
and the Prioritized DfL [29], amongst others, but all accept a static theory and 
reasoning. Although DfL is a powerful approach to nonmonotonic reasoning, little 
work has been done towards the dynamics of Default Theories with respect the 
change of the theory itself. Antoniou in [15] examines the use of belief revision 
dynamic operators, i.e., revision and contraction, in DfL in order to reason with 
change. This work contrary to our approach focuses on changing facts and constraints 
while defaults remain unchanged. Also, Linder et al., in [243], aim to place default 
reasoning in a dynamic context. They introduce actions to model the attempt to jump 
to conclusions on the basis of a set of beliefs. Beliefs are derived with the use of 
supernormal defaults, i.e. prerequisite-free normal default rules of the form true: C /C. 
Although this approach is close to our technique, we see that rule reformulation 
towards assumption employment, compared to belief generation via interspersed 
rules, affords us the ability to directly relate conclusions with employed assumptions 
in an argumentation-like manner which consequently facilitates nonmonotonicity. 
8.3 Research on Assumption-based Reasoning and 
Nonmonotonic Reasoning   
As already noted section 5.2, addressing the issue of reasoning with incomplete 
knowledge in OMAS, one must essentially address several questions. Here we remind 
them briefly: 
1H. What assumptions are applicable to fill in information gaps? 
2H. What is the relationship between assumptions and the current of future 
world?  
3H. What happens when new information becomes available? 
 Work within the assumption-based reasoning community focuses on issue 1H, 
only. We review the main proposals to assumption-based reasoning, in order to put 
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forward the main difference between these approaches and the work presented in this 
thesis. There is also work within the nonmonotonic reasoning community that is 
predominantly focused on questions 2H and 3H and does not address the issue of 
dynamic identification of assumptions satisfactorily, which we review next. Finally, 
since we argued that the degree of agent autonomy is related to the extend to which 
an agent is free to make assumptions, we review some of the main viewpoints of 
autonomy in MAS. 
8.3.1 Assumption-based Reasoning 
During the past twenty years various approaches to assumption-based or 
hypothetical reasoning have been proposed. These can be broadly grouped into:  
• those that rely on a priori specification of the assumptions that can be 
employed during the reasoning process, i.e., those where assumption 
identification is static; and  
• those that claim to support ad hoc identification of potentially useful 
assumptions during the reasoning process, that is those that purport to identify 
and employ assumptions dynamically. 
8.3.1.1 Static Assumption-based Reasoning 
Clearly, static approaches to assumption-based reasoning are not appropriate for 
open environments, but we discuss them here briefly.  
Doyle in 1979 [72] described the representation and structure of a Truth 
Maintenance System (TMS). As argued, this work solves part of the belief revision 
problem and provides a mechanism for making assumptions. It is guided by the so 
called problem of control that is the problem of deciding on what will be the system’s 
next inference. In other words, the agent needs an inference about which inference to 
make. New inferences are made by the Reasoner System (or overall Problem Solver) 
based on different assumptions that are statements believed without a particular 
reason. Consequently, different assumptions define different justified beliefs or 
reasoned arguments. A TMS, firstly, works as a cache by storing all inferences 
(justifications) ever made and, secondly, it makes any necessary revisions in the 
current belief set when the justifications-set, i.e. a set of justifications that represent 
different reasons for accepting a belief, is altered either by removing or adding a 
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justification. In cases where a contradiction arises, a procedure, called reasoned 
retraction of assumptions is introduced. The procedure searches on each belief 
justification-set for at least one assumption to be removed or added in order to 
eliminate the contradiction. In 1986, de Kleer in [60, 61] presented a new kind of 
TMS that avoids certain previous pitfalls. Contrary to [72] this new approach, the so 
called Assumption-based Truth Maintenance System (ATMS), is based on 
manipulating not only justifications but assumptions too. In this way, each belief is 
labelled with the set of assumptions under which it holds, besides the justifications 
that support it. Later, in [210] and [62] respectively, Reiter and de Kleer proposed 
some extensions and generalizations of the ATMS that are concerned mainly with the 
way the system is able to manipulate clauses more general than Horn clauses. Based 
on the above ideas of TMS and ATMS, Kohals et al. in [144, 11] proposed an 
extension of the propositional assumption-based model with probabilities, the so 
called Assumption-based Evidential Language (ABEL). Consequently, hypotheses 
were, also, enhanced with notions such as support, quasi-support, plausibility and 
doubt. 
Poole in [194, 195] presents Theorist that is a framework for default reasoning 
implemented in Prolog. Poole argues that no special logic is required for default 
reasoning and proposes a modification to classical logic to achieve default reasoning. 
He considers the simplest case of hypothetical reasoning where the user provides the 
form of possible assumptions in order to achieve explanation. Specifically, Theorist 
accepts from users a set of closed formulae called facts (F), and a set Δ of potential 
assumptions called possible hypotheses. A closed formula G is explainable from F and 
Δ if there is a set D of ground instances of Δ such that F∪D entails G, and F∪D is 
consistent17. Finally, in [196] a very interesting discussion is presented. Queries such 
as “What are the possible hypotheses?” and “Who makes the assumptions?” are 
answered based on the type of problem the agent faces, i.e. planning, diagnosis or 
default reasoning. Although, this approach is close to the technique that is presented 
in this thesis, there is a quite important difference. In Theorist, rules are taken as 
hypotheses, i.e. hypotheses are in a sense predefined. In our approach, we search for 
hypotheses among the components, i.e. conditions, of the rules. This gives us the 
                                                 
17 As Poole points out, his assumptions are identical to Reiter’s supernormal default rules.  
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
09/12/2017 01:19:12 EET - 137.108.70.7
Symbolic Representations and Common-sense Reasoning in Open Multi-agent Systems
 
 155
 
ability to abstract knowledge from not-knowledge and to reason in an argumentation 
manner. 
Bondarenko et al. in [24] proposed an argumentation-based approach to 
hypothetical reasoning. This work is inspired by Dung’s general argumentation 
framework and, specifically, it is based on the notions of attack and counterattack of 
the Argumentation Theory. An assumption is said to be acceptable if it is able to 
counterattack any other attacking set of assumptions. According to this view, 
definitions for admissible, complete, grounded, stable and preferred sets of 
assumptions were given. This fixed-assumptions framework is first introduced for 
logic programming, while an extension for its application to other formalisms of 
nonmonotonic reasoning is possible. Note that our previous comment about the EC 
representation viewed as a Logic Program with stable model semantics apply, here, 
also. 
Kowalski and Sadri in [147, 148] compare the Situation Calculus [172, 209] and 
the EC. Both calculi are formulated as Logic Programs. As noted, the EC was 
intended primarily for reasoning about actual events and the Situation Calculus was 
primarily designed for reasoning about hypothetical actions. Thus the unification of 
the way both calculi handle hypothetical and actual events is proposed. Actual events 
are simply asserted in the knowledge base and their effects are considered valid. On 
the contrary, hypothetical events are also asserted in the knowledge base but nothing 
on their effects is stated. During the procedure of the assertion of events, integrity 
verification of the knowledge base is imperative. Integrity constraints are used to 
ensure that i) an event that happens is a possible event in the current situation and all 
its preconditions actually or hypothetically hold, and ii) no concurrent events are 
possible. Those constraints have a different role when dealing with actual or 
hypothetical events. In the first case constraints ensure that only possible events 
happen and in the second case constraints denote the context in which an assumption 
is possible. 
Provetti in [201] also deals with the problem of actual and hypothetical actions in 
terms of the Situation Calculus and the EC. Contrary to the Kowalski’s and Sadri’s 
approach, that unifies both calculi, Provetti introduces: i) new predicates such as 
HypHolds(fluent,situation) to denote that a fluent is true in a situation, and ii) new ordered types of 
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constants for denoting dates and functions denoting situations. A simple version of 
the EC formulated as an Extended Logic Program with answer sets semantics is 
presented and discussed as a tool for making assumptions on domains. Thus the new 
axiomatization of the EC is enhanced with new predicates and constants of the 
language. 
Florea in [80] presents an assumption-based reasoning approach for MAS that is 
based on the TLI (Teoria Logica Implicita) logic. The proposed logic is a FOL 
enhanced with special notations that describe Reiter’s original default rules and help 
to derive extensions. In this work, the notion of the assumption coincides with 
Reiter’s original notion of assumption. 
Tahara in [237] addresses the issue of inconsistency that arises in the knowledge 
base due to inconsistent hypotheses. In this work, different contradictory scenaria, 
comprising of facts and hypotheses, are formed based on different hypothesis sets. 
Contradictions may be overcome using a preference relation between hypotheses. 
Thus, a scenario is represented as a triple (F, H, <), where F denotes the set of facts, H 
denotes the set of hypothesis and < denotes the partial ordered preference relation that 
holds among hypotheses. 
8.3.1.2 Dynamic Assumption-based Reasoning 
The most notable approaches that fall into the second category, where assumptions 
are supposed to be identified and employed dynamically, include those of Cox and 
Pietrzykowski [52], Reichgelt and Shadbolt [205, 206], Abe [2], Pellier and Fiorino 
[192, 193], Jago [131] and Stamate [233]. Our work is, obviously, related mostly to 
this second category. However, it seems to us that assumption identification in these 
approaches is not truly dynamic. Before we discuss briefly each of these approaches, 
we make some general remarks on this issue: 
Some of these approaches rely on the use of a pre-specified pool of assumptions, 
from which the agent must choose appropriate ones, whenever it identifies an 
information gap and needs to fill it, in order to proceed with its reasoning. A natural 
question that arises though, is whether it is realistic to expect that candidate 
assumptions can be identified in advance. It may be the case that in some application 
domains this is possible. However, in such cases, candidate assumption identification 
is not really dynamic, rather selection of an appropriate assumption from the pre-
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specified pool, may be carried out dynamically during the inference process. This 
selection though, requires deductive proof, which is notably computationally 
expensive. Other dynamic approaches that purport to support dynamic identification 
of assumptions, rely on finding appropriate assumptions in a goal-driven manner, that 
is, a particular conclusion that the agent wants to derive is given, and then the agent 
identifies the assumptions that are required, in order for this conclusion to be 
derivable. In some cases, such goal-driven identification of candidate assumptions 
requires proof. But more importantly, the problem that we perceive with purely goal-
driven assumption identification is the following: although software agents, in 
general, are inherently goal-driven in planning their activity, their rationality (and 
consequently their performance measures) depends on the extent to which they are 
perceptive of their environment, so that they may exploit changes in it. A purely goal-
driven identification of candidate assumptions does not leave much room for the 
agent to adapt to circumstances.  
We now discuss each one of the approaches on dynamic assumption identification 
and usage, with some additional comments on each of them: 
Cox and Pietrzykowski in [52] explore the problem of the derivation of hypotheses 
to explain observed events. This is equivalent to finding what assumptions together 
with some axioms imply a given formula. This is similar to what we refer to as no-
risk reasoning, i.e. the identification and usage of assumptions about the past. They 
provide a method for computing causes of events that is based on linear resolution 
[158] and reverse Skolemization [51]. More importantly, this work proposes 
restrictions that guarantee that the derived assumptions are in some sense interesting 
for our causing events. A cause of an event is: i) minimal, ii) consistent with the 
knowledge base, iii) nontrivial in the sense that cause⊃event does not hold, and, finally, 
iv) basic iff every consistent cause of cause is trivial. In this work, the identification of 
assumptions is essentially goal-driven, and it requires proof, in order to establish that 
the observed event is implied by what is known (the axioms) and what is assumed. 
Reichgelt and Shadbolt in [205, 206] present a way to analyze planning as a form 
of theory extension. Theory extension enables an agent to add further assumptions to 
its knowledge base, in order to derive potential plans towards goal achievement. This 
is similar to what we refer to as best-guess reasoning, i.e. the identification and usage 
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of assumptions about the future. Their approach requires the use of a pre-specified 
assumption pool, where candidate assumptions are defined in advance, along with 
preconditions for their usage. The selection of an appropriate assumption from this 
pool is conducted in a goal-driven manner and requires that the preconditions 
associated with the assumption may be deductively proved from the knowledge base. 
If multiple assumptions have preconditions that are satisfied, selection amongst them 
is performed by checking them against pre-specified criteria, e.g. parsimony (the 
assumption with the fewest preconditions is selected) or generality (the more general 
assumption is preferred).  
Abe in [2], also, deals with the problem of missing hypotheses for the explanation 
of an observation. He proposes a way to generate analogous hypotheses from the 
knowledge base when the latter lacks the necessary ones. This work extends the 
Clause Management System (CMS) proposed by Reiter and de Kleer [210] for 
abduction. A CMS, given an observation Ο that cannot be explained from the 
knowledge base ΚΒ (ΚΒ⊭Ο), returns as set of minimal clauses O′ such that ΚΒ⊨Ο∪O’ and 
ΚΒ⊭Ο’. That is to say, O’ is the minimal support for O with respect to KB, iff no proper 
subset of O’ is support for O with respect to KB. Hypothesis generation is done in two 
distinct steps: i) using first abduction and then deduction, candidate hypotheses are 
searched in the knowledge base, and ii) in case where such candidate assumptions do 
not exist in the knowledge base, analogous hypotheses are generated by examining 
clauses in the knowledge base and the assumption requirements that were identified 
in the previous step. Hypotheses are generated ad hoc during the inference process, 
by exploiting predefined analogy relationships between clauses. This is an attractive 
approach, but it requires caution: in some applications it is difficult to define analogy 
relations between clauses, in advance; if no such definition for analogy is provided a 
priori, counterintuitive results may be produced: For instance, suppose that a buyer 
agent is obliged to pay a seller agent by some deadline, and that it actually proceeds 
to do so by cash deposit into the seller’s bank account. Although the action of paying 
via a cash deposit is analogous to the action of paying in cash (in the sense that they 
have the same practical effect, the seller agent ends up possessing the required funds), 
the contract that regulates the exchange between the two agents may dictate that only 
payment in some specific form is deemed as acceptable. The two distinct forms of 
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payment that seem analogous in terms of practical effects, may have different legal 
effects: one will result in the successful discharge of the buyer’s obligation to pay the 
seller, while the other will result in a (technical) violation of this obligation. 
Pellier and Fiorino in [192, 193] address Assumption-based Planning, and propose 
a mechanism by which an agent can produce “reasonable” conjectures, i.e. 
assumptions, based on its current knowledge. Any action precondition that cannot be 
proved from the knowledge base is considered to be a candidate assumption. A 
tentative plan (i.e. one that involves assumptions) becomes firm, and can be 
employed by the agent in order to achieve a specific goal, only when the agent can 
satisfy all of the conjectures, and this requires the agent to regard them as sub-goals 
and produce plans for them in turn. They distinguish two kinds as assumptions: i) 
hypotheses that are literals that do not belong to the current knowledge base, and ii) 
fact negations that are the negation of literals replacing facts that an agent believes. 
The planning mechanism is based on the Hierarchical Transition Network (HTN) 
[185] where an agent decomposes non-primitive tasks into smaller subtasks until 
primitive tasks are reached, but unlike HTN a branch and bound algorithm is used in 
order to compute as few conjectures as possible. 
Jago in [131] uses the notion of context in making assumptions. A context is the 
current set of the agent beliefs. Nested contexts are used to model nested 
assumptions, and temporally ordered contexts are used to represent the agent’s set of 
beliefs as it changes over time. Assumptions are not identified a priori, but rather 
during the reasoning process, either by guessing or in a goal-driven manner. 
Finally, [159] and [233] adopt a numerical approach to assumption-based 
reasoning. Specifically, Loyer and Straccia in [159] presented the Any World 
Assumption, a generalization of Closed World Assumption and Open World 
Assumption, which allows any interpretation over the truth space to be a default 
assumption. The truth spaces were considered to be bilattices due to their interesting 
mathematical structure. They extended the many-valued logic programs rules, under 
stable model semantics, with computable functions that denote the truth values of 
their atoms and are used to compute and manipulate the truth value of the sentence 
itself. Stamate in [233] presented a relative approach to assumption-based reasoning. 
This work, also, uses multi-valued logics to express uncertainty in logic programs, 
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
09/12/2017 01:19:12 EET - 137.108.70.7
8. Related Work 
 
 160
but under well-founded and Kripke-Kleene semantics. Uncertainty is not only related 
to uncertain information but also to missing information, which is knowledge that is 
not derivable using the current knowledge and program rules. Atoms are assigned 
logical values representing various degrees of truth that may me combined and 
propagated by applying logic programs’ rules. A three-valued logic is adopted where 
true, false and unknown are the logical values. Consequently, a pessimistic 
assumption is made whenever non derivable atoms are considered to be false. This 
case is identical to the Closed World Assumption. A skeptical assumption is made 
whenever non derivable atoms are considered to be unknown. This case is identical to 
the Open World Assumption. And finally an optimistic assumption is made whenever 
non derivable atoms are considered to be true. 
8.3.2 Non-monotonic Reasoning 
A temporal representation of a contract, alone, allows us to establish what factual 
and normative fluents are true at a given time point, through appropriate queries. 
Such representations, though, does not allow us to reason with incomplete knowledge 
dynamically. There are various approaches to reasoning with incomplete knowledge, 
such as the Closed World Assumption [207], Circumscription [173], Logic Programs 
[83, 84], and Defeasible Logic [187], and in fact these have been explored by many 
researchers (for example, [166, 17, 79, 211, 261, 111, 187, 191] among others). 
8.3.2.1 Closed World Assumption 
Under the CWA [207], an atomic formula is assumed false, unless it is explicitly 
known to be true. When an agent that uses a (possibly incomplete) EC contract 
representation, coupled with CWA, makes assumptions, these concern the falsity of 
certain formulae, rather than their truth. That is, in addressing question 1H, CWA 
dictates that an information gap be treated as negative information (one might call 
this the ‘atheist’ stance). In many realistic scenaria, however, it is important to be able 
to make assumptions about the truth (rather than the falsity) of certain formulae, i.e., 
to treat information gaps for what they are (absence of definite information) as 
potentially positive information (one might call this the ‘agnostic’ stance). For 
instance, suppose that a buyer agent has a rule determining whether it bears an 
obligation to pay a seller agent. Some of the rule conditions may be whether the buyer 
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placed an order with the seller, whether the goods that were ordered were, in fact, 
delivered, and if so, whether such delivery met all possible requirements (e.g. the 
right quantity and quality of goods were delivered, to the right place of delivery, 
using the right delivery method, at the right time and so on). The buyer agent will 
assume that anything it does not know about explicitly is false, so if does not possess 
explicit information about one or more of these conditions, it will not infer that it 
bears the obligation to pay the seller agent through the application of the rule, and 
may infer, through CWA, that it does not bear such an obligation. The buyer agent, in 
this case, cannot exploit assumptions in order to perform no-risk or best-guess 
reasoning. Since any assumptions employed at some point of the inference process 
are not retained for future reference, there is no way to relate them to future 
inferences. Hence with CWA we cannot address 2H satisfactorily. When new 
information becomes available, possibly refuting some of the assumptions that were 
employed at earlier points in the inference process, there is no way to retract 
previously drawn conclusions, that is CWA does not address 3H satisfactorily. Of 
course, one may argue that such questions can be addressed, in a domain-specific 
manner, via the use of special purpose predicates (e.g. by recording assumptions used 
during the inference of each specific conclusion). However, we argued that by 
resorting to Default Logic we obtain a more general-purpose solution to the problem 
of dynamic assumption identification, which is also compatible with our common 
intuitions. 
8.3.2.2 Circumscription  
Circumscription [173] is a generalization of the CWA, and might be used instead 
of it (work described in [261] is in this direction). Here, special predicates are used, in 
order to denote abnormal (unexpected) events and effects of actions, and the 
inference strategy attempts to minimize abnormality. The agent possesses explicit 
information about abnormality, and the conclusions derived are those contained in the 
minimal models of the (augmented with special predicates about abnormality) 
knowledge base. It is now possible for the seller agent of our example above to 
perform best-guess and no-risk reasoning, for if it does not explicitly know that 
delivery was ‘abnormal’ in some sense (e.g. it never happened, or it happened at the 
wrong time, or the wrong quantity or quality of goods were delivered an so on), it 
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will use its rule to infer that it has an obligation to pay. That is, the agent is able to 
treat an information gap as potentially positive (true) information. However, 
Circumscription poses some other problems, acknowledged by other researchers, as 
well: First, it requires that we define abnormal events, effects of actions and the like, 
explicitly, and, also, that we distinguish each abnormal individual from other 
individuals, explicitly [27] (page 222)]. Second, in order to decide which individuals 
to characterize as abnormal, we are required to anticipate the conclusions that we 
want to be able to derive [12] (page 149)]. Finally, in addressing 2H and 3H, 
Circumscription suffers from the same problems as CWA. 
8.3.2.3 Logic Programs 
The correspondence between Logic Programs (with stable model or answer set 
semantics) and default theories has been established in [156]. We might consider the 
EC contact representation as a (general) Logic Program, with stable model semantics 
[83], or as an extended Logic Program, with answer sets [84] – in fact, work 
described in [111] and [191] adopt the former view. In both cases, entailment is goal-
driven. In stable model semantics, given a logic program LP we define its reduction LPM 
with respect to a set of goal atoms M. A stable model may be computed following two 
steps. First, by removing all ground instances of rules contained in LP, that have in 
their body negative literals ¬B, where B∈M. Second, by removing all ground negative 
literals in the bodies of the rules that remain in LP. In answer sets semantics a similar 
procedure is used to compute the answer set of LP. Note that the elimination steps, 
described above, for the computation of a stable model or an answer set, presuppose 
the rejection of all rules that either contradict the set of goal atoms, or are irrelevant 
with the goal and, furthermore, these steps presuppose the falsity of all assumptions. 
The absence of an atom A from a stable model of LP is taken to signal that A is false. 
The absence of an atom A from an answer set of an extended LP is taken to mean that A 
is unknown. In the light of the comments we made earlier, when discussing CWA, it 
seems to us that answer set semantics are preferable to stable model semantics, for 
they enable us to treat information gaps in a more open-minded way (the agnostic vs. 
the atheist stance). What we find problematic in both cases though, for the purposes 
of assumption-based reasoning (and specifically in relation to question 1H), is the fact 
that potential assumptions can only be spotted in a goal-driven manner. The agent 
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needs to decide a priori what conclusion it wants to derive, in order to be able to 
identify which assumptions are essential to make, in order to be able to actually 
derive it. 
8.3.2.4 Defeasible Logic 
Finally, there is another approach to default reasoning with e-contracts, namely 
Defeasible Logic [187], which is used by [105] and [191]. Defeasible Logic allows us 
to define which conclusions are retractable, by making a distinction between strict 
and defeasible rules. Knowing that some information is defeasible enables an agent to 
treat it as a potential assumption. A question that arises is whether it is possible to 
determine, a priori, during the construction of the rule base, what is and what is not 
defeasible. In some situations (such as the examples shown in [105] and [191]) we 
are, indeed, able to determine this on the basis of some specific domain information. 
In this case though, the agent does not discover potentially useful assumptions for 
itself; rather it uses an implicitly pre-specified pool of assumptions. We can see a way 
out of this problem: we may adopt a more general view and consider all derived 
conclusions as defeasible. Rule conditions that are themselves defined through 
defeasible rules, are defeasible. Rule conditions that are not defined through rules 
must be provided either as strict facts or as defeasible facts. The agent will treat 
anything that it does not know about as a potential assumption. However, in order to 
establish whether some information gap exists, it will need to carry out proof on its 
knowledge base (to determine which defeasible rules fire), which is computationally 
expensive. 
8.4 Research on Autonomy-oriented Reasoning 
The concept of autonomy is central to the agency and has, thus, received attention 
by nearly all researchers in the field of MAS. Earlier work on autonomy focused on 
its relation to an agent’s goals, i.e. on the extent to which an agent could choose its 
goals and pursue them without external intervention [78, 81, 160, 161, 19, 18], 
whether the latter were due to humans, other agents or the environment [21, 32, 78, 
168, 255, 160, 169, 38, 40, 161, 18, 224]. More recently, autonomy is examined in 
relation to an agent’s reasoning process in general, i.e. in relation to the mechanisms 
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by which an agent chooses not only its goals and course of action, but also its beliefs 
and desires, as well as its motivations.  
Notably, Luck and d’ Inverno in [160, 161] view motivations as higher-level non-
derivative components that characterize the nature of agents and can be regarded as 
desires or preferences affecting their behaviour. This view is similar to the way we 
use the Out set to restrict the assumption space used by an agent.  
Barber and Martin in [19, 18] use a metric to represent the degree of an agent’s 
autonomy, and this metric is determined by an agent’s goals. We believe that 
autonomy amounts to more than choice of goals, and that it is relevant to the 
reasoning process of an agent, where the latter may concern the establishment of 
goals, or actions, or beliefs, or norms. We claim that since in OMAS, it is 
unavoidable for agents to employ assumptions in their reasoning process, the extent 
to which an agent is autonomous depends on the extent to which the agent is 
independent in identifying and employing assumptions. 
In [247, 246] and [50] autonomy is examined in relation to an agent’s ability to 
choose which norms to adopt and subject itself to, and in this spirit we explore how 
agents may make such choices by identifying and using assumptions dynamically. 
8.5 Summary 
This chapter provides a critical review on various approaches, found in the 
literature, and the way these approaches address the issues discussed in the previous 
chapters 5, 6 and 7, such as the dynamics of default logic theories, assumption-based 
reasoning, non-monotonic reasoning, and autonomous agency. 
Research discussed in this chapter has been published or is under review in [91, 90, 
92, 95, 97, 100, 98, 85, 86]. 
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9 Conflict Management 
9.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapters, we proposed and discussed the representation of 
contractual norms as default rules that are constructed dynamically from an initial 
temporal representation and argued why and how this representation is suitable to 
address various issues of interest, such as temporal reasoning, assumption-based 
reasoning and non-monotonic reasoning. But, all of the above issues require some 
sort of conflict management: it is expected that in most realistic scenaria an agent will 
find itself in a situation where multiple, possibly conflicting, norms apply. The agent 
will need some way to detect that such conflicts exist, so that subsequently, it may 
deploy some resolution mechanism, in order to infer what it should do at a given 
point in time.  
The analysis, representation and management of normative conflicts have been the 
focus of much research in recent years, from a variety of perspectives, such as:  
• Distributed Systems Management: conflicts between roles and policies. 
Moffett et al. [181], Lupu et al. [164] and Dunlop et al. [73, 74] address 
conflicts from the Distributed Systems Management viewpoint and view 
policies as a way to determine and influence management behaviour. Cholvy 
et al. [47, 48] view normative conflicts as the result of role conflict and 
propose a solution based on hierarchies of roles. 
• Multi-agent Interaction: conflicts between commitments and BDI notions, or 
conflicts between goals. Broersen et al. [31] deal with conflicts that arise 
between an agent’s mental attributes such as beliefs, obligations, intentions 
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and desires. Kowalski [146] considers normative conflicts that arise as a result 
of conflicting goals and presents an approach that unifies logic and decision 
theory. Kollingbaum et al. [145, 245] focus on practical reasoning agents and 
Virtual Organizations. They use either instantiation graphs or unification to 
detect conflicts.  
• Legal reasoning and E-Commerce applications: conflicts between normative 
notions that are analysed in some nonmonotonic logic. Grosof, Governatori 
and Paschke, in [111, 105, 191] respectively, consider normative conflicts in 
e-commerce applications and assign static priorities to business rules in order 
to overcome conflicting situations. 
In this thesis, we see that the analyses offered so far from these different 
perspectives should be integrated fruitfully, so as to facilitate e-commerce application 
development. To this end, in this chapter, we:  
• identify a set of primitive patterns for normative conflicts,  
• show how the conflicts identified by other researchers may be seen as 
instances of these primitives, 
• identify some patterns of normative conflicts that have not been identified in 
other proposals, and finally, 
• argue that the representation of contractual norms as default rules facilitates 
both conflict detection and resolution. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: sections 9.2 and 9.3 discuss the 
theoretical basis of normative conflicts, discuss an example scenario, which we use 
for illustration purposes, and presents all normative conflicts that an agent may face 
up; section 9.4 discusses the way the representation of contractual norms as default 
rules facilitates conflict detection; section 9.5 presents the way this representation is 
used for conflict resolution proposes; section 9.6 discusses the relation between 
conflicts and assumptions; and finally, section 9.7 presents related work and 
summarizes our research approach for conflict management. 
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9.2 Preliminaries 
At first, legal philosophers [139, 140, 115, 157] identified normative conflicts 
through the impossibility-of-joint-compliance test. According to this test a normative 
conflict arises when and only when there is a pair of norms having opposite subject, 
i.e. the compliance with one norm causes the violation of the other. In the language of 
Deontic Logic this test is expressed with the consistency principle [125]: 
Obligation(A) → ¬Obligation(¬A) 
where A denotes a specific action to be done. 
According to H.L.A. Hart [116] the impossibility-of-joint-compliance test is 
similar to an obedience statement which may be constructed for deontic norms. 
Specifically, a normative conflict arises when the obedience statements of two 
deontic imperatives is logically inconsistent. But, such a view is totally restrictive 
[116, 124], because: (i) it accepts conflicts only between deontic norms that have an 
imperative character (i.e. a deontic permission cannot conflict with another deontic 
modality18) and (ii) it does not deal with conflicts other than conflicts between 
deontic modalities (e.g. conflicts between powers, roles, policies etc). To deal with 
such situations, H.L.A Hart put in the place of obedience the looser concept of 
conformity.  
Later, Munzer in [184] set a new basis on the normative conflicts identification 
problem. Specifically, he placed normative conflicts of rules in particular occasions. 
In such an occasion the norms in question must clash or collide. Similarly, Hans 
Kelsen used the notion of tension. In this way, normative conflict analysis moves 
away form logical contradictions. Now conflicting norms are considered as two 
forces operating in opposite directions whether the forces meet (a clash), or whether 
the forces pull in different directions (a tension) [124]. 
In the early nineties, Sartor’s [222] and Horty’s [127] work on normative conflicts 
set the theoretical basis for conflict management. According to Sartor [222] a conflict 
arises when “(possibly) valid norms establish incompatible qualifications for the 
same concrete state”. The cornerstone in this approach is a norm set. This may be 
either inconsistent, if a contradiction is logically derivable from it, or potentially 
                                                 
18 A fruitful discussion on conflicts between imperative and permissory norms and conflicts between 
permissions can be found in [124].  
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inconsistent, if it may lead to contradiction in an upcoming state. In similar spirit 
Horty in [127, 128] addresses moral conflicts: an agent is in moral conflict if it ought 
to do an action A and, at the same time, it ought to do another action B, but it is 
impossible to do both. 
For the purposes of illustration consider the electronic marketplace, populated by 
software agents that establish and perform e-contracts on behalf of some real world 
parties, as already discussed in chapter 4. Let the set Agents={Agent1, Agent2, Agent3,…..} denote 
distinct identifiers for the various agents, and the set Roles={BA, SA, CA, …} denote distinct 
roles that agents may assume in the e-market (where BA, SA, CA denote buyer, seller and 
carrier respectively). Consider a two-party business transaction. Agent1 that acts as a 
buyer orders some goods from the seller Agent3. The terms of the agreement between 
these two agents are: Agent3 should see to it that the goods be delivered to Agent1 within 
10 days from commencement (e.g., the date that the order takes place). Agent1, in turn, 
should see to it that payment be made within 21 days from the date it receives the 
goods. If Agent3 does not deliver on time, then a fixed amount is to be deducted from 
the original price of the goods for each day of delay and it should see to it that 
delivery be made by a new deadline. If Agent1 does not perform payment on time, then 
a fixed amount is to be added to the original price of the goods for each day of delay 
and it should see to it that payment be made by a new deadline. 
As mentioned in chapter 4, we may adapt an informal view of the business 
transaction that is regulated by the agreement as a state diagram. Normative 
propositions of the form: 
ΝN(agent1, role1, action, agent2, role2) 
express that agent1 that acts as role1 is in legal relation ΝN towards agent2 that acts as role2 to 
perform action, where ΝN may be Obligation, Prohibition, Permission and legal Power. We do not 
employ the axiomatization of any particular system of Deontic Logic; specifically, we 
do not employ the axiomatization of SDL, in which these notions are modelled as 
operators that are inter-defined. This is because in SDL (and any system where the 
D19 scheme is valid) it is not possible for an agent to bear conflicting obligations 
because of the D scheme. Yet, in most realistic situations, indeed in our everyday life, 
agents do find themselves in normative conflict. Moreover, if we were to employ 
                                                 
19 ¬O⊥ where O denotes obligation. 
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SDL, permission, obligation and prohibition would be interdefined, and so all of the 
patterns we present in subsection 9.3 would be reduced to three of all six patterns (we 
explain this in detail in the Appendix B); thus the representation would be less 
distinguishing.  
The first step of conflict management involves the detection of conflicts. To this 
end, in subsection 9.3.1, we identify primitive patterns of normative conflicts, in 
subsection 9.3.2 we discuss other analyses of normative conflicts and show how these 
may be seen as instances of the primitive patterns, and finally in subsection 9.3.3 we 
identify additional cases of normative conflict, which are not discussed already in the 
existing literature. 
9.3 Normative Conflict Patterns 
9.3.1 Primitive Patterns of Normative Conflicts 
Table 9.1 presents a list of primitive patterns of normative conflicts. Next we 
discuss each one in turn. 
 
Table 9.1 Primitive conflict patterns 
IDENTIFIER EXPLANATION EXAMPLE 
A 
Conflict between a 
normative notion (NN) and 
its negation 
NN(action)    vs  ¬NN(action) 
e.g. Obligation(action)    vs  ¬ Obligation (action) 
B 
Conflict between the 
prohibition to perform an 
action and the simultaneous 
permission or obligation to 
perform the same action 
e.g. Prohibition(action)   vs  Permission(action)  
or Prohibition(action)   vs  Obligation(action) 
C 
Conflict between an 
obligation to perform action 
and the simultaneous 
obligation or permission to 
perform ¬action 
e.g. Obligation(action)    vs   Obligation(¬action) 
D Conflict between the power to perform an action and 
e.g. Power(action)  vs Prohibition(action) 
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the simultaneous 
prohibition to perform the 
same action 
E 
Conflict between two 
obligatory distinct actions, 
when it is impossible to 
perform both at the same 
time 
e.g. Obligation(action1)    vs Obligation(action2) 
F 
Conflict between an 
obligation and the negation 
of the agent’s permission or 
power to perform it 
e.g. Obligation(action)   vs ¬ Permission(action) 
or Prohibition(action)   vs  ¬ Power(action) 
 
Pattern A  
Conflict between a normative notion (NN) and its negation. The general pattern is: 
NN(agent1, role1, action, agent2, role2) 
¬NN(agent1, role1, action, agent2, role2) 
This is the common syntactical conflict that arises when an agent has contradictory 
knowledge. For example, an instance of this conflict arises whenever BA (Agent1) is 
obliged towards SA (Agent3) and simultaneously it is not obliged towards the same agent 
to perform payment (Payment) for a product it ordered. All other approaches, without 
any exception, refer to this type of conflict. In policy-based approaches, when the 
normative notion is obligation it is called positive-negative conflict of modalities 
[181].  
Pattern B 
Conflict between the prohibition to perform an action and the simultaneous 
permission or obligation to perform the same action. The general pattern is: 
Sub-pattern B1: prohibition vs permission 
Prohibition(agent1, role1, action, agent2, role2) 
Permission(agent1, role1, action, agent2, role2) 
Sub-pattern B2: prohibition vs obligation 
Prohibition (agent1, role1, action, agent2, role2) 
Obligation(agent1, role1, action, agent2, role2) 
For example, an instance of this conflict arises whenever SA (Agent3) is permitted or 
obliged to perform delivery (Delivery) towards BA (Agent1) but it is also prohibited to 
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deliver due to the some fact or assumption (i.e. that BA is a well known debtor). Once 
again, all previous research approaches refer to this type of conflict. In [181] and 
[164] these conflicts are called conflicts between authority policies (sub-pattern B1) 
and conflict between authority and imperatival policies (sub-pattern B2) respectively. 
Also, in [245] sub-pattern B1 is called conflict, while sub-pattern B2 is called 
inconsistency. 
Pattern C 
Conflict between an obligation to perform action and the simultaneous obligation or 
permission to perform ¬ action. The general pattern is: 
Obligation(agent1, role1, action, agent2, role2) 
Obligation(agent1, role1, ¬action, agent2, role2) 
Here ¬ action denotes a negative action, and the issue of representing negative actions 
has concerned researchers (e.g. [213] regards them as actions that do not lead to the 
successful fulfilment of a norm). We have not developed special semantics for the 
representation of negative actions; we merely regard such expressions as denoting 
either performance of some action other than the negative one, or as idleness (non 
performance of any action).  
For example, a conflict of this type arises whenever SA (Agent3) is obliged to perform 
delivery (Delivery) towards BA (Agent1) assuming that it will become regular but it is also 
obliged to not deliver (¬Delivery) due to some fact or assumption (i.e. that BA is a well 
known debtor). This case arises, also, in Lee [152] and Abrahams [3] who use the 
term Waive.  
Pattern D 
Conflict between the power to perform an action and the simultaneous prohibition 
to perform the same action. The general pattern is: 
Power(agent1, role1, action, agent2, role2) 
Prohibition(agent1, role1, action, agent2, role2) 
For example, an instance of this conflict arises whenever SA (Agent3) is empowered to 
perform delivery (Delivery) towards BA (Agent1) but it is also prohibited to deliver due to 
some fact or assumption. This type of conflict is also noted in [3]. 
One may argue that in this case there is no conflict and, consequently, that there is 
no need for conflict resolution. Indeed, legal power to perform an action goes hand-
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in-hand with permission to exercise it, according to formal definitions of institutional 
power ([165, 136]). Hence, there is a conflict here, albeit some may perceive it as a 
conflict between permission and prohibition to exercise a certain power.  
Pattern E 
Conflict between two obligatory distinct actions, when it is impossible to perform 
both at the same time. The general pattern is: 
Obligation(agent1, role1, action1, agent2, role2) 
Obligation(agent1, role1, action2, agent2, role2) 
This corresponds to Horty’s moral dilemma [127]. For example, an instance of this 
conflict arises whenever SA (Agent3) is obliged to perform Delivery1 and Delivery2 towards BA 
(Agent1) but cannot perform both simultaneously. 
Pattern F 
Conflict between an obligation and the negation of the agent’s permission or power 
to perform it. The general pattern is: 
Obligation(agent1, role1, action, agent2, role2) 
¬Permission/Power(agent1, role1, action, agent2, role2) 
The negation of an agent’s permission/power to perform an action may be 
explicitly derived from the agent’s knowledge base (sub-pattern F1) or it may be 
derived from a possibly incomplete knowledge base, through the absence of explicit 
information (sub-pattern F2). 
For example, an instance of this conflict arises whenever SA (Agent3) is obliged to 
perform Delivery towards BA (Agent1) assuming that it become regular but it is also not 
permitted to deliver due to some fact or assumption (i.e. that BA is a well known 
debtor). 
9.3.2 Other analyses of normative conflicts 
In this section we review some of the main ideas that other researchers have 
proposed in their analyses of normative conflict and discuss how these may be 
regarded as instantiations of the primitive patterns presented in the previous section. 
Although all the patterns discussed in this section may be regarded as special cases of 
the primitive patterns we introduced, they merit a separate discussion because they 
contain additional information that may be useful for efficient conflict resolution. 
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9.3.2.1 Policy-based Conflicts 
Intra-policy conflicts 
Dunlop et al. [73] refer to an internal policy conflict, when contradictory policies 
are assigned to a single role. A policy in their approach corresponds to what we call a 
single norm.  
Consider, for example, the two distinct obligations of Agent3 (a seller) to perform 
delivery towards two distinct buyers (Agent1 and Agent2). 
Obligation(Agent3,SA,Delivery1,Agent1,BA) 
Obligation(Agent3,SA,Delivery2,Agent2,BA) 
The conflict arises from the fact that contradictory policies are assigned to Agent3 
when acting as seller. Apparently, this specific case can be mapped onto pattern E. In 
the same manner, other examples of this kind may be seen as instances of other 
primitive patterns. 
Inter-policy conflicts 
Dunlop et al. [73] refer to an external policy conflict, when an agent 
simultaneously assumes different roles that contradict “in co-existence”.   
Consider, for example, that when Agent3 acts as a seller it is obliged to perform 
delivery towards Agent1 while when it acts as a mediator it is prohibited to perform the 
same action. 
Obligation(Agent3,SA,Delivery,Agent1,BA) 
Prohibition(Agent3,MA,Delivery,Agent1,BA) 
This specific example can be mapped onto pattern B2. 
9.3.2.2 Role-based Conflicts 
Intra-role conflicts 
Cholvy et al. [47], consider conflicts only among different roles. In their approach 
a role is defined through a set of consistent norms. We believe that for a variety of 
applications it is not realistic to insist on consistent role definitions, and thus we 
accept intra-role conflicts. Typical examples of this kind of conflict are authority 
conflicts [181] and conflicts that are related with the notion of power. 
Consider the case where Agent3 who acts as a seller is both permitted and prohibited 
to perform delivery towards the buyer Agent1. This inconsistency may arise depending 
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on the assumptions that are made, such as the ones presented earlier on the relation of 
the buyer with a well known debtor.   
Permission(Agent3,SA,Delivery,Agent1,BA) 
Prohibition(Agent3,SA,Delivery,Agent1,BA) 
Apparently, this case can be mapped onto pattern B1. 
Inter-role conflicts 
Cholvy et al. [47] and Dunlop et al. [73] identify an inter-role conflict when 
contradictory norms arise as a result of multiple roles being assigned to an agent.  
For example, when Agent3 acts as a carrier it is obligatory to perform delivery. If, at 
the same time, the same agent assumes the role of seller, then such delivery is not 
obligatory. 
Obligation(Agent3,CA,Delivery,Agent1,BA) 
¬Obligation(Agent3,SA,Delivery,Agent1,BA) 
This case can be mapped onto pattern A. 
Obviously intra-policy and intra-role conflict patterns, as well as inter-policy and 
inter-role conflict patterns are conceptually related. The respective authors use the 
terms “policy” and “role” differently, and the only reason for discussing them 
separately is to facilitate comparison.  
9.3.2.3 Conflicts related to Interest/Duty 
Conflicts of interest 
Moffett et al. in [181] define conflicts of interest as the situation where “the same 
subject can perform management tasks on two different sets of targets”. This type of 
conflict can be seen as an instance of inter-role conflict or inter-policy conflict or, 
correspondingly, of the primitive pattern E (conflict between two obligations). 
Conflicts of Duty 
Moffett et al. in [181] and later Lupu et al. in [164] define conflicts of duties and 
application specific conflicts respectively. They refer to situations where the same 
agent should not be allowed to perform two distinct actions (e.g. the same agent 
should not be allowed both to enter a payment and to sign the payment cheque). Such 
conflicts may be seen as instances of inter-role conflict or inter-policy conflict or, 
correspondingly, of the primitive pattern E (conflict between two obligations). 
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9.3.2.4 Exceptions 
This type of conflict arises generally in norm-governed systems. As Sartor [222] 
notes such conflicts emerge when “exceptions to norms state that particular norms, 
unambiguously identified, do not apply in a given situation”. 
Consider, for example, that the buyer Agent1 who holds a discount card orders goods 
from the seller Agent3. Based on a policy rule the buyer gets a 10% discount due to the 
discount card. On the other hand, based on another policy rule the buyer should get a 
20% discount because it places an order during the sales period. The described 
conflict is of type E: 
Obligation(Agent3,SA,Discount10%,Agent1,BA) 
Obligation(Agent3,SA,Discount20%,Agent1,BA) 
 
9.3.2.5 Temporal Normative Conflicts 
Dunlop et al. [73] present a temporal logic based approach for the detection of 
normative conflicts. In this section we present briefly a modification of our 
representation of normative relations, which takes into account the external time of a 
norm (i.e. the time at which it comes into force) and the internal time of a norm (i.e. 
the time stipulated for its satisfaction, its deadline) (cf. [166]). A formula of the form: 
NN(agent1, role1, action, time2, agent2, role2, time1) 
denotes that at time point time1 agent1 (acting as role1) is in legal relation NN towards agent2 
(acting as role2) to perform action by time2. 
Now, we may discuss normative conflicts of the types described by the primitive 
patterns B-F, in a temporal setting. For the purposes of illustration consider the 
primitive pattern E, in which the following norms are in conflict: 
Obligation(Agent3,SA,Delivery1,IT1,Agent1,BA,ET1) 
Obligation(Agent3,SA,Delivery2,IT2,Agent2,BA,ET2) 
where IT1, and ET1 are the internal/external time points for the first norm, and IT2, ET2 are 
the internal/external time points for the second norm. Temporally well formed norms 
are those whose internal time is subsequent to their external time, so each normative 
proposition corresponds to an interval; the intervals for the example we use here are 
ΔΤ1=[ΕΤ1, ΙΤ1] and ΔΤ2=[ΕΤ2, ΙΤ2]. 
A conflict arises in the following situations (these are depicted as shadowed in 
Figure 9.1): 
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• ET1 = ET2 and IT1 = IT2: when ΔΤ1 coincides with ΔΤ2 (Figure 9.1 (a)). 
• ET1 ≤ ET2 < IT2 ≤ IT1: when ΔΤ1 fully overlaps ΔΤ2 (Figure 9.1 (b), 9.1 (c) and 9.1 (d)). 
• ET1 < ET2 < IT1 < IT2: when ΔΤ1 partially overlaps ΔΤ2 (Figure 9.1 (e)). 
• IT1 = ET2: when ΔΤ1 meets ΔΤ2 (Figure 9.1 (f)). This conflict holds only at time 
point IT1 = ET2. 
Note that for completeness, one should also consider the symmetrical cases. 
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Figure 9.1 Time interval-based conflicts 
 
9.3.3 Additional Patterns  
Here are some additional cases of normative conflicts, which are not discussed 
already in the existing literature. We mention them separately because, although they 
may be reduced to the primitive patterns, there is additional information that may be 
exploited to facilitate conflict resolution. 
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9.3.3.1 Type of action-based conflicts  
A common feature of e-contracts is the so called Contrary-to-Duty structures [200]. 
An agent’s contractual obligations may be divided in two types. Prima facie 
obligations that concern the performance of actions that are in principle stipulated by 
the agreement and secondary obligations that concern the performance of reparatory 
actions; the latter apply only when violations of prima facie obligations happen.  
An agent may, thus, bear two distinct obligations (for instance of the kind 
described in pattern E or in the intra-policy conflict), where one of them is primary 
and the other is secondary (as the result of a violation). This qualification may be 
helpful in conflict resolution, as will be discussed in section 4. The general pattern is: 
Obligation(agent1, role1, action, agent2, role2) 
Obligation(agent1, role1, reparatoryaction, agent3, role3) 
9.3.3.2 Agreement-based conflicts  
An agent may find itself in a conflicting state because it is engaged in multiple 
contracts. For instance a seller may be obliged to perform two distinct deliveries to 
two distinct buyers as dictated by two distinct agreements. This situation may be 
regarded as the generalization of the intra-policy conflict and, consequently, of the 
pattern E. But, in this specific case the important information is the distinction 
between the contracts. The additional information that the two norms stem from two 
agreements, may be exploited for the purposes of conflict resolution. The general 
pattern is: 
Obligation(contract1, agent1, role1, action1, agent2, role2) 
Obligation(contract2, agent1, role1, action2, agent3, role3) 
Normative propositions of the form: 
ΝN(contract, agent1, role1, action, agent2, role2) 
express that according to contract, agent1 that acts as role1 is in legal relation ΝN towards 
agent2 that acts as role2 to perform action. 
Note that this conflict pattern is different form the one presented in [117]. The key 
notion here is the different contracts an agent has to comply with. Different contracts 
may be established towards different agents or even towards the same agent. 
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9.3.3.3 Conflicts between assumptions and knowledge  
A conflict may arise not only as a result of an agent’s explicit knowledge but also 
between its knowledge and its current assumptions or even between distinct 
assumptions.  
For example, consider that Agent3 (a seller) assuming that it is permitted to perform 
delivery towards Agent1 (a buyer) entails that is obliged to perform that delivery. 
Moreover, the same agent assuming that Agent1 is related to a well known debtor entails 
that it is prohibited to perform that delivery. Note that in this scenario the prohibition 
that derives from the second rule contradicts not only with obligation that derives 
from the first rule, but also with the assumption of the first rule (permission).  
9.4 Conflict Detection 
9.4.1 Conflict Detection with Default Logic 
We represent the norms of an agreement as default rules. For instance, the 
following default rule expresses that if an order from Agent1 (acting as a buyer) towards 
Agent3 (acting as a seller) holds, and it is consistent to assume that Agent1 will become a 
regular client, then we may infer that Agent3 is legally obliged towards Agent1 to perform 
delivery: 
Order(Agent1, BA, Agent3, SA) 
: 
BecomeRegularClient(Agent1)  
Obligation(Agent3, SA, Delivery, Agent1, BA) 
An agent that engages in some agreement-governed transaction essentially reasons 
with a default theory. At each time point during the business transaction the agent 
attempts to compute the extensions of its current DfT. The DfT contract 
representation allows us to detect normative conflicts by examining extensions, which 
are essentially possible worlds. A conflict may be detected either between multiple 
courses of extensions or between the same course of extensions, i.e. between some 
extension and the current knowledge of the agent. Where a conflict is detected 
between multiple courses, the latter represent alternative courses of futures for the 
agent; let us call these inter-extension conflicts. Where a conflict is detected between 
an extension and the current knowledge of the agent; let us call these intra-extension 
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conflicts. The role of conflict detection is, thus, to assist an agent to choose a course 
of action so that normative violations may be predicted and avoided.  
To illustrate this interpretation consider the following DfT (W, D): 
W = { P1, P2, P3 } 
D={D1 ≡ P1:J1/C1,  D2 ≡ P2:J2/C2} 
where the following cases arise: 
• Case 1: Assume that P3 and C2 represent a conflict pattern of type A (between a 
normative notion and its negation).  The only possible extension is In(1)={P1, P2, 
P3, C1}, Out(1)={¬J1} for Π(1)={D1}. In this case an intra-extension conflict is avoided 
(Figure 9.2). The discontinuous arrow between the nodes denotes that step is 
not feasible due to normative conflicts that arise. 
 
Π(1) = { D1 }, 
In(1) = { P1, P2, P3, C1 }, 
Out(1) = { ¬ J1 } S1
W={ P1, P2, P3 }
D={ D1=P1:J1/C1,  D2=P2:J2/C2 }
Π(0) = { }, In(0) = W, Out(0) = { }
Default D1 fires
Π(2) = { D1, D2 }, 
In(2) = { P1, P2, P3, C1, C2 }, 
Out(2) = { ¬ J1, ¬ J2 } S2
Default D2 fires
S0
 
Figure 9.2 Detection of Normative Conflicts - Case 1 
 
• Case 2: assume that P3 and C2 represent a conflict pattern other than type A. A 
possible extension is In(2)={P1, P2, P3, C1, C2}, Out(2)={¬J1, ¬J2} for Π(2)={D1, D2}. In this case 
an intra-extension conflict occurs among P3 and C2 (Figure 9.3). 
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Π(1) = { D1 }, 
In(1) = { P1, P2, P3, C1 }, 
Out(1) = { ¬ J1 } S1
W={ P1, P2, P3 }
D={ D1=P1:J1/C1,  D2=P2:J2/C2 }
Π(0) = { }, In(0) = W, Out(0) = { }
Default D1 fires
Π(2) = { D1, D2 }, 
In(2) = { P1, P2, P3, C1, C2 }, 
Out(2) = { ¬ J1, ¬ J2 } S2
Default D2 fires
S0
 
Figure 9.3 Detection of Normative Conflicts - Case 2 
 
• Case 3: Assume that C1 and C2 represent a conflict pattern of type A (between a 
normative notion and is negation). There are two possible extensions, i.e. 
In(1)={P1, P2, P3, C1}, Out(1)={¬J1} for Π(1)={D1} or In(1)={P1, P2, P3, C2}, Out(1)={¬J2} for Π(1)={D2}. In 
this case an inter-extension conflict is detected and arises between C1 and C2 
and a course of action should be followed. This is a general dilemma for an 
agent to choose which rule, D1 or D2, to apply (Figure 9.4). The discontinuous 
arrows between nodes denote that these steps are not feasible due to normative 
conflicts that arise (intra-extension conflicts are avoided). 
• Case 4: Assume that C1 and C2 represent a conflict pattern other than type A. 
Similarly, there are two possible courses, i.e. In(1)={P1, P2, P3, C1}, Out(1)={¬J1} for 
Π(1)={D1} or In(1)={P1, P2, P3, C2}, Out(1)={¬J2} for Π(2)={D2}. So far, this case is identical to 
case 3, that an inter-extension conflict is detected and arises between C1 and C2. 
In the next step of the process Π the new extensions are In(2)={P1, P2, P3, C1, C2}, 
Out(2)={¬J1, ¬J2} for Π(2)={D1, D2} or In(2)={P1, P2, P3, C2, C1}, Out(2)={¬J2, ¬J1} for Π(2)={D2, D1}, 
respectively. Of course, those extensions seem identical, but they record 
different courses of actions. Now, intra-extension conflicts between C1 and C2 
occur (Figure 9.5). 
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Π(1) = { D1 }, 
In(1) = { P1, P2, P3, C1 }, 
Out(1) = { ¬ J1 } S1
W={ P1, P2, P3 }
D={ D1=P1:J1/C1,  D2=P2:J2/C2 }
Π(0) = { }, In(0) = W, Out(0) = { }
Default D1 fires
Π(1) = { D2 }, 
In(1) = { P1, P2, P3, C2 }, 
Out(1) = { ¬ J2 }
S2
Default D2 fires
Π(2) = { D2, D1 }, 
In(2) = { P1, P2, P3, C2, C1 }, 
Out(2) = { ¬ J2, ¬ J1 }
S4
Default D1 fires
Π(2) = { D1, D2 }, 
In(2) = { P1, P2, P3, C1, C2 }, 
Out(2) = { ¬ J1, ¬ J2 } S3
Default D2 fires
S0
 
Figure 9.4 Detection of Normative Conflicts - Case 3 
 
 
 
Π(1) = { D1 }, 
In(1) = { P1, P2, P3, C1 }, 
Out(1) = { ¬ J1 } S1
W={ P1, P2, P3 }
D={ D1=P1:J1/C1,  D2=P2:J2/C2 }
Π(0) = { }, In(0) = W, Out(0) = { }
Default D1 fires
Π(1) = { D2 }, 
In(1) = { P1, P2, P3, C2 }, 
Out(1) = { ¬ J2 }
S2
Default D2 fires
Π(2) = { D2, D1 }, 
In(2) = { P1, P2, P3, C2, C1 }, 
Out(2) = { ¬ J2, ¬ J1 }
S4
Default D1 fires
Π(2) = { D1, D2 }, 
In(2) = { P1, P2, P3, C1, C2 }, 
Out(2) = { ¬ J1, ¬ J2 } S3
Default D2 fires
S0
 
Figure 9.5 Detection of Normative Conflicts - Case 4 
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Note that for completeness, one should also consider the analogous cases regarding 
hypotheses J1 and J2, as mentioned to the last conflict pattern, i.e. conflicts between 
assumptions and knowledge. Of course, more complicated cases may also be defined 
with the combination of more conflicting patterns in the same example.  
On the whole, we could record that: 
• in case 1 the conflict is syntactic and it never actually arises or occurs due to 
the property of DfL to preserve consistency. The role that DfL plays is that of 
the prevention of conflicts.  
• in case 2 the conflict is semantic and actual. The agent finds itself in a 
conflicting state. 
• in case 3 the conflict is syntactic and actual in means that the agent faces a 
dilemma. Although the agent is not and will not find itself in a conflicting 
state, due to the property of DfL to maintain consistency, it faces a query 
which course of action to choose. 
• in case 4 the conflict is semantic and actual. Initially the agent is not in a 
conflicting state but has a dilemma as in the previous case. Finally, when both 
defaults apply, sequentially, the agent ends in a conflicting state. 
Note that by syntactic we refer to the conflict pattern A, while by semantic we 
mean all other conflict patterns. Moreover, we relate the notions of actual conflict and 
non-actual conflict with the way DfL entails new knowledge, its property to maintain 
consistency and the situation where an agent finds itself in a situation where a general 
query of the form “What should I do?” arises. Specifically, a non-actual conflict is the 
one explained in case 1, where contrary to other approaches where this type of 
conflict arises, here it is avoided and the agent never addresses a query. Additionally, 
the notion of actual conflict has dual semantics. We identify it not only with the 
situation where an agent faces a query such as “Which norm should I apply?”, but 
also with the situation where an agent has semantically contradictory knowledge 
about the current world and queries itself “Which normative relation should I comply 
with?” or “Which normative relation should I concede?”. Dual semantics of an actual 
conflict arises due to the DfL property to entail possible world views by computing 
extensions. The computation of extensions is like having a short run look in possible 
worlds, while only the by accepting a single extension the agent finds itself in this 
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world. This characteristic gives agent the ability to address conflicts in a pro-active 
way. We discuss this issue in detail in the subsection 9.4.2.   
In what follows, we present examples of primitive, as well as, other patterns of 
conflicts by representing agreement rules as defaults. Moreover, through these 
examples we illustrate the way DfL facilitates conflict detection by searching and 
examining clauses among sets. 
9.4.2 Patterns of Normative Conflicts Represented and 
Detected via Defaults 
Pattern A 
Conflict between a normative notion (NN) and its negation. This type of conflict 
never actually occurs in our representation, where norms are represented as defaults, 
because the derivation of extensions preserves consistency, i.e. this intra-extension 
conflict is avoided. It may, however, arise as an inter-extension conflict, when 
multiple extensions are computed as the result of the application of norms that infer 
conflicting consequences.  
Consider the following DfT where20: 
W={Order(Agent1,BA,Agent3,SA)} 
and D={ 
Order(Agent1,BA,Agent3,SA) 
: 
Obligation(Agent3,SA,Delivery,Agent1,BA) 
Obligation(Agent3,SA,Delivery,Agent1,BA) 
 
Order(Agent1,BA,Agent3,SA) 
: 
WellKnownDebtor(Agent1) 
¬Obligation(Agent3,SA,Delivery,Agent1,BA) 
} 
The first default denotes that if an order from Agent1 (acting as buyer) towards Agent3 
(acting as seller) holds then we may infer that Agent3 is obliged to perform delivery if it 
is consistent to assume so. Similarly, the second default expresses that if an order 
from Agent1 towards Agent3 holds, and it is consistent to assume that Agent3 is related to a 
well known debtor, then we may infer that Agent3 is not obliged to perform delivery 
towards Agent1. There are two possible extensions, i.e.  
                                                 
20 Note that special terms, such as WellKnownDebtor(agent), BecomeRegularClient(agent) or IsRegularClient(agent) 
among others, are used only for the purposes of illustration and are not binding to the characterization 
of domain-independent conflict patterns. 
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In(1)={ Order(Agent1,BA,Agent3,SA), Obligation(Agent3,SA,Delivery,Agent1,BA)}  
and 
In(1)={ Order(Agent1,BA,Agent3,SA), ¬Obligation(Agent3,SA,Delivery,Agent1,BA)}  
Agent3 should choose a course of action. 
Pattern B 
Conflict between the prohibition to perform an action and the simultaneous 
permission or obligation to perform the same action. 
Consider, for instance, the following default theory (W,D) where: 
W={Order(Agent1,BA,Agent3,SA)} 
and D={ 
Order(Agent1,BA,Agent3,SA) 
: 
WellKnownDebtor(Agent1)  
Prohibition(Agent3,SA,Delivery,Agent1,BA) 
 
Order(Agent1,BA,Agent3,SA) 
: 
Permission(Agent3,SA,Delivery,Agent1,BA) 
Permission(Agent3,SA,Delivery,Agent1,BA) 
} 
The first default denotes that if an order from Agent1 (acting as buyer) towards Agent3 
(acting as seller) holds, and it is consistent to assume that Agent1 is related to a well 
known debtor then we may infer that Agent3 is prohibited to perform delivery. 
Similarly, the second default expresses that if an order from Agent1 towards Agent3 holds, 
and it is consistent to assume that Agent3 is permitted to perform delivery, then we may 
infer that Agent3 is permitted to perform delivery towards Agent1. Finally, Agent3 may find 
itself in a conflicting state (sub-pattern B1) after applying the two defaults 
sequentially (intra-extension conflict). The computed extension is: 
In(2)={ Order(Agent1,BA,Agent3,SA), Permission(Agent3,SA,Delivery,Agent1,BA), Prohibition(Agent3,SA,Delivery,Agent1,BA)} 
In the same spirit, consider the following DfT: 
W={Order(Agent1,BA,Agent3,SA)} 
and D={ 
Order(Agent1,BA,Agent3,SA) 
: 
WellKnownDebtor(Agent1)  
Prohibition(Agent3,SA,Delivery,Agent1,BA) 
 
Order(Agent1,BA,Agent3,SA) 
: 
Obligation(Agent3,SA,Delivery,Agent1,BA) 
Obligation(Agent3,SA,Delivery,Agent1,BA) 
} 
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Once again Agent3 will end up in a conflicting state (sub-pattern B2). The 
corresponding extension is: 
In(2)={ Order(Agent1,BA,Agent3,SA), Prohibition(Agent3,SA,Delivery,Agent1,BA), Obligation(Agent3,SA,Delivery,Agent1,BA)} 
Pattern C 
Conflict between an obligation to perform action and the simultaneous obligation or 
permission to perform ¬ action.  
For example consider the following DfT where: 
W={Order(Agent1,BA,Agent3,SA)} 
and D={ 
Order(Agent1,BA,Agent3,SA) 
: 
BecomeRegularClient(Agent1)  
Obligation(Agent3,SA,Delivery,Agent1,BA) 
 
Order(Agent1,BA,Agent3,SA) 
: 
WellKnownDebtor(Agent1)  
Obligation(Agent3,SA,¬Delivery,Agent1,BA) 
} 
Finally, Agent3 may find itself in a conflicting state after applying the two defaults 
sequentially (intra-extension conflict). The computed extension is: 
In(2)={ Order(Agent1,BA,Agent3,SA), Obligation(Agent3,SA,Delivery,Agent1,BA), Obligation(Agent3,SA,¬Delivery,Agent1,BA)} 
Pattern D 
Conflict between the power to perform an action and the simultaneous prohibition 
to perform the same action. 
For instance consider the following DfT: 
W={Order(Agent1,BA,Agent3,SA)} 
and D={ 
Order(Agent1,BA,Agent3,SA) 
: 
Power(Agent3,SA,Delivery,Agent1,BA)  
Power(Agent3,SA,Delivery,Agent1,BA) 
 
Order(Agent1,BA,Agent3,SA) 
: 
WellKnownDebtor(Agent1) 
Prohibition(Agent3,SA,Delivery,Agent1,BA) 
} 
Once again, Agent3 may end up in a conflicting state after applying the two defaults 
sequentially (intra-extension conflict). The computed extension is: 
In(2)={ Order(Agent1,BA,Agent3,SA), Power(Agent3,SA,Delivery,Agent1,BA), Prohibition(Agent3,SA,¬Delivery,Agent1,BA)} 
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Pattern E 
Conflict between two obligatory distinct actions, where it is impossible to do both 
at the same time. 
For instance consider the following DfT where: 
W={Order(Agent1,BA,Agent3,SA), Order(Agent2,BA,Agent3,SA), no simultaneous performance of actions is possible} 
and D={ 
Order(Agent1,BA,Agent3,SA) 
: 
BecomeRegularClient(Agent1) 
Obligation(Agent3,SA,Delivery1,Agent1,BA) 
 
Order(Agent2,BA,Agent3,SA) 
: 
IsRegularClient(Agent1) 
Obligation(Agent3,SA,Delivery2,Agent2,BA) 
} 
After applying the two defaults sequentially, Agent3 bears two obligations that cannot 
be simultaneously satisfied. The corresponding extension is: 
In(2)={ Order(Agent1,BA,Agent3,SA) , no simultaneous performance of actions is possible,   
           Obligation(Agent3,SA,Delivery1,Agent2,BA), Obligation(Agent3,SA,Delivery2,Agent2,BA)} 
Pattern F 
Conflict between an obligation and the negation of the agent’s permission or power 
to perform it. 
For instance consider the following DfT where: 
W={Order(Agent1,BA,Agent3,SA)} 
and D={ 
Order(Agent1,BA,Agent3,SA) 
: 
BecomeRegularClient(Agent1) 
Obligation(Agent3,SA,Delivery,Agent1,BA) 
 
Order(Agent1,BA,Agent3,SA) 
: 
WellKnownDebtor(Agent1) 
¬Permission(Agent3,SA,Delivery,Agent1,BA) 
} 
Finally, Agent3 may find itself in a conflicting state after applying the two defaults 
sequentially (intra-extension conflict). The computed extension is: 
In(2)={ Order(Agent1,BA,Agent3,SA), Obligation(Agent3,SA,Delivery,Agent1,BA), ¬Permission(Agent3,SA,Delivery,Agent1,BA)} 
The negation of an agent’s permission to perform an action derives from the 
agent’s knowledge base (sub-pattern F1). In the case of an incomplete knowledge 
base, it may derive via an assumption (sub-pattern F2). 
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To illustrate this consider a DfT that contains the first of the defaults above and in 
place of the second, the following: 
Order(Agent1,BA,Agent3,SA) 
: 
¬Permission(Agent3,SA,Delivery,Agent1,BA) 
¬Permission(Agent3,SA,Delivery,Agent1,BA) 
If the agent’s knowledge base does not contain an explicit permission, then the 
justification of this default will be satisfied, and hence its conclusion will be drawn. 
Once again, Agent3 may end up in a conflicting state after applying the two defaults 
sequentially. The extension is as computed above. 
Up to now we have only referred to primitive patterns. Regarding all other 
conflicts, similar examples and representations may be recorded. We pass over these 
cases because all of them correspond to the primitive patterns. We will only refer to 
the last conflict pattern that concerns hypotheses and current knowledge. 
Conflicts between assumptions and knowledge. 
As, already, mentioned a conflict may arise not only as a result of an agent’s 
explicit knowledge but also between its knowledge and its current assumptions or 
between its assumptions.  
For example, consider the following DfT:  
W={Order(Agent1,BA,Agent3,SA)} 
and D={ 
Order(Agent1,BA,Agent3,SA) 
: 
Permission(Agent3,SA,Delivery,Agent1,BA)  
Obligation(Agent3,SA,Delivery,Agent1,BA) 
 
Order(Agent1,BA,Agent3,SA) 
: 
WellKnownDebtor(Agent1) 
Prohibition(Agent3,SA,Delivery,Agent1,BA) 
} 
As in previous examples, Agent3 will find itself in a conflicting state after applying 
the two defaults sequentially. The computed sets for Π(2)={D1, D2} are: 
In(2)={ Order(Agent1,BA,Agent3,SA), Obligation(Agent3,SA,Delivery,Agent1,BA), Prohibition(Agent3,SA,Delivery,Agent1,BA)} 
and  
Out(2)={ ¬Permission(Agent3,SA,Delivery,Agent1,BA), ¬WellKnownDebtor(Agent1)} 
Note that in this case the prohibition that derives from the second default 
contradicts not only with obligation that derives from the first default, but also with 
the assumption of the first default (permission). Of course, due to the fact that the Out() 
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set contains what should not become true in the knowledge base, i.e. the negation of 
the assumptions made, when conflicts are related with assumptions (justifications) a 
correct form of a conflicting formula should be searched for. 
One may argue that following Reiter’s original computation of extensions within 
DfT [208] we may compute possible world models that are counter-intuitive because 
contradictory assumptions are possible (e.g. by assuming that the buyer (Agent1) is 
related to a well known debtor (WellKnownDebtor(Agent1)) or it is not  (WellKnownDebtor(Agent1)). For 
example, consider the following DfT (W, D): 
W=∅ 
D={ D1 ≡ true:J/C1,  D2 ≡ true:¬J/C2 } 
According to the original computation of extensions an extension including C1 and 
C2, based on contradictory assumptions (J and ¬J), is computed. This view of 
extensions, separated from assumptions, as possible world models is clearly 
undesirable. Thus a technique to preserve consistency and detect conflicts over 
justifications is also imperative. The proposed representation of contract rules as 
defaults enables us to achieve this aim in two ways. Either by searching for conflict 
patterns in the Out() set, also, besides the In() set, or by employing Constrained Default 
Logic [225]. The possible world model that the agent infers, for a Constrained 
Default Theory, is the consistent set In(i)∪¬Out(i). This is tantamount to saying that the 
possible world models inferred by the agent contain, besides previous knowledge, 
both the consequents and the assumptions of the applied defaults. 
9.5 Conflict Resolution 
Various approaches for conflict resolution have been proposed in the last decade. It 
seems that the common ground for most of them is the ascription of priorities to 
norms [222, 145], policies [181, 164, 74], roles [48], based on some criterion, which 
may be domain dependent or independent. Belief revision [222], goal reduction and 
decision based on utility [146], conflicting provision voidance [3] and instantiation 
graphs/unification [145, 245] are some of the other proposed strategies for conflict 
resolution. 
According to the dual semantics of the notion  actual conflict as we presented it in 
the subsection 9.4.1, conflict resolution needs to be done in such a way that facilitates 
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answering both queries “Which norm should I apply?” and “Which normative 
relation should I comply with?”. Conflict resolution in DfL may be performed using 
Brewka’s [30] proposal that enables us to define and apply priorities on default rules 
dynamically.  
Brewka in [30] defined a prioritized DfT as a triple (W, D, name), where name is a 
function that assigns names to default rules D. The extension of a PDfT is derived in 
the same way as in a DfT. As noted in subsection 3.3.2.5, priorities over defaults can 
either define preference on extensions that are, eventually, preferred transaction plans 
when dealing with the query “Which norm should I apply?”, or define preference on 
normative relations that already hold, that is an answer to the query “Which 
normative relation should I concede?” given based on the priorities of defaults that 
entailed these normative relations. 
To illustrate this interpretation consider the DfT of the previous example of section 
9.4.1 where (W, D): 
W={P1, P2, P3} 
D={ D1 ≡ P1:J1/C1,  D2 ≡ P2:J2/C2 } 
where D1 has priority over D2. According to case 3 (section 9.4.1) where C1 and C2 
represent a conflict pattern of type A (between a normative notion and is negation) 
and based on the priority relation the agent may end up choosing the first extension 
due to the fact that D1 has priority over D2. In a similar way, according to case 4 
(section 9.4.1) where C1 and C2 represent a conflict pattern other than type A and after 
applying both defaults (Π={D1, D2}) the agent may decide to comply with normative 
relation C1 due to the fact that it is the consequent of the default that overrides all 
other defaults. 
What makes PDfTs really useful is that the ascription of priorities to default rules 
may, itself, be done dynamically. Using dynamic priorities, we generate preferred 
extensions, each of which indicates a distinct transaction plan to follow. Specifically, 
priorities amongst ground defaults may be defined dynamically either by making 
different assumptions or by specifying domain-dependent criteria. The general pattern 
for ascribing priorities dynamically takes the form of a default rule: 
Rule(d1,v1)∧Rule(d2,v2)∧criterion 
: 
assumptions 
d1<d2 
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Here d1, d2 are variables that denote names of ground defaults; Rule(d1 ,v1) denotes a 
ground default d1 and its set of entities of interest v1. The intended interpretation of this 
rule is: if two defaults d1 and d2 apply and some criterion is satisfied between entities 
of interest, then d1 takes priority over d2, if certain assumptions may consistently be 
made. We see that the criterion of interest may also be a consistent assumption. 
Table 9.2 Resolution Strategies for Normative Conflict Patterns 
Strategy Conflict Pattern Criterion 
Hierarchy 
• Primitive normative conflicts 
• Inter-policy/inter-role conflicts 
• Conflict of duties/interests 
• Agreement-based conflicts 
• Type of action-based conflicts  
• Conflicts between assumptions 
and knowledge 
e.g. prohibitions overrides 
all other normative notions, 
explicit knowledge 
overrules assumptions,  
obligations of reparatory 
actions should be met first,  
a regular client has priority 
Temporality 
• Time interval-based conflicts e.g. the oldest obligation 
takes priority, or the shortest 
deadline takes priority 
Specificity • Exceptions e.g. the most specific rule overrides all others 
 
Three general strategies for defining such criteria have been discussed in the 
literature, namely hierarchies of entities of interest, time and specificity of norms. 
Table 9.2 summarizes one possible way in which the patterns of normative conflicts 
that we discussed may be used by specific strategies. Given a particular normative 
conflict, different resolution strategies may be applied depending on our specific 
criterion of interest.  
For instance, consider the case where two norms (D1 and D2) that define conflicting 
obligations for Agent3 are active (Figure 9.6). The first one is initiated at ET1 and it is 
towards buyer Agent1 who is a regular client. It sets an obligation to perform delivery 
until IT1. The second one is towards buyer Agent2, it is initiated at ET2 and defines a 
reparatory obligation to perform delivery until IT2. The relation between time points is 
as follows: ET1 < ET2 < IT2 < IT1. There is information that can be used to determine 
different conflict resolution criteria. The strategy of temporality based on external 
time may give priority to D1 as it was initiated first. On the other hand, temporality 
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based on internal time may give priority to D2 since it has a shorter deadline. Another 
alternative, using the strategy of hierarchy is to give precedence to D1, because Agent1, 
as a regular client, takes precedence over Agent2. Or, we may give precedence to D2, 
because it concerns a reparatory action, if we choose to assign higher priority to 
secondary norms over primary ones. It should be clear that various combinations of 
these criteria may also be defined based on the agent’s current knowledge and the 
assumptions it makes.  
 
Buyer
Seller
Agent1
Agent3
Buyer
Agent2
 
Figure 9.6 Buyer - Buyer - Seller Example Scenario 
 
A fourth general strategy is also applicable by exploiting the fact that we employ 
DfL, i.e. an agent may ascribe priorities between default rules, based on the number 
or the type of assumptions used. In [97] we presented a technique where, under 
incomplete knowledge, initial contract rules are reformulated appropriately when 
needed, and thus inferencing is possible on a totally hypothetical basis via the 
dynamic identification and employment of appropriate candidate assumptions. 
Various rule formulations derive by populating appropriately the P and J sets on the 
basis of currently available knowledge. All possible formulations are organized in a 
hierarchical structure, where the binary relation that causes them to be partially 
ordered is the number of assumptions employed. In fact, this separation of inference 
rules may have a useful role during conflict resolution. For instance a cautious agent 
may give priority to rules with fewer assumptions, while a risky agent may give 
priority to rules with more assumptions. In this case priority ascription is based on a 
quantitative analysis of assumptions used. On the other hand a qualitative analysis is 
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also useful. For instance consider the DfT as shown in conflict type F. In this case 
different consequents are inferred depending on different assumptions. A cautious 
agent may give priority to rules with semantically positive assumptions that infer 
deterrent consequents, while a risky agent may give priority to rules with 
semantically negative assumptions that infer incitement consequents. 
Finally, a fifth general strategy, which is related to DfL feature to compute possible 
world views and a utility factor, is also applicable. Utility factors usually are 
quantitative notions such as profit/loss (amount of money earned/lost), number of 
obligations that arise/fulfilled or number of new conflicts. Using DfL the agent is able 
to derive all possible extensions and apply utility factor estimation on their 
conclusions. In this way a short-term analysis takes place that leads the agent to the 
dilemma resolution. 
Consider the following example where the carrier Agent3 should choose among two 
distinct obligations to perform delivery towards two buyer agents (Agent1 and Agent2). 
Furthermore, consider that no simultaneous delivery is feasible and if the first 
obligation is being violated a 1000 euros penalty arises while if the second one is 
being violated then a 100 euros penalty arises but also new obligations that contradict 
with others come up. During this scenario Agent3 may resolve the dilemma either by 
adopting as the utility factor the pre-agreed compensation in case of violation and 
gives priority to the second default or by considering the new conflicting obligations 
and their effects on its plan and gives priority to the first default. 
9.6 Conflicts and Assumptions 
Another point that is worth exploring is the interaction between the ordering of 
defaults as this result from stratification and the construction of lattice structures, as 
per the proposal of this thesis, and other approaches such as the PDfL. Recall that, the 
technique described before, towards autonomous hypothetical and non-monotonic 
reasoning, resembles, in a way, stratification of a DfT. The possible default 
formulations of each initial norm are assigned to the various lattice levels, depending 
on the number of assumptions that each default formulation employs. We came to the 
conclusion that, an agent when using stratification on the set of available lattice 
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structures before performing its reasoning within the lattices, it does not miss any 
causal knowledge and avoids employing unhelpful assumptions. 
Naturally, a question that arises is how these distinct ordering methods (one due to 
stratification/lattices and one due to priorities) interact with each other. For 
stratification/lattices, we seek for relations among defaults. This relation is based, 
first, on propositions that are common in two or more rules, and second, on the 
number of assumptions employed in each default rule. Thus different strata define a 
causal hierarchy between lattices. On the contrary, in PDfL, hierarchy/priority 
relations are not defined for all defaults but only among those that have conflicting 
consequents. For example, consider that we have two buyers BA and BA' that order 
goods from the same seller SA, but at different time points (T<T'<T1). Consequently, 
from the SA’s perspective, two obligations for delivery hold. Suppose that only one 
action may be performed at any given time. In this case, the SA agent has two 
conflicting obligations to satisfy. If time is used as the criterion in the general pattern 
rule for priority ascription then the default that infer the SA’s obligation to deliver to BA 
takes priority over the other default that infer its obligation to deliver to BA'. 
A reasonable choice seems to be to give precedence to stratification/lattices. We 
came to this conclusion, because in this way we infer more knowledge, even on a 
hypothetical basis, before moving on with the reasoning procedure. In this way an 
agent forms a better view (even hypothetical) of the world and its potential pasts or 
futures. Then we may assign priorities among conflicting norms, if possible, within 
each stratum based on some conflict resolution strategy. 
9.7 Related Work and Summary 
It is clear from the above discussion that the analysis, representation and 
management of normative conflicts have been the focus of much research in recent 
years, from a variety of perspectives. Here, we presented a summary of these research 
approaches and perspectives, briefly.  
 Moffett et al. [181], Lupu et al. [164] and Dunlop et al. [73, 74] address conflicts 
from the Distributed Systems Management viewpoint by specifying policies as a way 
to determine and influence management behaviour. We have shown how the basic 
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types of conflict presented in these approaches may be seen as instances of our 
primitive patterns in DfL. Both [181] and [164] focus on the detection and resolution 
of syntactic conflicts at compile-time, by proposing static priority assignment. On the 
other hand, work in [73, 74], which addresses temporal reasoning about conflicts, 
concentrates on run-time conflict detection. Our approach is intended for conflict 
detection and resolution at run-time. Cholvy et al. in [47, 48] accept only inter-role 
conflicts and propose a solution that is based on the concept of role and regulation 
respectively. Contrary to this approach we accept intra-role conflicts and have shown 
how their conflict patterns map onto our primitive ones. Note that none of the above 
approaches supports defeasible reasoning.  
Broersen et al. in [31] deal with different kinds of conflicts: they are interested in 
conflicts arising between an agent’s beliefs, obligations, intentions and desires. 
Although they, too, use DfL, they only use normal defaults, thus requiring agents to 
have complete knowledge. They do not address conflicts in a temporal setting. Other 
approaches, such as [111, 105, 191], that also support nonmonotonic reasoning with 
e-contracts do not presented in detail a discussion on the conflict patterns they 
consider and priorities are statically defined. 
Abraham and Bacon in [3] examine normative conflicts but their focus corresponds 
to only a part of our set of primitive patterns. Although the absence of implicit 
knowledge is mentioned as a conflicting pattern, no resolution is proposed because no 
assumption-based reasoning is supported. Kowalski [146] is concerned with goal-
driven conflict detection and resolution and attempts to unify logic with decision 
theory. Finally, Kollingbaum et al. [145, 245] focus on practical reasoning agents and 
norm-regulated Virtual Organizations. Specifically, they are only interested in 
situations of our conflict pattern B.  They use either instantiation graphs for actions or 
unification to detect and resolve conflicts. 
To sum up, in this chapter we presented a set of normative conflict patterns that 
may be encountered in e-contracts, and discussed how other analyses of normative 
conflicts found in the literature of distributed systems, legal reasoning and multiagent 
interaction may be seen as instances of these patterns. We also identified some 
conflicts that have not been identified yet in other proposals. Finally, we discussed 
how the representation of contractual norms as default rules facilitates both conflict 
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detection and dynamic conflict resolution in a total or partial factual/hypothetical 
setting. 
Research discussed in this chapter has been published or is under review in [90, 
94, 93, 99, 87] 
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10 Other Issues for Common-
sense Reasoning 
10.1 Introduction 
During a business transaction that is regulated by some agreement, other issues of 
interest for an agent towards contract performance monitoring are to establish: 
• Factual information, given a history of events that have occurred up to the 
point of its query. For instance, an agent for an e-commerce application may 
need to establish what facts are true of orders, payments, deliveries etc., that 
have occurred (who caused such events, when, whether they were carried out 
successfully and so on).  
• Prescriptive information, given a history of events that have occurred up to 
the point of its query. That is, an agent needs to know what obligations, 
permissions, prohibitions and legal powers are active for itself and each other 
agent in its environment. 
To answer such queries some kind of temporal reasoning and reasoning about 
actions and their effects is required. Many researchers (for example, [166, 17, 79, 
211] among others) have adopted EC [149] for contract representation. However, the 
historical information available to an agent at the time point it poses its query may be 
incomplete, for various reasons: Information may be lost, or distorted by noise, and in 
a truly open system, where agents join or leave the system at different times, 
information delivery from agent to agent may simply be delayed. Therefore, in order 
to reason in the presence of incomplete historical knowledge, agents must be able to 
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
09/12/2017 01:19:12 EET - 137.108.70.7
10. Other Issues for Common-sense Reasoning 
 
 198
fill in information gaps, by employing assumptions about the past and the present 
time. In this chapter, first, we discuss issues such as reasoning with time, action and 
deontic modalities, and, second, we link the ideas presented in the previous chapters 
with a contract representation in EC towards reasoning with incomplete knowledge. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: section 10.2 presents the full 
representation of contract norms and the way this representation enables reasoning 
with time, actions and deontic modalities; section 10.3 illustrates the proposals of this 
thesis through an example where contract norms are represented in the full language; 
and finally, section 10.4 provides a discussion on related work and a summary. 
10.2 Reasoning with Time, Action and Deontic 
Modalities 
To establish the state of a business exchange, given a history of parties’ actions, we 
may represent the agreement that regulates this exchange in some temporal logic. In 
fact, such representations have been constructed for various types of agreements by 
many other researchers in Event Calculus (e.g. [166, 17, 79, 211] among others). The 
basic elements of the language are time points, fluents and actions or events. Fluents 
are factual and normative propositions whose truth-value alters over time, as a result 
of the occurrence of an action or an event. 
In this thesis, we adapt the simple EC formalism presented in [180]. In its original 
form, the formalism does not distinguish between events that are brought about 
through agents’ actions, and force majeure events that are brought about 
independently of the agents. We preserve the distinction and use the term ‘action’ to 
refer to the former, and ‘event’ to refer to the latter. We use terms, such as Order(agent1, 
agent2), for fluents that become true as a result of specific actions (here ordering 
AOrder(agent1, agent2)). We use terms of the form NN(agent1, agent2, action, time) for fluents that 
describe normative propositions and their intended reading is “agent1 is in legal relation 
NN towards agent2 to perform action by time”. The legal relation NN may be obligation, 
prohibition or permission; although these notions are typically formalized in some 
system of Deontic Logic, we merely use them as descriptive names for fluents, and do 
not adopt any specific Deontic Logic axiomatization. 
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
09/12/2017 01:19:12 EET - 137.108.70.7
Symbolic Representations and Common-sense Reasoning in Open Multi-agent Systems
 
 199
 
As [165, 17] note, the effects of an action apply only when the action is considered 
valid, and this, in turn depends on whether its agent has the legal and practical ability 
to perform it. An agent’s legal and practical ability with respect to certain actions may 
be time-dependent, so we use the fluents IPower(agent, action) and PAbility(agent, action) 
respectively, and the fluent Valid(agent, action) to denote that an action performed by an 
agent is valid. We employ the six basic predicates of [180], shown in Table 3.1 in 
chapter 3; of those, Initiates and Terminates are used along with Happens in the specific 
description of a particular contract, to represent causal relations between fluents and 
actions/events. The other three are defined in a domain-independent manner. We 
modify the original definition of the HoldsAt predicate to take into account action 
validity, and have, consequently, extended the Happens predicate to include the agent of 
an action as an argument (for events, though, we use the original form of Happens). 
For illustration purposes, some domain-independent definitions are shown below: 
Clipped(time1, fluent, time2) ← (Happens(agent, action, time) ∧ Terminates(action, fluent, time) ∧ time1≤ time<time2  
∧ HoldsAt(Valid(agent, action), time)) 
Declipped(time1, fluent, time2) ← (Happens(agent, action, time) ∧ Initiates(action, fluent, time) ∧ time1≤ time<time2 
∧ HoldsAt(Valid(agent, action), time)) 
HoldsAt(fluent, time2) ← (Happens(agent, action, time1) ∧ Initiates(action, fluent, time1) ∧ time1<time2  
∧ ¬Clipped(time1, fluent, time2) ∧ HoldsAt(Valid(agent, action), time1)) 
¬HoldsAt(fluent, time2) ← (Happens(agent, action, time1) ∧ Terminates(action, fluent, time1) ∧  time1<time2  
∧ ¬Declipped(time1, fluent, time2) ∧ HoldsAt(Valid(agent, action), time1)) 
HoldsAt(fluent, time2) ← (HoldsAt(fluent, time1)  ∧ time1<time2 ∧ ¬Clipped(time1, fluent, time2)) 
¬HoldsAt(fluent, time2) ← (HoldsAt(fluent, time1) ∧ time1<time2 ∧ ¬Declipped(time1, fluent, time2)) 
Note that the first definition for HoldsAt above reflects the establishment of a fluent as a 
result of an action, while the second one reflects the common sense law of inertia.  
As stated in chapter 6, the EC representation of an e-contract may be characterized 
as a triple (H, R, A). Specifically, H corresponds to historical information and is a 
(possibly empty/incomplete) set of definitions for predicates HL = {Happens, Holds}, R 
corresponds to causal information and is a (possibly empty/incomplete) set of 
definitions for RL = {Initiates, Terminates}, and A is the (non-empty) set of definitions for the 
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domain–independent predicates AL = {HoldsAt, ¬HoldsAt, Clipped, Declipped}, that is,  A = {Y←X1∧…∧Xk | 
Y∈AL and Xi∈AL∪HL∪RL∪TL}, where TL contains the first-order-logic predicates used to express 
temporal relations, i.e., TL={<, =, >, ≥, ≤}. So, the complete language is HL∪RL∪AL∪TL. 
Another point worth mentioning is the so called Contrary-To-Duty structures 
[200].  CTDs arise when a primary obligation is defined for a party, along with a rule 
that determines a secondary obligation for it, should the primary one be violated.  For 
instance, consider that the seller agent is obliged to deliver within 10 days from the 
date the buyer agent order took place.  If it does not do so, then it is obliged to deliver 
within the next 3 days and to claim a reduced price. We should note, that during this 
work it is not our purpose to analyse all possible cases of CTD structures as presented 
in [200]. We do not address issues that concern the persistence of norms or indeed 
periodicity. We assume that when primary obligations are violated, some reparation 
action may be specified in the same manner the primary obligations were defined. 
10.3 Example 
Consider a 3-party business transaction that takes place in an electronic 
marketplace populated by software agents, as already discussed in chapters 4, 6 and 7. 
Let the set {BA, SA, CA, …} denote agents in the e-market (where BA, SA, CA denote buyer, 
seller and carrier respectively). A buyer agent (BA) communicates with a seller agent 
(SA) and establishes an agreement with it for purchasing a certain product. 
Consequently, SA communicates with a carrier agent (CA) and establishes another 
agreement with it for the timely and safe delivery of goods to BA. 
The first agreement (between BA and SA) is to be conducted on the following terms: 
SA should see to it that the goods be delivered to BA within 10 days from the date BA’s 
order happens. BA, in turn, should see to it that payment be made within 21 days from 
the date it receives the goods. The agreement may specify sanctions and possible 
reparations in case the two agents do not comply with their obligations, but we do not 
need to refer to them explicitly here. In the same spirit, the second agreement 
(between SA and CA) specifies obligations, deadlines and possible sanctions/reparations 
in case of violations. 
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Here is an extract of the H, R and A sets of the EC representation for the agreement 
between BA and SA. Recall that this information may be incomplete, i.e., an agent may 
possess only partial historical knowledge (here, BA knows that it ordered from SA at 
time point T) and partial causal knowledge (here, BA knows that placing an order 
imposes an obligation on the recipient of the order to deliver; it knows that this 
obligation is terminated/discharged successfully when delivery actually takes place; 
and it also knows that the occurrence of delivery imposes an obligation on itself for 
payment, which is terminated when payment is actually made): 
HBA = { Happens(BA, AOrder(BA, SA), T) } 
RBA = { 
             R1 ≡ Initiates(AOrder(agent1, agent2), Obligation(agent2, agent1, ADelivery(agent2, agent1), time1+10), time1) ←                           
Happens(agent1, AOrder(agent1, agent2), time1) 
             R2 ≡ Initiates(ADelivery(agent1, agent2), Obligation(agent2, agent1, APayment(agent2, agent1), time1+21), time1) ←                     
(Happens(agent1, ADelivery(agent1, agent2), time1) 
∧ HoldsAt(Obligation(agent1, agent1, ADelivery(agent1, agent2), time2), time1)  
∧ time1≤ time2) 
 
            R3 ≡ Terminates(ADelivery(agent1, agent2), Obligation(agent1, agent2, ADelivery(agent1, agent2), time2), time1) ←                  
(Happens(agent1, ADelivery(agent1, agent2), time1)  
∧ HoldsAt(Obligation(agent1, agent2, ADelivery(agent1, agent2), time2), time1)   
∧ time1≤ time2) 
 
           R4 ≡ Terminates(APayment(agent1, agent2), Obligation(agent1, agent2, APayment(agent1, agent2), time2), time1) ←                 
(Happens(agent1, APayment(agent1, agent2), time1)  
∧ HoldsAt(Obligation(agent1, agent2, APayment(agent1, agent2), time2), time1)  
∧ time1≤ time2) 
            } 
ABA = { 
             A1 ≡ HoldsAt(Obligation(agent2, agent1, ADelivery(agent2, agent1), time1+10), time2) ←   
Happens(agent1, AOrder(agent1, agent2), time1 )  
∧ Initiates(AOrder(agent1, agent2),Obligation(agent1, agent1,ADelivery(agent2, agent1),time1+10),time1) 
∧ ¬Clipped(time1, Obligation(agent2, agent1, ADelivery(agent2, agent1), time1+10), time2) 
∧ HoldsAt(Valid(agent1, AOrder(agent1, agent2)), time1) 
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time1<time2 
            A2 ≡ HoldsAt(Obligation(agent2, agent1, APayment(agent2, agent1), time1+21), time2) ←  
Happens(agent1, ADelivery(agent1, agent2), time1) 
∧ Initiates(ADelivery(agent1, agent2),Obligation(agent2, agent1,APayment(agent2, agent1), time1+21),time1) 
∧ ¬Clipped(time1, Obligation(agent2, agent1, APayment(agent2, agent1), time1+21), time2) 
∧ HoldsAt(Valid(agent1, ADelivery(agent1, agent2)), time1) 
∧ time1<time2 
        } 
 
With reference to this representation, and given BA’s current knowledge, only rule R1 
may actually be used for inference, since its conditions are satisfied, and so BA may 
only infer that: 
Initiates(AOrder(BA, SA), Obligation(SA, BA, ADelivery(SA, BA), T+10), T) 
But what if BA needs to perform best-guess or non-risk reasoning? In this case BA 
needs to identify rule conditions that it may use as assumptions, and we proposed that 
this is possible, if the initial set of contract rules is reformulated as default rules. 
Since many different formulations are possible for each contract rule, the agent need 
not commit (statically) to some specific one, and instead it may construct the lattice 
of possible default formulations, as we argued earlier. In this way, the agent will be 
able to use any of the possible formulations, depending on its currently available 
knowledge, which changes over time; essentially the agent will be identifying 
candidate assumptions dynamically. 
As a result the agent constructs the following DfT (WBA, DBA ):  
WBA = { Happens(BA, AOrder(BA, SA), T) }, 
that is, WBA contains the historical information available to the agent, and DBA is the set 
containing the corresponding lattices of default formulations for each rule contained 
in the RBA and ABA sets. 
10.3.1 Hypothetical Reasoning (1H) 
Now, BA is able to perform both no-risk and best-guess reasoning by employing 
some of these defaults, i.e. by employing assumptions in its knowledge base. For 
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example, in the absence of information to the contrary, it may assume that its order is 
a valid action and that SA’s obligation to deliver is not unexpectedly terminated, in 
order to infer that SA bears an obligation to deliver the ordered goods.  BA may come to 
this conclusion by employing in its inference the defaults DR1 and DA1, respectively, 
and by computing the In and Out sets as shown below21: 
 
DR1 ≡ 
         Happens(BA, AOrder(BA,SA), T) 
        : true 
        / Initiates(AOrder(BA, SA), Obligation(SA,BA,ADelivery(SA,BA), T+10), T) 
DA1 ≡ 
         Happens(BA, AOrder(BA, SA), T ), Initiates(AOrder(BA,SA),Obligation(SA,BA,ADelivery(SA,BA),T+10),T) 
        : ¬Clipped(T, Obligation(SA, BA, ADelivery(SA, BA), T+10),Τ1), HoldsAt(Valid(BA, AOrder(BA, SA)), T ), T < Τ1 
        / HoldsAt(Obligation(SA, BA, ADelivery(SA, BA), T+10), Τ1) 
In(2) BA = WBA ∪ {     Initiates(AOrder(BA, SA), Obligation(SA, BA, ADelivery(SA, BA), T+10), T),      
                                 HoldsAt(Obligation(SA, BA, ADelivery(SA, BA), T+10),Τ1)                                } 
Out(2) BA = WBA ∪ {     Clipped(T, Obligation(SA, BA, ADelivery(SA, BA), T+10), Τ1), 
                                     ¬ HoldsAt(Valid(BA, AOrder(BA, SA)), T ), ¬ (T< Τ1)                                     } 
In the same spirit, and on the assumptions that: SA’s delivery will happen at some 
time point; such delivery will be valid; the effect of such delivery will be an 
obligation for BA to pay; and, finally, that such obligation will not be terminated by 
some other action, BA may infer what its potential payment period will be, relative to 
the time point of its assumptions. BA may come to this conclusion by employing in its 
inference the defaults DR2 and DA2, respectively, and by computing the In and Out sets as 
shown below22: 
DR2 ≡  
         true 
        : Happens(SA, ADelivery(SA, BA), Τ’), HoldsAt(Obligation(SA, BA, ADelivery(SA, BA), T+10), Τ’), Τ’ ≤ Τ’ 
        / Initiates(ADelivery(SA,BA),Obligation(BA,SA,APayment(BA,SA), Τ’+21), Τ’) 
DA2 ≡ 
                                                 
21 Note that in our example time is discrete. So agents may generate past or future time points in order 
to make their assumptions. The only requirement for agents when assuming the existence of time 
points is to position each new time point in the overall time sequence, by introducing their temporal 
relation to other, known or assumed, time points.  
 
22 Note that the use of time point Τ’ is possible under the assumptions that Τ1< Τ’ < Τ2 and Τ’ ≤ Τ+10. 
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         true 
        : Happens(SA, ADelivery(SA, BA), Τ’), Initiates(ADelivery(SA,BA),Obligation(BA,SA,APayment(BA,SA), Τ’+21), Τ’), 
           ¬Clipped(Τ’, Obligation(BA, SA, APayment(BA, SA), Τ’+21), Τ2), HoldsAt(Valid(SA, ADelivery(SA, BA)), Τ’), Τ’ < Τ2 
        / HoldsAt(Obligation(BA, SA, APayment(BA,SA), Τ’+21), Τ2) 
In(2) BA = WBA ∪ {     Initiates(ADelivery(SA,BA), Obligation(BA, SA, APayment(BA, SA), Τ’+21),  Τ’),  
                                 HoldsAt(Obligation(BA, SA, APayment(BA, SA), Τ’+21, Τ2)                                       } 
Out(2) BA = WBA ∪ { ¬ Happens(SA, ADelivery(SA, BA), Τ’), 
                                ¬ HoldsAt(Obligation(SA, BA, ADelivery(SA, BA), T+10), Τ’), ¬ (Τ’≤ Τ’), 
                                ¬ Happens(SA, ADelivery(SA, BA), Τ’), 
                                ¬ Initiates(ADelivery(SA,BA),Obligation(BA,SA,APayment(BA,SA), Τ’+21), Τ’), 
                                Clipped(Τ’, Obligation(BA, SA, APayment(BA, SA), Τ’+21), Τ2), 
                                ¬ HoldsAt(Valid(SA, ADelivery(SA, BA)), Τ’),  ¬ (Τ’< Τ2)                                      } 
We may wish to restrict the assumption space. Suppose we wanted our agent BA to 
avoid assuming the validity of actions, and use information about action validity only 
when it explicitly knows about it. In this case, the PC=Out(0) set (the set of pre-
constraints) must be initialized to contain the forbidden assumption. For example, in 
this case BA constructs a PcDfT where the PC set contains the following formula: 
PCBA = Out(0) BA = { HoldsAt(Valid(agent, action), time) } 
Now, neither DA1 nor DA2 defaults may be employed in the inference process.  
10.3.2 Commitment to Assumptions (2H) 
As noted earlier, following Reiter’s original computation of extensions of a DfT we 
may compute possible world models that are counter-intuitive: for instance, in our 
example above, BA would infer, after applying all of DR1, DR2, DA1 and DA2, the extension: 
In(4) = WBA ∪ {     Initiates(AOrder(BA, SA), Obligation(SA, BA, ADelivery(SA, BA), T+10), T),      
                             HoldsAt(Obligation(SA, BA, ADelivery(SA, BA), T+10), Τ1),      
                             Initiates(ADelivery(SA,BA), Obligation(BA, SA, APayment(BA, SA), Τ’+21),  Τ’),  
                             HoldsAt(Obligation(BA, SA, APayment(BA, SA), Τ’+21), Τ2)                                           } 
This extension seems to suggest that BA infers a possible version of the world, in 
which it bears an obligation to pay SA, although no delivery from SA is explicitly 
recorded in this world, and similarly that SA bears an obligation to deliver, although 
this world does not explicitly record that BA’s order is valid. As we explained earlier, 
if we employ Constrained Default Logic the assumptions employed by an agent at 
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some time point constrain its future inferences, as we require joint consistency of 
assumptions. Moreover, if we use Stratified Default Logic, we ensure that 
assumptions are employed in a rational sequence, knowledge about causal relations 
between rules is preserved, and the agent resorts to assumptions only when it really 
has to do so. 
10.3.3 Non-monotonic Reasoning (3H) 
Consider, again the same initial knowledge and the same set of rules in H, R and A 
sets, for the agreement between BA and SA, but, now, with the restriction that if some 
agent is a known debtor, then all obligations that hold towards it are terminated, from 
the time point at which it becomes known that the agent is a debtor, onwards. 
PCBA = Out(0) BA  = { Clipped(time1, Obligation(agent1, agent2, action(agent1, agent2), time2), time2) ←      
                                                                                                                            HoldsAt(IsADebtor(agent2), time1) ∧  time1<time2     } 
With WBA = { Happens(BA, AOrder(BA, SA), T) } BA may, initially, perform both no-risk and best-
guess reasoning by employing assumptions as shown above. Now imagine that a later 
time point Τ’, BA is informed that SA is a debtor, i.e. HoldsAt(IsADebtor(SA), T’) is added in its 
knowledge base. This new information affects its previously drawn conclusion. In 
this case, BA needs to traverse the lattices downwards in order to retract its earlier 
assumptions and conclusions, and, if necessary, to choose alternative default 
formulations, compatible with its current, updated, knowledge.   
10.3.4 Conflict Management 
Consider, again the same set of rules in R and A sets, for an agreement, but, now, 
between a seller agent SA and two buyer agents BA’, i.e. a regular client, and BA’’, i.e. a 
new client. For SA, the initial information H may define conflicting obligations, i.e., SA 
may possess knowledge that, BA’ ordered from SA at time point T’ and BA’’ ordered from 
SA at time point T’’ > T’: 
HSA = { Happens(BA’, AOrder(BA’, SA), T’), Happens(BA’’, AOrder(BA’’, SA), T’’) } 
Thus, SA may find itself in a conflicting state at time point T1>T’’>T’ (intra-extension 
conflict) where two conflicting obligations are active by employing in its inference 
the defaults DR1’, DR1’’, DA1’ and DA1’’, respectively, and by computing the In and Out sets as 
shown below: 
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DR1’ ≡ 
         Happens(BA’, AOrder(BA’,SA), T’) 
        : true 
        / Initiates(AOrder(BA’, SA), Obligation(SA,BA’,ADelivery(SA,BA’), T’+10), T’) 
DA1’ ≡ 
         Happens(BA’, AOrder(BA’, SA), T’ ), Initiates(AOrder(BA’,SA),Obligation(SA,BA’,ADelivery(SA,BA’),T’+10),T’) 
        : ¬Clipped(T’, Obligation(SA, BA’, ADelivery(SA, BA’), T’+10),Τ1), HoldsAt(Valid(BA’, AOrder(BA’, SA)), T’ ), T’ < Τ1 
        / HoldsAt(Obligation(SA, BA’, ADelivery(SA, BA’), T’+10), Τ1) 
DR1’’ ≡ 
         Happens(BA’’, AOrder(BA’’,SA), T’’) 
        : true 
        / Initiates(AOrder(BA’’, SA), Obligation(SA,BA’’,ADelivery(SA,BA’’), T’’+10), T’’) 
DA1’’ ≡ 
         Happens(BA’’, AOrder(BA’’, SA), T’’ ), Initiates(AOrder(BA’’,SA),Obligation(SA,BA’’,ADelivery(SA,BA’’),T’’+10),T’’) 
        : ¬Clipped(T’’, Obligation(SA, BA’’, ADelivery(SA, BA’’), T’’+10),Τ1), HoldsAt(Valid(BA’’, AOrder(BA’’, SA)), T’’ ), T’’ < Τ1 
        / HoldsAt(Obligation(SA, BA’’, ADelivery(SA, BA’’), T’’+10), Τ1) 
In(4) SA = WSA ∪ {     Initiates(AOrder(BA’, SA), Obligation(SA, BA’, ADelivery(SA, BA’), T’+10), T’),      
                                 Initiates(AOrder(BA’’, SA), Obligation(SA, BA’’, ADelivery(SA, BA’’), T’’+10), T’’), 
                                 HoldsAt(Obligation(SA, BA’, ADelivery(SA, BA’), T’+10),Τ1) ,    
                                 HoldsAt(Obligation(SA, BA’’, ADelivery(SA, BA’’), T’’+10),Τ1)                                } 
Out(4) SA = WSA ∪ {     Clipped(T’, Obligation(SA, BA’, ADelivery(SA, BA’), T’+10), Τ1), 
                                    Clipped(T’’, Obligation(SA, BA’’, ADelivery(SA, BA’’), T’’+10), Τ1), 
                                     ¬ HoldsAt(Valid(BA’, AOrder(BA’, SA)), T’ ), ¬ (T’< Τ1) , 
                                     ¬ HoldsAt(Valid(BA’’, AOrder(BA’’, SA)), T’’ ), ¬ (T’’< Τ1)                                     } 
As discussed in section 9.5, in this scenario, there is information that can be used to 
determine different conflict resolution criteria. According to the strategy of 
temporality, based on external time, we may give priority to the obligation stated in 
DA1’ as it was initiated first. This is possible via the use of the PDfL and the general 
pattern for ascribing priorities dynamically: 
Rule(d1,v1)∧Rule(d2,v2)∧criterion 
: 
assumptions 
d1<d2 
Recall that, d1, d2 are variables that denote names of ground defaults; Rule(d1 ,v1) 
denotes a ground default d1 and its set of entities of interest v1. Specifically, for the 
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above case the following ground default could give precedence to the obligation 
stated in DA1’: 
Rule(DA1’,T’), Rule(DA1’’,T’’), T’< T’’ 
: 
true 
DA1’ < DA1’’ 
Alternative, using the strategy of hierarchy, we may give precedence to DA1’, 
because BA’, as a regular client, takes precedence over BA’’, i.e.: 
Rule(DA1’,BA’), Rule(DA1’’,BA’’), RegularClient(BA’) 
: 
true 
DA1’ < DA1’’ 
Or, we may give precedence to DA1’’, because BA’’, as a new client, takes precedence 
over BA’, because it is possible to become a regular client, i.e.: 
Rule(DA1’,BA’), Rule(DA1’’,BA’’), ¬RegularClient(BA’’) 
: 
BecomeRegularClient(BA’’) 
DA1’’ < DA1’ 
It is clear that various combinations of these criteria may also be defined based on 
the agent’s current knowledge and the assumptions it makes. 
10.4 Related Work and Summary 
A representation in Event Calculus, allows us to establish what each party is 
obliged (or permitted, forbidden, empowered) to do at a given time point.  It also 
allows us to determine whether each party complies with the agreement, and what, if 
any, reparatory mechanisms are stipulated, should violations arise. We may, also, spot 
potential conflicts, for example if such a query returns that a particular agent is both 
obliged and forbidden to perform a specific action at the same time.  
This representation, though, does not allow us to reason with incomplete 
knowledge dynamically. Towards this scope we argued that e-contracts could be 
represented as DfT that are constructed automatically from initial Event Calculus-
based contract representations. Of course, there are other temporal languages to 
reason with time, actions and their effects, (for example,  [219, 55, 56, 218, 217]) or 
other research approaches to reason with time and actions or with incomplete 
knowledge that adopt an e-contract representation in EC, (for example, [166, 17, 79, 
211, 143, 261, 111, 187, 191] among others). These approaches were reviewed and 
discussed in detail in chapters 4 and 8.  
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Research discussed in this chapter has been published or is under review in [91, 90, 
92, 95, 98, 86]. 
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11 Conclusions 
This thesis presented work conducted within a project that is concerned with 
knowledge representation and common-sense reasoning in an open computational 
environment, populated by software agents, whose interactions are regulated by 
electronic agreements, i.e. e-contracts. Agents in such environments will need to be 
able to monitor their interactions with other agents against the agreements that they 
are involved in, in order to determine what actions to perform and when.  
Specifically, this thesis focused on issues such as: (i) the agent will need to 
establish factual or prescriptive information, that is, given a history of events, what 
factual information is established and what norms are active for each party, (ii) if the 
history of events is incomplete, or if the agent possesses incomplete or inconsistent 
domain knowledge, or if the agent needs to plan its future activities, reasoning needs 
to employ assumptions; if more information become available later, rendering some 
of these assumptions false, any conclusions drawn will need to be retracted, and (iii) 
whether normative conflicts arise for the agent, that is, whether it finds itself in a 
situation where it bears norms that it cannot fulfill simultaneously. 
Such reasoning is essential in: 
• autonomous multi-agent systems and robotic systems, where systems need to 
manage the degree of their autonomicity and rationality. We believe that this 
is possible by managing appropriately the assumptions they employ, and 
correspondingly their actions.  
• legal systems where obligations, permissions, prohibitions hold and violations 
and conflicts arise. In such situations we may need to establish or to assume 
that certain actions will occur or have occurred, or that certain causal relations 
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will be effected in the environment, or that agents bear a certain normative 
status (obligations, permissions, prohibitions, powers) towards other agents, in 
order to plan future activities or avoid undesirable situations. 
• autonomic computing, where systems are self-regulated, self-monitoring and 
self-configured. Using the ideas presented in this thesis, systems may develop 
for themselves the laws and strategies according to which they regulate their 
behaviour and make their own inferences by relying on their own strategy. 
• commercial applications, e.g. e-contracts, service level agreements, 
negotiation, and semantic web applications, such as service composition, 
where systems may compute possible worlds on the basis of different 
hypothetical scenaria in order to model check, verify and monitor services. 
This chapter is organized as follows: section 11.1 provides a brief review of the 
work presented in this thesis; section 11.2 provides a listed view of the contributions 
of this thesis and its relation to other research approaches; and finally, section 11.3 
presents directions for future research.  
11.1 Summary 
In order to establish the state of the business exchange, i.e. factual and prescriptive 
information, given the actions that parties perform or omit to perform, we employed a 
representation of the agreement in Event Calculus [149]. Specifically, we adapted the 
simple Event Calculus formalism presented in [169]. The agreement representation in 
Event Calculus, allows us to establish what each party is obliged (or permitted, 
forbidden, empowered) to do at a given time point. It also allows us to determine 
whether each party complies with the agreement, and what, if any, reparatory 
mechanisms are stipulated, should violations arise. This representation, though, does 
not allow us to reason with incomplete knowledge dynamically. 
Therefore, on the basis of such a representation and in order to enable and support 
agents that perform dynamic and adaptive reasoning, we were inspired by Reiter’s 
Default Logic [208]. Generally, we discussed two reasons why it is useful for an 
agent to be able to reason on a dynamic basis. First, an agent may not know 
everything about the past and the present and thus the dynamic production of 
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assumptions is needed in order to explain a given situation. Moreover, the agent may 
wish to plan its future activities on the assumption that certain events/actions will 
occur, and that certain causal relations will be effected, or that its partners’ actions 
will be valid. In both cases we are interested in making specific assumptions about 
the truth of certain formulae in order to infer hypothetical possible worlds. Second, 
priorities over contract rules should be defined and reconsidered dynamically by 
specifying domain-dependent criteria. 
Towards these directions, a representation of e-contracts, and generally, a 
representation of open computational environments, as Default Theories was 
proposed. Our approach were inspired by the syntax and semantics of Default Logic, 
without however resorting to proof, which is notably computationally hard. We chose 
Default Logic for three reasons:  
• The syntax of Default Logic offers an intuitive way to represent separately 
what is known, what is assumed and what is concluded on the basis of this 
knowledge and assumptions; the schema of Default Logic rules comprises 
three distinct parts, namely prerequisites, justifications and consequents.  
• The semantics of Default Logic and its variations offers a way to reason non-
monotonically by preserving the relation of an assumption and any inferences 
drawn on its basis (in the sense of argumentation [198]) and to maintain 
consistency and rationality.  
• Implementation is feasible without resorting to theorem proving, but, by 
resorting to set manipulation, i.e. by maintaining syntactically consistent sets 
of formulae, whose conditions part (prerequisites and justifications) is 
interpreted conjunctively and the conclusions part (consequent) is interpreted 
disjunctively, as in sequent calculus. 
The final environment representation in Default Logic results as the outcome of 
the reconstruction of the e-contract’s initial Event Calculus-based representation. 
Specifically, each formula of the initial representation is mapped into one of the 
corresponding possible default rules. We presented a first proposal for the dynamic 
theory construction, but this was computationally unacceptable, since it requires an 
agent to attempt to prove literals from its knowledge base, in order to decide whether 
to use them in the prerequisite or the justification part of each default that it 
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constructs. In other words, the agent needs to attempt to prove literals (and fail in 
doing so) in order to determine which of these are candidate assumptions. In order to 
overcome this limitation we presented an alternative procedure by which an agent 
may determine assumptions dynamically and consequently construct the theory. This 
technique does not require the agent to prove literals from its current knowledge base, 
and therefore, it is suitable for implementation. 
The main idea of the second proposal is the organization of all possible mappings 
of each initial contract rule into default rules in a hierarchical multi-level structure. 
Each level of the constructed structure contains one or more of the possible defaults, 
depending on the number of assumptions that these defaults employ. Of course, 
contracts (and normative systems in general) contain multiple rules, for each of which 
a structure may be constructed. Hence, a theory representation of an environment 
consists of a set of logic formulae that represent initially available knowledge, and a 
set of structures, each containing the possible formulations of a contract rule as a 
default rule.  
First, we considered these structures, which denote what we called the single-
norm knowledge/hypothesis space, to be represented as triangles and to be parsed 
upwards sequentially. Thus, the inference process starts from the ground level of the 
set of structures, which contain only justification-free defaults, by applying as many 
as possible given the agent’s current knowledge. When there are no further defaults 
that can be applied in a level, this signals that assumptions are needed in order to 
proceed, and inference continues by examining defaults that lie in the next levels 
upwards.  
Then, we re-introduce this incremental technique in a manner that enables agents 
to ‘develop for themselves the laws and strategies according to which they regulate 
their behaviour (in the spirit of [219]) and to ‘make their own inferences and 
reasoning and to rely on their own conclusions’ (in the spirit of [40]). It turned out 
that the knowledge/hypothesis space is, in fact, a lattice. At any particular time point 
the agent may position itself on it, given the explicit knowledge that it currently 
possesses, i.e. without resorting to proof. Once the agent has positioned itself on this 
lattice, it finds out what assumptions are related to the node it occupies and may 
employ them in its reasoning. As the agent’s knowledge changes over time, and 
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consequently as its assumption needs change, the agent re-positions itself on the 
lattice by moving on it from node to node. The mathematical properties of the lattice 
structure that we used in order to represent knowledge/hypothesis spaces, first, 
suggests that an implementation is also feasible, relying only on set manipulation 
rather than proof, and, second, facilitates hypothetical nonmonotonic reasoning. 
Moreover, we noted that, for an agent that employs assumptions in full freedom 
may be risky and unsafe or may lead to counter-intuitive and inconsistent worlds. 
Thus a technique that enables agents to control and adjust their hypotheses was 
presented. Specifically, we discussed the way Default Logic syntax, semantics and 
major variations are really helpful towards this scope.  
Finally, this thesis addressed the issues of conflicts detection and dynamic 
conflict resolution. A set of primitive conflict patterns was presented and some 
patterns of normative conflict that have not been identified in other proposals were 
identified. We discussed how the proposed contract representation allows agents to 
detect conflicts by examining theory extensions. In general, a potential conflict arises 
when there are multiple extensions of a theory that represents a contract, and one of 
them contains a proposition that conflicts with a proposition contained in another, the 
so called inter-extension conflicts. Conflicts may also arise even when there is a 
single extension of the theory, if it contains conflicting propositions, the so called 
intra-extension conflicts. The detection of inter-extension conflicts is useful for an 
agent, which finds itself in a state that is not, yet, problematic, and has alternative 
courses of action to consider. The agent must decide upon a specific course of action 
– some way of preventing the potential conflicts from ever arising is required. The 
detection of intra-extension conflicts, on the other hand, essentially informs the agent 
that it is already or will be, in a problematic state. Again the agent needs a way to 
resolve the conflict and decide which norm to satisfy in a way that minimizes the 
damage done – since, unavoidably, some norm will be violated. Conflict resolution in 
our approach is performed using Brewka’s [30] proposal on prioritized theories that 
enables us to define and apply priorities on default rules. What makes prioritized 
theories really useful is that the ascription of priorities to default rules may, itself, be 
done dynamically. Using dynamic priorities, we generated preferred extensions, each 
of which indicates a transaction plan. Priorities amongst ground defaults may be 
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defined dynamically either by making different assumptions or by specifying domain-
dependent criteria. In this manner, we managed conflicts in a variety of ways, by 
specifying different criteria, such as hierarchies of entities of interest, time, specificity 
of norms, minimality or utility factors. 
To sum up and regarding the requirements for knowledge representation and the 
specifications for a tool implementation that we identified in chapter 4, this thesis 
addresses requirements R2, R3, R4, R5, R7 and R8. Moreover, it establishes the need 
for requirement R10 in e-contracting frameworks and proposed a technique for 
hypothetical nonmonotonic reasoning towards the direction of requirements R9 and 
R10. 
11.2 Contributions and Work in Context 
The main contributions of this thesis are as follows: 
• A critical review on various approaches on e-contract representation and 
performance monitoring. Through this analysis, first, we identified 
requirements that a representation of electronic agreements should meet, in 
order to facilitate the development of tools for contract performance 
monitoring, and second, helped us to review literature that is related to 
contract representation and contract performance monitoring and to identify 
which requirements each approach deals with.  
• Identification of explicit research questions (1H - 3H) that arise in open norm-
governed environment, where agents seek to establish missing information. 
The Open Default Assumption and the Dynamic Default Logic were presented 
in order to enable agents to common-sense reason within this setting. 
• Two initial approaches to assumption-based reasoning within an open 
normative system were presented along with algorithms and a system 
architecture that support the implementation of a prototype.  
• A revision of the initial approaches to assumption-based reasoning. The new 
proposal deals with hypothetical reasoning along with non-monotonic 
reasoning. The proposed technique enable agents to manage their reasoning 
(i.e. to maintain consistency, to restrict the assumptions they employ and to 
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entail rational conclusions) via the use of appropriate symbolic and schematic 
representations (i.e. lattices) of whatever knowledge agents possess and 
whatever knowledge agents ignore and may, possible, employ as assumptions. 
Through this attempt we have identified the role of assumption discovery in 
agents’ autonomous reasoning. 
• A critical analysis on various perspectives of normative conflicts management 
was made. This analysis: identified a set of primitive patterns for normative 
conflicts; showed how the conflicts identified by other researchers may be 
seen as instances of these primitives; identified some patterns of normative 
conflicts that have not been identified in other proposals. Moreover, we 
showed that the representation of contractual norms as default rules facilitates 
both conflict detection and resolution, first, by showing the way conflicts may 
be detected (i.e. inter-extension or intra-extension conflicts), and second, by 
showing how various strategies on conflicts resolution (i.e. hierarchy, 
temporality, specificity, quantitative or qualitative minimality of assumptions, 
utility factor) may apply in our approach. 
Consequently, the consideration of this thesis into the research area of Artificial 
Intelligence is as follows: 
• Regarding to the assumption-based reasoning approaches this thesis proposed 
a technique for the dynamic identification and usage of appropriate 
assumptions without resorting to a pre-specified pool of assumptions, or to a 
goal-oriented manner or even deductive proof. As discussed in chapter 8, 
some of the previous approaches to assumption-based reasoning rely on the 
use of a pre-specified pool of assumptions, from which the agent must choose 
appropriate ones, whenever it identifies an information gap and needs to fill it, 
in order to proceed with its reasoning. We believe that it is unrealistic to 
expect that candidate assumptions can be identified in advance. It may be the 
case that in some application domains this is possible. However, in such cases, 
candidate assumption identification is not really dynamic, rather selection of 
an appropriate assumption from the pre-specified pool, may be carried out 
dynamically during the inference process. This selection though, requires 
deductive proof, which is notably computationally expensive. Other 
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approaches that purport to support dynamic identification of assumptions, rely 
on finding appropriate assumptions in a goal-driven manner, that is, a 
particular conclusion that the agent wants to derive is given, and then the 
agent identifies the assumptions that are required, in order for this conclusion 
to be derivable. In some cases, such goal-driven identification of candidate 
assumptions requires proof. But more importantly, the problem that we 
perceive with purely goal-driven assumption identification is the following: 
although software agents, in general, are inherently goal-driven in planning 
their activity, their rationality (and consequently their performance measures) 
depends on the extent to which they are perceptive of their environment, so 
that they may exploit changes in it. A purely goal-driven identification of 
candidate assumptions does not leave much room for the agent to adapt to 
circumstances.  
• Regarding to the non-monotonic reasoning approaches for e-contracting this 
thesis focuses on the unavoidable changes of the world and the vital changes 
of the initial considerations, i.e. the dynamics of theories. As discussed in 
chapter 8, some of the previous approaches to non-monotonic reasoning 
require that an agent needs: to define abnormal events, effects of actions and 
the like, explicitly, and, also, to distinguish each abnormal individual from 
other individuals, explicitly;  to decide a priori what conclusion it wants to 
derive, in order to be able to identify which assumptions are essential to make, 
in order to be able to actually derive it; to determine, a priori, during the 
construction of the rule base, what is and what is not defeasible. In this thesis, 
we followed a more open consideration and require theories where the agent is 
able to decide in an ad hoc manner whether a condition of a norm is defeasible 
or not. 
• Regarding to the dynamics of the Default Theory, as discussed in chapters 5 
and 8, some approaches focus on changing facts and constraints while defaults 
remain unchanged, while other approaches introduce actions to model the 
attempt to jump to conclusions on the basis of a set of beliefs via the use of 
supernormal defaults. Our approach is close to the latter approach, but we see 
that rule reformulation towards assumption employment, compared to belief 
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generation via interspersed rules, affords us the ability to directly relate 
conclusions with employed assumptions in in the sense of argumentation 
[198] which consequently facilitates nonmonotonicity and autonomy. 
• Regarding to the issue of autonomous agency, as discussed in chapters 7 and 
8, earlier work on autonomy focused on its relation to an agent’s goals, i.e. on 
the extent to which an agent could choose its goals and pursue them without 
external intervention and more recently, autonomy is examined in relation to 
an agent’s reasoning process in general. In this thesis, we focused on the most 
recent perspective. Our agent is expected to make inferences about which 
beliefs to adopt about its environment, other agents and norms in force, which 
goals to commit to, and which actions to perform, in the presence of 
incomplete or inconsistent information, and it is expected to be independent 
from external intervention in this reasoning process. We believe that the 
degree to which an agent's reasoning is autonomous is affected by the degree 
to which it is able to choose its assumptions autonomously. We claimed that 
an agent that answers the hypothetical reasoning problem, addresses also the 
autonomy problem, i.e. an agent that possesses self-knowledge and is self-
regulated and self-managed. 
• Regarding to the issue of conflict management, as discussed in chapter 9, this 
thesis provided a vital critical survey on various analyses of normative 
conflicts that were found in the literature of distributed systems, legal 
reasoning and multi-agent interaction. We showed that all conflicts that were 
identified, from a variety of perspectives, may be seen as instances of some 
patterns. Finally, regarding to conflict resolution, contrary to other approaches 
to e-contracting, we used priorities among rules that where assigned 
dynamically either by making different assumptions or by specifying domain-
dependent criteria.  
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11.3 Future Work 
This section provides directions for future research for both theoretical and 
practical issues and other potential applications of the proposals presented in this 
thesis. 
The first in line of future work seems to be the implementation of a robust 
complete system that will combine all the ideas presented in this thesis. In chapter 6, 
we discussed a prototype and technologies towards the application of our initial 
proposal to assumption-based reasoning within the settings of a dynamic normative 
system. Latter, in chapter 7, we re-introduced our proposal in a more sophisticated 
manner and discussed vital changes on our first approach. This fact calls for the 
extension of the prototype in order to support knowledge management and 
hypothetical nonmonotonic reasoning as proposed in chapter 7. Additionally, towards 
knowledge management and the implementation of a complete framework, we could 
apply the techniques for conflict detection and conflict resolution as proposed in 
chapter 9. 
In this thesis, we discussed the way an atheist agent reasons with incomplete 
knowledge, i.e. an information gap is treated as negative information, and moreover, 
we enhanced the need for agnostic agents, i.e. agents that treat information gaps for 
what they are (absence of definite information) as potentially positive information. 
Consequently, regarding the various ways an agent could entail conclusions in 
realistic scenaria and towards the theoretical extension of our proposals, it comes 
natural the need to identify criteria and metrics that will enable agents to decide 
whether it is essential for their reasoning with incomplete/inconsistent/conflicting 
knowledge to proceed on a hypothetical basis, i.e. to employ either negative or 
positive assumptions in order to fill in information gaps by accepting some risk, 
instead of standing still in their environment and performing nothing due to their lack 
of explicit knowledge. Such an extension can provide a robust approach to 
hypothetical non-monotonic reasoning via the use of quantitative reasoning 
approaches along with qualitative reasoning approaches. 
Also, we want to explore a richer representation, where: dynamic assumption 
generation and deployment is applied to agents’ beliefs, desires, intentions, roles, 
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policies and the like; norms are represented using more expressive versions of Event 
Calculus [183] or other temporal/action languages, such as C/C+ [103, 101, 151].  
Since, the relation of Reiter’s Default Logic to other approaches to non-monotonic 
reasoning is known, another direction for future work is towards the examination of 
possible ways that the technique for dynamic identification and usage of hypotheses 
can be applied to other approaches to non-monotonic reasoning such as Logic 
Programs (with stable model [83] or answer set semantics  [84]) and Defeasible Logic 
[187]. Of course, we neither want to rely on goal-oriented processes nor to rely on 
approaches where defeasibility is predefined. For example, a potential application of 
the Open World Assumption to Defeasible Logic would be to consider all rules as 
defeasible rules. In this way, although, we facilitate dynamic reasoning without the 
need for pre-specified abnormalities, we see that we bound the reasoning capability of 
an agent. In our approach, we search for hypotheses among the components, i.e. 
conditions, of the rules. This gives an agent the ability to explicitly and accurately 
distinct knowledge from not-knowledge. 
Another point worth examining is the interpretation of open defaults. There are 
four major approaches (cf. [208, 155, 195, 137, 138]) to the semantics of open 
Default Theories. In chapter 7, we discussed why we adopted the approach proposed 
by Kaminski, i.e. we accepted the Domain Closure Assumption [137, 138] as putting 
the world in quarantine temporarily. In this case we accept a partially open 
environment, even temporarily. A question that arises is, whether this assumption is a 
restriction for an agent’s reasoning capability in a truly open system. 
Finally, towards the examination of other possible applications, we see that the 
ideas presented in this thesis could be used for further research in application areas 
that concern with: 
• the correctness of contracts [231, 188, 65] and, generally, with model 
checking of computational systems, where given a model of a system, it is 
required to test automatically whether this model meets a given specification 
under various pragmatic or hypothetical, possible conflicting, scenaria. 
• services composition and negotiation [232, 179, 203, 236], where an agent 
finds itself in a truly open environment and, realistically, possesses 
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incomplete knowledge. In such a setting, the agent unavoidably needs to 
employ assumptions. 
• autonomous robotic systems for both cooperative and antagonistic problems, 
and, generally autonomic computing applications [141, 235, 129], where 
systems are self-managed. In such settings system components and services 
need to: be verified during runtime, i.e. self-verification; collect and analyze 
data, and then react according to the results, i.e. self-monitor; be able to 
evolve dynamically in an open world, i.e. self-configuration, and, finally, 
detect, diagnose, and repair problems, i.e. self-protection and self-healing.   
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Appendix A Survey Summary on 
e-Contracting Frameworks 
In this appendix we provide a summary of surveyed approaches that have 
emerged during the last decade, are related to contract performance monitoring and 
are based on logic. Each approach is summarized with respect to (i) its goal and main 
aspects of interest, (ii) the recorded requirements for efficient reasoning with 
electronic contracts and (iii) its integration to Semantic Web and tool presentation.  
E-commerce 
• Santos and Carmo: [219] 
Goal and main aspects of interest: Compliance to the agreement. 
Ontology representation: Yes 
Temporal information representation: Dynamic operator for action and time. 
Deontic Modalities: Deontic Logic operators for Obligation and Prohibition. 
Legal and Physical ability: No. 
The representation of normative violation: Yes. 
Contrary to Duty Structures: No. 
Normative conflict representation and resolution: No.  
Auxiliary calculations: No. 
Default, Defeasible and Nonmonotonic Reasoning: No. 
Autonomous and Adaptive Reasoning: No. 
Integrated to Semantic Web: No. 
Tool: No. 
 
• Daskalopulu et al.: [55, 56] 
Goal and main aspects of interest: Temporal reasoning over deontic specifications. 
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Ontology representation: Yes. 
Temporal information representation: Modal Action Logic. 
Deontic Modalities: Deontic Logic operators for Obligation and Permission. 
Legal and Physical ability: Operator to represent Legal Power. 
The representation of normative violation: Yes.  
Contrary to Duty Structures: Yes. 
Normative conflict representation and resolution: No. 
Auxiliary calculations: No. 
Default, Defeasible and Nonmonotonic Reasoning: No. 
Autonomous and Adaptive Reasoning: No. 
Integrated to Semantic Web: No. 
Tool: No. 
 
• Sallé et al.: [217, 218, 216] 
Goal and main aspects of interest: Support the whole life-cycle of the contract. 
Ontology representation: Yes. 
Temporal information representation: Meyer’s Dynamic Logic. 
Deontic Modalities: Deontic Logic operators for Obligation, Permission and 
Prohibition. 
Legal and Physical ability: No. 
The representation of normative violation: Yes. 
Contrary to Duty Structures: Two types of sanctions are supported. 
Normative conflict representation and resolution: No. 
Auxiliary calculations: No. 
Default, Defeasible and Nonmonotonic Reasoning: No. 
Autonomous and Adaptive Reasoning: No. 
Integrated to Semantic Web: No. 
Tool: No. 
 
• Farrell et al.: [79] 
Goal and main aspects of interest: Contract state tracking for Service Level 
Agreements. 
Ontology representation: Yes. 
Temporal information representation: Event Calculus. 
Deontic Modalities: Deontic Logic operators for Obligation and Permission.  
Legal and Physical ability: Institutionalized Power. 
The representation of normative violation: This requirement can be met although it 
is not explicitly discussed.  
Contrary to Duty Structures: This requirement can be met although it is not 
explicitly discussed.  
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Normative conflict representation and resolution: No. 
Auxiliary calculations: Yes. 
Default, Defeasible and Nonmonotonic Reasoning: Although no specific 
discussion is made, this requirement can be met under various interpretations of 
Event Calculus. 
Autonomous and Adaptive Reasoning: No. 
Integrated to Semantic Web: ecXML 
Tool: Event Calculus State Tracking Architecture (ECSTA). 
 
• Knottenbelt and Clark: [143] 
Goal and main aspects of interest: Contract monitoring.  
Ontology representation: Yes. 
Temporal information representation: Event Calculus. 
Deontic Modalities: Deontic Logic operator only for Obligation. 
Legal and Physical ability: Institutionalized Power. 
The representation of normative violation: Yes. 
Contrary to Duty Structures: This requirement can be met although it is not 
explicitly discussed. 
Normative conflict representation and resolution: As noted, this requirement can 
be met through the BOID architecture as presented in [31], but it is not explicitly 
discussed. 
Auxiliary calculations: This requirement can be met although it is not explicitly 
discussed. 
Default, Defeasible and Nonmonotonic Reasoning: Although no specific 
discussion is made, this requirement can be met under various interpretations of 
Event Calculus. 
Autonomous and Adaptive Reasoning: No. 
Integrated to Semantic Web: No. 
Tool: A Prolog contract representation is given. 
 
• Grosof et al.: [112, 204, 113, 111, 22] 
Goal and main aspects of interest: Representation and execution of business rules 
in the WWW framework. Defeasibility. Priorities over rules. 
Ontology representation: Yes. 
Temporal information representation: No. 
Deontic Modalities: No. 
Legal and Physical ability: No. 
The representation of normative violation: Yes. 
Contrary to Duty Structures: No. 
Normative conflict representation and resolution: Mutual exclusion statements are 
defined for conflict detection. Static priorities over rules are defined for conflict 
resolution. 
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Auxiliary calculations: Yes. 
Default, Defeasible and Nonmonotonic Reasoning: Courteous Logic Programs 
(CLP) and Situated Courteous Logic Programs (SCLP).  
Autonomous and Adaptive Reasoning: No. 
Integrated to Semantic Web: Common Rules, Business Rules Markup Language 
(BRML). 
Tool: Yes. 
 
• Governatori et al.: [104, 105, 107] 
Goal and main aspects of interest: Defeasibility. Priorities over rules. Contrary to 
Duty Structures. 
Ontology representation: Yes. 
Temporal information representation: No temporal dimension is explicitly given 
but an extension to this direction is feasible as shown in [108, 106, 109]. 
Deontic Modalities: Deontic Logic Operators for Obligation and Permission. 
Legal and Physical ability: No. 
The representation of normative violation: Defeasible Deontic Logic of Violation 
(DDLV). 
Contrary to Duty Structures: Defeasible Deontic Logic of Violation (DDLV). 
Normative conflict representation and resolution: Incompatible literals are defined 
for conflict detection. Static priorities over rules are defined for conflict resolution. 
Auxiliary calculations: No. 
Default, Defeasible and Nonmonotonic Reasoning: Nute’s Defeasible Logic. 
Autonomous and Adaptive Reasoning: No. 
Integrated to Semantic Web: Yes. 
Tool: DR-Contract. 
 
• Paschke et al.: [191, 189, 190] 
Goal and main aspects of interest: Execution and monitoring of Service Level 
Agreements. 
Ontology representation: Yes. 
Temporal information representation: Event Calculus and Event-Condition-Action 
rules. 
Deontic Modalities: Deontic Logic operators for Obligation, Permission and 
Prohibition. An extension of Standard Deontic Logic with a role-based model and 
further logic formalisms is presented. 
Legal and Physical ability: No. 
The representation of normative violation: Yes. 
Contrary to Duty Structures: Yes. 
Normative conflict representation and resolution: Authorization Conflict 
(Permission vs Prohibition) and Obligation Conflicts (Obligation vs Prohibition) 
and other application specific conflicts seem to be considered. Nute’s Defeasible 
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Logic and Grosof’s Generalized Courteous Logic Programs (GCLP) are used for 
conflict resolution via rule prioritization. 
Auxiliary calculations: This requirement can be met although it is not explicitly 
discussed. 
Default, Defeasible and Nonmonotonic Reasoning: Nute’s Defeasible Logic and 
Grosof’s Generalized Courteous Logic Programs (GCLP). 
Autonomous and Adaptive Reasoning: No. 
Integrated to Semantic Web: Yes. 
Tool: ContractLog. 
 
• Xu: [257, 258, 259, 260] 
Goal and main aspects of interest: Specification of monitoring requirements for e-
marketplaces. Proactive monitoring and violation prevention. 
Ontology representation: Yes. 
Temporal information representation: Propositional Temporal Logic.  
Deontic Modalities: No (Commitment-based approach where a Commitment is not 
related to an Obligation). 
Legal and Physical ability: No. 
The representation of normative violation: Proactive violation detection and 
prevention is supported via commitment graphs.  
Contrary to Duty Structures: No. 
Normative conflict representation and resolution: No.  
Auxiliary calculations: No. 
Default, Defeasible and Nonmonotonic Reasoning: No. 
Autonomous and Adaptive Reasoning: No. 
Integrated to Semantic Web: No. 
Tool: No. 
 
• Yolum and Singh: [261], Chopra and Singh: [49], Desai et al.: [64], Udupi and 
Singh: [241] 
Goal and main aspects of interest: Specification and execution of protocols that 
regulate multi agent interactions. 
Ontology representation: Yes (Commitment-based approach where a Commitment 
functions like a directed Obligation). 
Temporal information representation: Event Calculus, C+. 
Deontic Modalities: Yes (Commitment-based approach). 
Legal and Physical ability: No. 
The representation of normative violation: Yes. Transformations are used to verify 
compliance.  
Contrary to Duty Structures: No. 
Normative conflict representation and resolution: No. 
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Auxiliary calculations: This requirement can be met although it is not explicitly 
discussed. 
Default, Defeasible and Nonmonotonic Reasoning: Circumscription, C+. 
Autonomous and Adaptive Reasoning: No. 
Integrated to Semantic Web: No. 
Tool: No. 
 
• Rouached et al.: [211, 212] 
Goal and main aspects of interest: Regulation of Web Services to support cross-
organizational collaborations. 
Ontology representation: Yes. 
Temporal information representation: Event Calculus.  
Deontic Modalities: Yes (Commitment-based approach where deontic clauses can 
be defined in terms of operations on commitments. Obligations, Permissions and 
Prohibitions are considered). 
Legal and Physical ability: No. 
The representation of normative violation: No. 
Contrary to Duty Structures: No. 
Normative conflict representation and resolution: No. 
Auxiliary calculations: This requirement can be met although it is not explicitly 
discussed. 
Default, Defeasible and Nonmonotonic Reasoning: No. 
Autonomous and Adaptive Reasoning: No. 
Integrated to Semantic Web: No. 
Tool: No. 
 
• Letia and Groza: [153], Vartic and Letia [244] 
Goal and main aspects of interest: Business agreement regulation by specifying 
sets of commitments. 
Ontology representation: Yes 
Temporal information representation: Temporalized Defeasible Logic. 
Deontic Modalities: Yes (Commitment-based approach where a commitment is 
considered to be identical to an obligation). 
Legal and Physical ability: No. 
The representation of normative violation: Yes (via attaching deadlines for 
fulfilment to each commitment). 
Contrary to Duty Structures: No. 
Normative conflict representation and resolution: No specific conflict patterns are 
recorded. Conflict resolution may be addressed via priority assignment over rules 
as used in Defeasible Logic. 
Auxiliary calculations: This requirement can be met although it is not explicitly 
discussed. 
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Default, Defeasible and Nonmonotonic Reasoning: Nute’s Defeasible Logic. 
Autonomous and Adaptive Reasoning: No. 
Integrated to Semantic Web: No. 
Tool: No. 
 
• Tan and Thoen: [238, 239] 
Goal and main aspects of interest: Linguistic perspective of e-contracts. Directed 
deontic modalities. 
Ontology representation: It deals with e-contracts from a linguistic perspective. 
Temporal information representation: Formal Language for Business 
Communication (FLBC) and Event Semantics. 
Deontic Modalities: Yes (Alternative definition for directed Obligation is 
presented and an alternative definition for directed Permission is proposed. 
Alternative interrelation from the one considered in Standard Deontic Logic is 
proposed). 
Legal and Physical ability: No. 
The representation of normative violation: No. 
Contrary to Duty Structures: No. 
Normative conflict representation and resolution: No. 
Auxiliary calculations: No. 
Default, Defeasible and Nonmonotonic Reasoning: No. 
Autonomous and Adaptive Reasoning: No. 
Integrated to Semantic Web: Yes. 
Tool: A Prolog contract rules representation is given. 
 
• Alberti et al.: [6, 7, 8] 
Goal and main aspects of interest: Monitoring and verification of e-contracts at 
run-time. Abductive Logic Programming. 
Ontology representation: No. 
Temporal information representation: Events, actions and time are represented in 
SCIFF logic language. 
Deontic Modalities: Yes. A mapping of deontic operators to abductive 
expectations is proposed. 
Legal and Physical ability: No. 
The representation of normative violation: Yes. 
Contrary to Duty Structures: No. 
Normative conflict representation and resolution: Yes. No specific normative 
conflict patterns are discussed.  
Auxiliary calculations: No. 
Default, Defeasible and Nonmonotonic Reasoning: No. We see that it is possible 
to address this requirement via the relation of Abductive Logic Programs with 
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
09/12/2017 01:19:12 EET - 137.108.70.7
Appendix A Survey Summary on e-Contracting Frameworks
 
 232
(general) Logic Programs (under stable model semantics [83]) or with extended 
Logic Programs (under answer sets [84]). 
Autonomous and Adaptive Reasoning: We see that Abduction Logic Programming 
can be used towards this scope. 
Integrated to Semantic Web: Yes. The encoding of SCIFF contract rules in 
RuleML is proposed. 
Tool: An inference engine called SCIFF Reasoning Engine (SRE) is given. 
 
• Giannikis and Daskalopulu: 
Goal and main aspects of interest: Nonmonotonic and Hypothetical reasoning with 
e-contracts. Conflict Detection and Resolution. 
Ontology representation: Yes. 
Temporal information representation: Event Calculus. 
Deontic Modalities: Deontic Logic Operators for Obligation, Permission and 
Prohibition. No specific Deontic Logic axiomatization is adopted. 
Legal and Physical ability: Operators for Institutionalized Power and Practical 
Ability. 
The representation of normative violation: Yes. 
Contrary to Duty Structures: This requirement can be met although it is not 
discussed in detail.  
Normative conflict representation and resolution: Conflict detection is possible by 
examining Default Logic extensions. Conflict resolution is possible using 
Brewka’s Prioritized Default Theory.  
Auxiliary calculations: This requirement can be met although it is not explicitly 
discussed. 
Default, Defeasible and Nonmonotonic Reasoning: Reiter’s Default Logic and its 
variations. 
Autonomous and Adaptive Reasoning: A technique that enables agents to 
reformulate the initial set of norms by identifying and employing appropriate 
candidate assumptions dynamically is proposed. 
Integrated to Semantic Web: Yes (XML norm representation). 
Tool: A prototype is presented. 
E-business 
• Davulcu et al.: [58, 59] 
Goal and main aspects of interest: Specification, analysis and scheduling of 
workflows. Manage adversarial situations.  
Ontology representation: Yes. 
Temporal information representation: Concurrent Transaction Logic (CTR) and 
CTR-S. 
Deontic Modalities: No. 
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Legal and Physical ability: No. 
The representation of normative violation: Yes. 
Contrary to Duty Structures: No. 
Normative conflict representation and resolution: No. 
Auxiliary calculations: No. 
Default, Defeasible and Nonmonotonic Reasoning: No. 
Autonomous and Adaptive Reasoning: No. 
Integrated to Semantic Web: Although this work proposes a logic to specify 
contracts in Semantic Web Services, no direct formalizations or technologies are 
discussed towards the integration to Semantic Web.  
Tool: No. 
 
• Marjanovic and Milosevic: [167] 
Goal and main aspects of interest: E-contract modelling. Temporal and Deontic 
Constraints. Role windows. Time maps. 
Ontology representation: Yes. 
Temporal information representation: Various time operators and temporal 
constraints are defined for the Reference Model of Open Distributed Processing 
(RM-ODP). 
Deontic Modalities: Deontic Logic operators for Obligation, Permission and 
Prohibition. 
Legal and Physical ability: No. 
The representation of normative violation: Yes. 
Contrary to Duty Structures: No. 
Normative conflict representation and resolution: Deontic inconsistencies are 
detected through role windows.  
Auxiliary calculations: No. 
Default, Defeasible and Nonmonotonic Reasoning: No. 
Autonomous and Adaptive Reasoning: No. 
Integrated to Semantic Web: No. 
Tool: No. 
 
• Lubwig and Stolze: [162] 
Goal and main aspects of interest: Model and manage contractual content. 
Promise. 
Ontology representation: Yes. 
Temporal information representation: Yes (no specific temporal logic is adopted). 
Deontic Modalities: Yes (Obligations and Rights are considered, Simple 
Obligations and Rights Model (SORM)). 
Legal and Physical ability: No. 
The representation of normative violation: Yes. 
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
09/12/2017 01:19:12 EET - 137.108.70.7
Appendix A Survey Summary on e-Contracting Frameworks
 
 234
Contrary to Duty Structures: Although no specific discussion is made, obligation 
dynamics may be addressed via the proposed actions that modify (add, remove, 
change) obligation sets. 
Normative conflict representation and resolution: No. 
Auxiliary calculations: Yes. 
Default, Defeasible and Nonmonotonic Reasoning: No. 
Autonomous and Adaptive Reasoning: No. 
Integrated to Semantic Web: No. 
Tool: No. 
 
• Cardoso and Oliveira: [33, 34, 35] 
Goal and main aspects of interest: Dynamic Electronic Institutions. Institutional 
reality. Norm modelling for contracts establishment, monitoring and enforcement. 
Ontology representation: Yes. 
Temporal information representation: Yes (Timestamps, no specific temporal logic 
is adopted). 
Deontic Modalities: Yes (Directed Obligations are considered). 
Legal and Physical ability: Yes (Brute and Institutional facts). 
The representation of normative violation: Yes. 
Contrary to Duty Structures: Yes. CTD structures are modelled as “default rules” 
by defining default clauses for CTD situations. 
Normative conflict representation and resolution: No. 
Auxiliary calculations: No. 
Default, Defeasible and Nonmonotonic Reasoning: No. 
Autonomous and Adaptive Reasoning: No. 
Integrated to Semantic Web: Yes (XML norm representation).  
Tool: No. 
Virtual Communities 
• Dellarocas: [63] 
Goal and main aspects of interest: Social Contracts for multi agent society control. 
Ontology representation: Yes. 
Temporal information representation: No. 
Deontic Modalities: No. 
Legal and Physical ability: No. 
The representation of normative violation: Yes. 
Contrary to Duty Structures: Yes (via the definition of positive and negative 
sanctions). 
Normative conflict representation and resolution: No. 
Auxiliary calculations: Yes. 
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Default, Defeasible and Nonmonotonic Reasoning: No. 
Autonomous and Adaptive Reasoning: No. 
Integrated to Semantic Web: No. 
Tool: Contractual Agent Societies (CAS). 
 
• Dignum et al.: [70, 69, 71] 
Goal and main aspects of interest: Social Contracts for multi agent society 
regulation. 
Ontology representation: Yes. 
Temporal information representation: Temporal and Deontic Logic (BTLcont) and 
the branching-time temporal logic (CTL*). 
Deontic Modalities: Deontic Logic expressions for Obligations and Conditional 
Obligations with deadlines are considered. 
Legal and Physical ability: No. 
The representation of normative violation: Yes. 
Contrary to Duty Structures: Yes. 
Normative conflict representation and resolution: Role-based conflicts are 
represented and considered. 
Auxiliary calculations: No. 
Default, Defeasible and Nonmonotonic Reasoning: No. 
Autonomous and Adaptive Reasoning: No. 
Integrated to Semantic Web: No. 
Tool: Organizations per Agents (OperA). 
 
• Boella and van der Torre: [23], Broersen et al.: [31] 
Goal and main aspects of interest: Social Contracts for multi agent society 
regulation. Conflicts between Beliefs, Obligations, Intentions and Desires. 
Ontology representation: Yes. 
Temporal information representation: No. 
Deontic Modalities: Only Obligations are considered along with Beliefs, Intentions 
and Desires (BDI-based approach). 
Legal and Physical ability: No. 
The representation of normative violation: Yes.  
Contrary to Duty Structures: Yes (via the definition of sanctions). 
Normative conflict representation and resolution: Patterns of conflicts between 
Beliefs, Obligations, Intentions and Desires are presented. Conflict resolution is 
capable via priorities assignment among mental states. 
Auxiliary calculations: No. 
Default, Defeasible and Nonmonotonic Reasoning: Although contact rules are 
represented as Reiter’s normal default rules to facilitate conflict detection between 
beliefs, desires, intentions and obligations, no specific discussion on 
nonmonotonic reasoning is given. 
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Autonomous and Adaptive Reasoning: No. 
Integrated to Semantic Web: No. 
Tool: A Prolog prototype is given. 
 
• Wooldridge and van der Hoek: [256], Ågotnes et al.: [5], Walther et al.: [251] 
Goal and main aspects of interest: Social Contracts for multi agent society 
regulation. Link among ability and obligations. Explicit Agent Strategies are 
considered. 
Ontology representation: Yes. 
Temporal information representation: Variations of Alternating-time Temporal 
Logic (ATL) and Computational Tree Logic (CTL). 
Deontic Modalities: Indexed Deontic Logic operators for Obligations and 
Permissions are considered (Kripke semantics). 
Legal and Physical ability: No. 
The representation of normative violation: No. 
Contrary to Duty Structures: No. 
Normative conflict representation and resolution: No. 
Auxiliary calculations: No. 
Default, Defeasible and Nonmonotonic Reasoning: No. 
Autonomous and Adaptive Reasoning: No. 
Integrated to Semantic Web: No. 
Tool: No. 
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
09/12/2017 01:19:12 EET - 137.108.70.7
Symbolic Representations and Common-sense Reasoning in Open Multi-agent Systems
 
 237
 
Appendix B Standard Deontic 
Logic and Conflict Management 
We mentioned in chapter 9 that if one accepts Standard Deontic Logic then some 
of the conflict patterns that we presented are mapped onto others. Here we explain 
this further, and discuss why we find the adoption of such an axiomatization 
undesirable. 
According to SDL the following inter-definability relations hold among operators 
for Obligation (O), Permission (P) and Prohibition (F): 
It is obligatory that a: Oa 
It is permitted that a: Pa ≡ ¬O¬a 
It is prohibited that a: Fa ≡ ¬Pa ≡ O¬a 
In Table B.1 we show the conflict patterns that arise, if one adopts an SDL 
axiomatization. As can be seen from this table, under SDL inter-definability of 
operators, we may consider that only three primitive conflict patterns arise, i.e. type 
A, type D and type E. 
We noted in chapter 9 that in the representation of norms as default theories the 
conflict pattern A never actually arises in an extension, because the derivation of 
extensions preserves consistency. But, this does not hold for pattern B1, which is 
possible even as an inter-extension conflict. If we accept the inter-definability of 
Deontic operators, pattern B1 essentially collapses and becomes pattern A. Hence, B1 
will never actually arise in an extension.  
Adopting an SDL axiomatization of Deontic operators seems, thus, to lead to 
some sort of a priori pruning of potential normative conflicts. We find this 
undesirable, because it seems unrealistic to assume that fewer normative conflicts 
may arise for agents in a virtual environment, than in real world situations. We prefer, 
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therefore, to maintain a more discriminating representation, which can express more 
conflict patterns, so that these may be detected and eventually resolved appropriately. 
[160] 
 
Table B.1 Conflict patterns with and without SDL axiomatization 
Pattern Type Without SDL With SDL 
A 
(Oa    vs  ¬Oa) 
or 
(NNa    vs  ¬NNa) 
(Oa  vs ¬Oa) 
or 
 (NNa    vs  ¬NNa) 
B1 (Fa   vs  Pa) (Ob  vs ¬Ob) if b ≡ ¬a  is assumed 
B2 
(Fa   vs  Oa) (Oa  vs O¬a) 
or 
 (Oa  vs Ob) 
if b ≡ ¬a  is assumed 
C (Oa    vs   O¬a) (Oa  vs Ob) if b ≡ ¬a  is assumed 
D (PWa  vs Fa)23 - 
E (Oa    vs Ob) (Oa  vs Ob) 
F 
(Oa   vs ¬Pa) (Oa  vs O¬a)  
or   
(Oa  vs Ob) 
if b ≡ ¬a  is assumed 
                                                 
23 Here, PWa denotes that it is empowered that a 
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